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Supporting longer term development in crises at the nexus

Lessons from Somalia report
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Executive summary

This Somalia country report contributes to a multi-country study focusing on the role of development actors in addressing people’s longer term needs, risks and vulnerabilities and supporting operationalisation of the humanitarian–development–peace (HDP) nexus. This is pertinent to the Covid-19 response, involving both immediate lifesaving assistance and longer term support for health systems, socioeconomic impacts and peacebuilding.

This report aims to improve understanding of how development actors operate in Somalia and their current and potential role in addressing the longer term needs, risks and vulnerabilities of crisis-affected populations. It explores the extent to which development actors work alongside or in complementarity with humanitarian and peace actors at the strategic, programmatic and institutional levels. It identifies examples of good practice, lessons and recommendations for how development assistance can better prevent and respond to crisis situations and support the delivery of the HDP nexus agenda, both within Somalia and globally. This report is based on desk research and key informant interviews with actors working in Somalia at local, national and international levels.

This study is part of Development Initiatives' programme of work on the nexus and aligns with objectives of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Results Group 5 on Humanitarian Financing. It builds on 2019 research on donor approaches to the nexus and the IASC’s research on financing the nexus, which identified a gap in understanding how development finance actors address longer term development needs of vulnerable populations and structural causes of crises. Other focus countries are Cameroon and Bangladesh, and the study will conclude with a synthesis report with key findings and lessons across countries and recommendations for development actors engaging in crisis contexts.

This study will build the evidence base for how development actors work in crisis contexts, informing national and global development policy and decision-making and supporting effective programming approaches. Development Initiatives, with support from the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) under the umbrella of IASC Results Group 5, will engage with development actors on the findings of this research.

Slow progress in a situation of protracted and recurring crisis

Somalia is an interesting case for this study as it has for the past 30 years experienced political instability and frequent conflict, coupled with environmental, disease and economic shocks, converging in 2020 into a triple threat of flooding, desert locusts and Covid-19. These crises have resulted in widespread internal displacement, sustained food insecurity with recurring spikes and high levels of poverty, emphasising the need for preventative and longer term approaches. The international community has supported reconciliation and state-building efforts, aimed at achieving a political settlement among competing political/clan elites and establishing legitimate federal and state governance.
institutions. While substantial progress has been made in forming federal and state institutions, international agencies and remittances continue to play a major role in the delivery of basic services.

The successful intervention of the humanitarian sector in averting famine after prolonged drought in 2016 and 2017 fostered greater acknowledgement that humanitarian assistance alone cannot provide a sustainable or cost-effective solution to recurring shocks in Somalia. Donors and the UN community recognise that development efforts should be increased to prevent and build resilience to future economic, climate and conflict-related shocks. Donors are investing in longer term forecasting, anticipatory action, risk reduction and resilience, and, more recently, in recovery, safety nets and social cohesion, but more is needed to move towards sustainable and lasting solutions. This requires substantial development investment and strengthened synergies between humanitarian, development and peace actors.

The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has low domestic revenue and public spending per capita compared with other countries in sub-Saharan Africa, and it faces significant challenges in increasing tax revenue. Domestic spending is dominated by administrative and recurring costs, such as public sector salaries and operational costs (including security), with little left for the social sector. Somalia has received steadily growing volumes of official development assistance (ODA) over the past decade, and in March 2020 Somalia achieved the milestone of reaching the ‘decision point’ of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative, restoring access to regular concessional financing and bringing the country closer to debt relief.

Recommendations

Strategy and partnerships

There should be a focus on building federal and state government capacity for service delivery

In recent years there has been a strategic shift in the engagement of international actors to address underlying and structural causes of crisis, although opportunities for this vary across the country. Development partners are scoping opportunities to work with and through government systems as capacities and trust is developed and, in areas where this is not yet possible due to the absence of structures and relationships, scoping opportunities and laying foundations for this in the future.

The World Bank Multi-Partner Fund (MPF) has been testing and incrementally expanding finance through government systems, in parallel with technical support to strengthen public financial management systems and develop a mutual accountability framework. The use of pooled resources to scale up budget support, linked with performance-based benchmarks, monitoring and accountability mechanisms, is expected to increase substantially. This should be done cautiously to manage the risks not only of corruption and misuse of resources but also of conflict, such as the potential to create political competition over aid resources or contribute to inequalities that lead to grievances.
For development assistance to play a greater role in meeting the needs of crisis-affected populations, development partners need to ensure they have partnerships and dialogue with governments to prioritise service delivery, social protection systems, livelihoods, economic development initiatives aimed at expanding the government's fiscal base, and other interventions necessary to achieve medium- to long-term solutions to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and target groups experiencing vulnerability. For example, the World Bank’s Country Partnership Framework (2019–2022) prioritises strengthening institutional capacity for service delivery and restoring economic resilience as its two focus areas, and the EU prioritises governance and security, food security and resilience, and education as the focus areas of its 2014–2020 National Indicative Programme. It will be important for Somalia’s major bilateral and multilateral partners to sustain policy dialogue with the FGS and federal member states on reforms to strengthen government-led service delivery and social protection systems (such as the World Bank’s dialogue with the FGS on the development of a social registry) and include benchmarks on social outcomes in accountability frameworks and country partnership frameworks. It will also be crucial to ensure a conflict lens is integrated into this dialogue and to ensure donor non-crisis financing to infrastructure and economic development is conflict sensitive. The establishment of Somalia’s federal structure is an opportunity for development partners to expand technical and financial support to government-led service delivery at the state and municipality level, although it will be important to navigate uncertainties and political tensions around the functions of each level of government.

Local responses should be scaled up through financing and capacity building for Somali NGOs, with private sector actors

Local and national NGOs are well-established in Somalia, having played a key role in the humanitarian response since the drought in 2011 and in advocacy on the localisation agenda. The establishment of NGO consortia on resilience and durable solutions to displacement also signals progress. Change is needed, however, in how donors approach and finance partnerships with local NGOs, and Somali NGOs should be included in consortia from the outset and involved in decision-making and management structures. Donors should consider scaling up direct funding to Somali NGOs (in line with World Humanitarian Summit commitments on localisation) through pooled development funds. Strengthening third-party monitoring structures and establishing a national NGO office and code of conduct would help to manage associated risks.

**Coordination, planning and prioritisation**

Organisational change should take place to deliver the nexus, not just informal collaboration

UN agencies and NGOs with mandates encompassing humanitarian and development work were better able to coordinate and adapt programming to address both immediate needs and longer term issues than those with a limited mandate. Some donors and agencies have internal divisions between their humanitarian and development teams, however, with limited systematic internal cooperation. A fundamental review of organisational structures is required in some cases to facilitate collaboration, coherence, and complementarity between HDP actors. Development partners might consider
reorganising management structures, strategy and planning processes, and allocation decisions around regional, country or subnational geographic areas – rather than humanitarian, development and political functions – to strengthen coherence of their overall support. Strong leadership will be needed for this to occur.

Existing coordination mechanisms and development plans should be better aligned and built on as the basis for identifying shared outcomes and strengthening coordination among HDP actors

Somalia has an elaborate aid architecture, in which humanitarian and development actors have separate structures for coordinating among themselves and with government. While there are some examples of coordination across the HDP nexus, this is not systematic. There are multiple coordination platforms at the federal, member state and district levels, which could be better aligned and inclusive of actors that are currently not well represented (such as peacebuilding and private sector actors). Regular joint analysis, drawing together expertise from across the HDP nexus, is not yet the norm, although the latest UN Common Country Analysis is considered a good example.

Given the complexity of existing coordination mechanisms, there is little appetite in country to establish a new standalone nexus coordination structure. Ideally, existing coordination mechanisms and development planning processes should be built on to better link up HDP actors around joint analysis, planning and implementation of collective outcomes. The UN has taken the lead on nexus coordination and planning and collective outcomes initiatives, and there is limited engagement and ownership by the government and key development actors, including international financial institutions (IFIs). While four collective outcomes were agreed by a group of humanitarian and development actors in 2018, the extent of buy-in among non-UN actors for their implementation is unclear and there is a lack of ownership by development actors.

For nexus collaboration to be effective, leadership and buy-in is required from both development and humanitarian actors, with government. The UN and World Bank should play such a role, formally leading strategic nexus coordination and planning and shared outcomes initiatives, in line with the IASC Light Guidance on Collective Outcomes, jointly with government counterparts. Coordination should go beyond UN actors and be as inclusive as possible while still functioning effectively.

The Somalia National Development Plan 2020 to 2024 (NDP9) and accompanying cooperation frameworks could provide a strong basis for coordination between government and all international actors, but they are currently more effective at coordinating development and security actors and have not managed to bring together the full range of HDP actors. The new aid architecture under NDP9 is starting to be operationalised and provides the foundation for the recently signed UN Cooperation Framework. Therefore, the new nexus-coordination mechanism proposed by the UN should seek to complement and support these nationally led coordination efforts.

There has been strengthened coordination of development and humanitarian actors working on health as a result of the Covid-19 response. This success could be built on across sectors, and area-based programming models that are strengthening coordination
at local levels could be scaled up. Sub-national HDP coordination mechanisms could be established with the involvement of government, depending on the context.

At both national and sub-national levels it is, however, vital to maintain separation of humanitarian coordination and the independence of the Humanitarian Country Team. This is particularly important for assistance to states where conflict is active, areas are controlled by non-state armed groups, and where coherence is not an option, both practically and to safeguard humanitarian principles. In certain circumstances, the humanitarian sector’s duty to respect the humanitarian principles of neutrality and independence in order to access people in need must take precedence over greater collaboration across the HDP nexus. Establishing mechanisms that bring together HDP actors should therefore complement and not replace separate humanitarian coordination mechanisms.

Donors should reconsider funding and system requirements to provide greater incentives to work collaboratively across the humanitarian, development and peace sectors

Entrenched ways of working and a lack of incentives to collaborate across the humanitarian, development and peace sectors can be a barrier to implementing nexus approaches in practice. Funding is a powerful incentive, and donors should create an environment conducive to collaboration and innovation. Channelling greater volumes of funding through joint programmes or pooled funds can help, as can sharing clear expectations on nexus commitments with all recipients of core and programme funding and supporting partners’ staffing capacities. Flexible funding is key to allow partners the space to iterate and innovate, but at the same time clear requirements and accountability to ensure that partners will make connections within and between themselves are needed. Donors should explore how this can be built into contracts without restricting partners or adding to reporting burdens.

Consensus should be sought on the opportunities and limits to collaboration in stabilisation or active conflict settings

As with other countries, the most challenging aspect of the nexus in Somalia is understanding how peace and humanitarian components align. While humanitarian actors have begun to integrate social cohesion or peace components into their programmes, there are clear limits on how humanitarian action can or should be joined up with development or peace initiatives that have clear political or security objectives, particularly in areas of active conflict or where counter-terrorism or stabilisation efforts are underway. Dialogue is needed between actors on the opportunities, limits and principles for coordination, and, as a minimum, systems for communication and information-sharing should be strengthened.

The government should be supported to establish a shared data system on vulnerability and poverty that embeds tools for inclusive monitoring and evaluation; however, this should not replace independent humanitarian assessments and data

International actors should support the government to develop national data systems on disaster management, recovery and social protection to inform sustainable and collaborative responses to immediate and longer term needs of crisis-affected
populations, and transparent standards for data management. Efforts are underway in this respect, including the Somalia Aid Management Information System, managed by the Ministry of Planning, Investment and Economic Development (MoPIED). Data systems currently managed by international actors (such as the FAO's Early Warning Dashboard and the Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit (FSNAU)) should be embedded into these national data frameworks in the medium to long term, coupled with related investment in government institutional capacity development.

Jointed-up data and assessments are often necessary for collaborative programming and are appropriate in areas such where government structures are strong. In other areas, independent assessments and protection of humanitarian data is vital for safeguarding humanitarian principles, and in these contexts information-sharing and complementarity may be possible where collaborative programming is not. Appropriate joining up of assessments and programming is thus highly context specific and varies across Somalia.

**Programming approaches**

Community-level resilience and peacebuilding approaches should be scaled up and run in parallel to longer term national efforts

Humanitarian agencies have developed innovative resilience programmes over recent years, making significant yet small scale progress at the community level. There have also been positive examples of collaboration across sectors in the disaster risk reduction space. For greater impact and wider reach, these efforts should be scaled up based on learnings from successful programmes. In the longer term, resilience approaches should be embedded more holistically into national efforts to address structural sources of vulnerability and poverty, including national frameworks for shock-responsive safety nets, social protection and livelihoods. This will require greater development investments in what has traditionally been a humanitarian-led resilience agenda in Somalia, although the need for parallel complementary humanitarian and development-led programmes will continue in the medium-term. This will also depend on a range of sub-national contextual factors including the capacity of and trust in local government structures, the local conflict context and access. Community-based peacebuilding and conflict-sensitive recovery approaches should also be scaled up and run in parallel to longer term national efforts. Donors interviewed highlighted the need for resilience to be embedded more holistically within national priorities on safety nets, social protection, food systems and livelihoods.

Durable solutions programming should increasingly be led by development actors

Much progress has been made on the durable solutions agenda for internally displaced people in Somalia (see definition in Box 1), including buy-in from the government. Humanitarian actors have largely led programming in this area, but there is a need to transition leadership and reporting lines to government and include a broader range of development actors. Optimising development finance and private sector engagement for this purpose will be key.
Financing tools

The Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility and multi-partner funds should be reviewed and reinvigorated as mechanisms to enhance coordinated and flexible financing.

The 2013 Somali Compact, based on the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States, established the Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility (SDRF) as a mechanism to enhance donor coordination and country ownership. The SDRF aimed to address the legacy of fragmented and project-based aid by providing a common governance framework for three aligned trust funds set up to pool donor contributions: the UN Multi-Partner Trust Fund (UN MPTF), the World Bank Multi-Partner Fund (MPF) and the African Development Bank’s multi-partner Somali Infrastructure Fund (SIF). The SDRF was initially slow to operationalise; for example, the SIF only became operational in 2016 and the first mutual accountability framework was endorsed in 2017 (although the peacebuilding and state-building goals under the New Deal were in place prior to this).

Although the SDRF now operates at a larger scale, its full potential is not yet used. The aid landscape in Somalia remains fragmented and donors continue to channel most of their support bilaterally and outside of government systems. Donor confidence in the UN MPTF has waned for a variety of reasons, including high overhead costs, inflexibility and challenges related to delivery by UN agencies. The World Bank MPF, which was set up to strengthen delivery through government systems, has made incremental progress and is looking towards working at a greater scale. While much smaller, the Somalia Stability Fund offers an example of an agile, flexible and context-driven pooled fund that could potentially be built on. To enable trust funds to provide funding flexibility, there is a need to protect funds from earmarking in alignment to donors’ own political ambitions. One option would be to agree a vulnerability criterion for allocation of trust funds. Another option could be to ring fence a flexible funding window for partners within the trust funds. Further decentralising the management of these funds through nationally situated and staffed mechanisms would enable greater alignment to local needs, understanding of the context and flexibility.

Flexibility and contingency financing should be embedded into development programmes

There are examples from donors, the UN and the FGS of budget flexibility and contingency financing being built into programmes to respond to unforeseen, a scale-up in existing, or rapid-onset crises. Contingency mechanisms are vital for enabling a timely response to crises but are not yet systematised across development actors, with most progress to date in humanitarian contingency financing. Contingency financing mechanisms should be part of standard practice in the planning phase of development programmes. A high degree of budget flexibility is needed to re-allocate funds to respond to changing needs, with decentralised authorisation, reduced earmarking and less budget demarcation between HDP responses. Shock-responsive mechanisms should continue to be embedded into national safety nets and social protection programmes to allow them to be scaled up in response to cyclical environmental shocks. There is also scope to embed contingency financing mechanisms into country partnership frameworks that are agreed between major development partners and developing country governments and focus predominantly on structural and economic reforms. This could help strengthen access to contingency risk and crisis finance mechanisms at the national level to complement and
better connect country-level strategy with global decision-making associated with dedicated global crisis financing modalities.

Donors should review and capture learnings from the Covid-19 response and how the speed and scale of response, risk and due diligence are balanced in future financing. Donors should also provide flexible funding to respond to Covid-19 and food insecurity issues while addressing long-term socioeconomic impacts and chronic displacement.

**Strengthen evidence on the impact and comparative advantage of global crisis financing mechanisms**

The World Bank and other development finance institutions, notably the African Development Bank (AfDB) in response to Covid-19, have established a range of global crisis financing modalities that are now benefiting Somalia. As of 2020, Somalia met the requirements for accessing the World Bank’s International Development Association (IDA) Crisis Response Window, which is funding the Somalia Crisis Recovery Project and the Emergency Locust Response Programme.

While partners receiving these global funds are extremely positive about their added value, there are questions regarding the impact of these crisis financing modalities, specifically on vulnerable populations, highlighting the need for greater evidence on lessons for broader uptake. The World Bank, UN, AfDB and partners should consider ways to document and share publicly evidence of impact. For stronger alignment with local needs, contextual relevance and local ownership, decentralising the management of these global funds to regional and national levels should be considered. For this, senior analytical capacity on conflict and resilience and the appointment of senior staff with decision-making autonomy at country level will be key.
Al-Shabaab and the ICU take control of Mogadishu, later recaptured by Ethiopian forces and transitional government.

Armed conflict and insecurity
- 2006: Al-Shabaab and the ICU take control of Mogadishu, later recaptured by Ethiopian forces and transitional government.
- 2011: Al-Shabaab lost key towns to Kenyan, African Union and Somali government forces.
- 2017: Al-Shabaab militants abducted civilians, livestock and committed arson attacks. More than 15,000 people fled their homes.
- 2019: Twin truck bombings in Mogadishu killed more than 500 people and injured over 300. Al-Shabaab militants suspected to be responsible.
- 2019: Al-Shabaab banned NGOs and UN agencies from areas under its control. July: al-Shabaab suicide attack killed Mayor of Mogadishu in his office. December: Suicide truck bombing in capital killed 82 people.

Natural disasters and environmental shocks
- 2006: Almost 260,000 people died during a famine triggered by severe drought and worsened by conflict.
- 2010−2012: Famine declared in five regions and malnutrition and food insecurity faced by many.
- 2011: Prolonged drought threatened famine but was averted due to humanitarian intervention.
- 2016-2017: Worst floods in decades displaced 416,000 people.
- 2019: Worst desert locust outbreak in 25 years impacts the livelihoods of nearly 2.6 million people.

Political transition
- 2017: New parliament and president elected, triggering international recognition and support for FGS.

Covid-19
- 2020: March: Somalia’s first case confirmed on 16 March.
- December: Total confirmed cases pass 4,000 with over 100 deaths. WHO leads health response to Covid-19 in Somalia, supporting federal government national plans.

Displacement
- 2016: Puntland and Galmudug agreed to ceasefire after fighting displaced 90,000 people.
- 2019: There are 2.6 million IDPs in Somalia due to conflict, violence, drought and flooding. 11 million people are estimated to be in a state of protracted crisis.
- 2020: Flooding, conflict and violence displaced more than 700,000 people in the first half of the year.

Timeline
- 2004
- 2006

Proportion of ODA as humanitarian, development and peace assistance 2009-2018
- Humanitarian: 71%, 50%, 72%, 56%, 55%, 48%, 32%, 39%, 59%, 47%
- Development: 4%, 5%, 4%, 6%, 8%, 5%, 6%, 5%, 8%, 8%
- Peace: 24%, 45%, 25%, 38%, 38%, 44%, 63%, 36%, 36%, 45%
- No data: 0%

Subnational ODA 2017-2020
- Federal Government of Somalia (FGS)
- Banadir Regional Administration (BRA)
- Galmudug
- Hirshabelle
- Jubaland
- Puntland
- South West State
- Puntland
- Somalia
- Other

Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC Creditor Reporting System (CRS) and Somalia Aid Information Management System (AIMS).
Notes: US$ millions. ODA figures for total ODA are from the CRS and include DAC, non-DAC and multilateral donors in constant 2017 prices. ODA figures for regional allocations in Somalia are from the AIMS in current prices. 2020 values include budgeted amounts. Humanitarian includes CRS purpose codes for emergency food assistance; immediate post-emergency reconstruction and rehabilitation; material relief assistance and services; multi-hazard response preparedness; and relief co-ordination and support services. Peace includes CRS purpose codes for civilian peacebuilding; conflict prevention and resolution; and participation in international peacekeeping operations. Development includes all other purpose codes under total ODA. FGS = Federal Government of Somalia; IDPs = internally displaced persons; ODA = official development assistance; WHO = World Health Organization.
Introduction

Strengthening joined-up humanitarian–development–peace (HDP) responses requires a shift towards ‘development where possible and humanitarian only when necessary’, as recognised by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC).

Humanitarian and development actors have a joint responsibility for preventing, managing and recovering from crises. However, they approach crises with different priorities, objectives, policies and programmatic approaches, as well as different mandates and accountabilities to donors. This can lead to gaps in responses in crisis contexts. Research by Development Initiatives and the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) identified the need for further research on the current and potential role of development finance and institutions in complementing humanitarian action to provide more durable solutions for crisis-affected people. This is pertinent in responding to Covid-19, which involves needs for both immediate lifesaving assistance and longer term support for health systems, socioeconomic impacts and peacebuilding.

This country report on Somalia contributes to a multi-country study focusing on the role of development actors in addressing people’s longer term needs, risks and vulnerabilities, and supporting the operationalisation of the HDP nexus.

Somalia has been selected as a focus country and its experience can inform global policy and practice for several reasons. Somalia has been in a state of protracted conflict and political instability for decades and experiences chronic displacement and food insecurity linked with recurring environmental shocks, including droughts, flooding and most recently locusts, which highlight the need for sustainable and preventative responses. The absence of an internationally recognised federal government, ongoing armed conflict and the threat of terrorism and lawlessness was, until recently, a barrier to development investment, and the country has depended on humanitarian assistance to address chronic vulnerability for decades. However, since 2017 Somalia’s political transition has opened doors for longer term development and recovery. Somalia is also a priority country for the UN Joint Steering Committee to Advance Humanitarian and Development Collaboration and the Humanitarian Development Peace Initiative (HDPI), a joint initiative of the UN and World Bank that emerged from a commitment made at the World Humanitarian Summit in 2016.

This report aims to improve understanding of how development actors operate in Somalia and their current and potential role in addressing the longer term needs, risks and vulnerabilities of crisis-affected populations. It explores the extent to which development actors work alongside or in collaboration with humanitarian and peace actors at the strategic, programmatic and institutional levels. It identifies examples of good practice, learning and recommendations for how development assistance can better prevent and
respond to crisis situations and support the delivery of the HDP nexus agenda, both within Somalia and more broadly.

The research findings are based on a desk review of relevant documentation and key informant interviews with approximately 30 development and humanitarian actors engaging in Somalia and based at local, national and international (HQ) levels (Appendix 1).

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**Box 1: Definitions of key terms**

**Nexus:** This paper uses ‘nexus’ or ‘triple nexus’ as shorthand terms for the connections between humanitarian, development and peacebuilding approaches. We align with the OECD DAC definition:

“‘Nexus approach’ refers to the aim of strengthening collaboration, coherence and complementarity. The approach seeks to capitalize on the comparative advantages of each pillar – to the extent of their relevance in the specific context – in order to reduce overall vulnerability and the number of unmet needs, strengthen risk management capacities and address root causes of conflict.”

Achieving collaboration, coherence and complementarity means quite different things to different actors. We understand the three ambitions to sit on a spectrum from complementarity to coherence, with complementarity being the minimum requirement for approaching the nexus. At the higher end of the spectrum, the nexus can fundamentally challenge existing divisions between humanitarian, development and peace systems, encouraging stronger coherence and working towards shared outcomes. The concept of shared or collective outcomes was conceived by the UN in preparation for and follow-up to World Humanitarian Summit and recently adopted in the UN-IASC Light Guidance on Collective Outcomes. We also recognise that there are three dual nexuses within the triple nexus – the well-established humanitarian–development, the development–peace and the humanitarian–peace nexuses. In the context of Somalia, working at the nexus translates into actions under a range of existing concepts including resilience, preparedness and early action; recovery; durable solutions in displacement contexts, inclusion and peacebuilding; and embedding risk, among others.

This report focuses explicitly on the role of development actors, covering the development–peace and development–humanitarian nexuses. Specifically, this means understanding how development actors are working collaboratively, coherently and complementarily with humanitarian and peace actors at the strategic, practical and institutional levels to address the needs of vulnerable crisis-affected populations.
Resilience: We align with the OECD DAC definition:

“The ability of households, communities, and nations to absorb and recover from shocks, whilst positively adapting and transforming their structures and means for living in the face of long-term stresses, change and uncertainty. Resilience is about addressing the root causes of crises whilst strengthening the capacities and resources of a system in order to cope with risks, stresses and shocks.”

Resilience is understood as cross-cutting to humanitarian, development and peacebuilding activities.

Early recovery: An approach that addresses recovery needs arising during the humanitarian phase of an emergency, using humanitarian mechanisms that align with development principles. The multidimensional process of recovery begins in the early days of a humanitarian response.

Recovery: This is the restoration, and improvement where appropriate, of facilities, livelihoods and living conditions of disaster-affected communities, including efforts to reduce disaster risk factors, largely through development assistance.

Development: This report focuses explicitly on the role of development actors and actions in crisis contexts. Here, we understand ‘development’ as long-term support to developing countries to deliver sustainable solutions for addressing poverty, supporting livelihoods and providing basic services, with a particular focus on those in greatest need and furthest behind. We understand development actors to include donors, NGOs, UN agencies, multilateral development banks, local and national authorities, and private sector and community-based organisations.

Peace: There are many ways to understand conflict and peace, and clear overlaps with development and resilience. In this report, where there is not yet consensus on what is covered in the ‘peace’ aspect of the triple nexus, we understand it to include conflict prevention, conflict sensitivity (to ensure programming avoids harm and where possible builds peace), peacebuilding and mediation efforts at local, national and regional levels. To cover all possible ‘peace-related’ activities in the research, we have included a focus on stabilisation and efforts to tackle violent extremism though recognise the contentions between political priorities on security and stability and safeguarding humanitarian principles.

Humanitarian action: Humanitarian action is intended to:

“...save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain human dignity during and after man-made crises and disasters caused by natural hazards, as well as to prevent and strengthen preparedness for when such situations occur.”
Furthermore, humanitarian action should be governed by the key humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence, as well as the guiding principles for humanitarian assistance set out in UN General Assembly resolution 46/182. In Somalia, the centrality of protection is also at the core of humanitarian intervention, as set out in the Humanitarian Country Team-led Centrality of Protection Strategy.\(^\text{16}\)

**Durable solutions:** The IASC framework on durable solutions for internally displaced people describes that:\(^\text{17}\)

“…a durable solution is achieved when internally displaced persons no longer have any specific assistance and protection needs that are linked to their displacement and can enjoy their human rights without discrimination on account of their displacement. It can be achieved through:

- Sustainable reintegration at the place of origin
- Sustainable local integration in areas where internally displaced persons take refuge
- Sustainable integration in another part of the country.”
Crisis context

A complex and protracted state of crisis

Somalia has one of the most complex and protracted states of crisis anywhere in the world. For the past 30 years Somalia has experienced political instability and frequent conflict, coupled with environmental and economic shocks. These crises have resulted in widespread displacement, food insecurity and high levels of poverty.

Somalia has an intricate societal make up, with complex dynamics governing geographic areas, clans and ethnic groups. Following the collapse of the government led by dictator Siad Barre in 1991, clan-based political coalitions and alliances fought for control throughout the country, with no effective federal government in place. A de facto government in the north declared the formation of an independent Republic of Somaliland in 1991 and continues to seek international recognition of its sovereignty. In 1998, Puntland’s leaders in the north east declared the territory an autonomous state within a federal Somalia. Both regions are in effect self-governing and maintain relative stability in contrast to southern and central Somalia, which remains engulfed in inter-clan political violence. From early 2000, conflict and security dynamics in southern and central Somalia became increasingly complex and internationalised, as Islamist militant groups filled the security vacuum and internationally backed forces conducted counter-insurgency operations.

The international community’s political and security agenda in Somalia has been dominated by two inter-related trends over the last decade and a half. Firstly, the international community supported reconciliation and state-building efforts, aimed at achieving a political settlement among competing political/clan elites and establishing legitimate federal and state governance institutions. Secondly, an African Union (AU) and internationally backed military offensive sought to weaken al-Shabaab and other militant Islamist groups and transfer and consolidate territorial control to legitimate government authorities.

In this context, Somalia took painstaking steps from being a ‘failed’ to a ‘fragile’ state. Substantial progress has been made in establishing federal and state institutions, although political transition is still underway. In 2004, a transitional federal government was established. In 2012, Somalia selected a new president and federal parliament and adopted a provisional constitution, completing the transition to the new FGS. 2017 marked another turning point, as the FGS completed its first political transition since 2012, electing a new parliament and president, through a limited, indirect electoral process. This triggered additional international recognition and support for the FGS. Somalia has since made further progress in establishing and rehabilitating political and government institutions, including the creation of four federal member states in southern Somalia (Jubaland, South West State, Galmudug and Hirshabelle).
SOMALIA REMAINS, HOWEVER, AN EXTREMELY FRAGILE POLITICAL AND SECURITY ENVIRONMENT. ALTHOUGH AL-SHABAAB HAS BEEN SUBSTANTIALLY WEAKENED, IT STILL RETAINS CONTROL IN LARGE AREAS OF CENTRAL AND SOUTHERN SOMALIA AND IS CAPABLE OF CARRYING OUT TERRORIST ATTACKS. DESPITE PROGRESS IN BUILDING SOMALIA’S SECURITY ARCHITECTURE, THE GOVERNMENT CONTINUES TO DEPEND HEAVILY ON AU FORCES TO MAINTAIN SECURITY IN STRATEGIC AREAS. IN ADDITION, SOMALIA’S POLITICAL SITUATION REMAINS FRAGILE DESPITE PROGRESS IN ITS POLITICAL TRANSITION; THE PATH TOWARDS DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS HAS BEEN CHALLENGING AND THE KEY ISSUES RELATING TO THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND FEDERAL MEMBER STATES REMAIN UNRESOLVED. FURTHERMORE, GOVERNMENT INFRASTRUCTURE, INSTITUTIONS AND SERVICES ARE STILL IN THEIR INFANCY, AND INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES CONTINUE TO PROVIDE MANY BASIC SERVICES.

IN THE CONTEXT OF ONGOING ARMED CONFLICT AND POLITICAL INSTABILITY, SOMALIA HAS EXPERIENCED PERSISTENT FOOD INSECURITY, DISPLACEMENT, HEALTH AND PROTECTION CRISIS OVER THE PAST 30 YEARS. THREE-FIFTHS OF SOMALIA’S ECONOMY IS BASED ON AGRICULTURE, WITH LIVESTOCK-RAISING THE BIGGEST SECTOR. THE DOMINANCE OF PASTORALISM AND RAIN-FED AGRICULTURE MAKES THE POPULATION HIGHLY VULNERABLE TO CLIMATE SHOCKS AND NATURAL DISASTERS. FURTHERMORE, SOMALIA HAS HIGH RATES OF POVERTY, WITH 69% OF THE POPULATION LIVING UNDER THE INTERNATIONAL POVERTY LINE OF US$1.90 A DAY AND AN ADDITIONAL 10% LIVING WITHIN 20% OF IT. THIS MEANS THAT ALMOST 80% OF THE POPULATION ARE ESPECIALLY VULNERABLE TO CLIMATE-RELATED SHOCKS, CONFLICT AND ECONOMIC DISRUPTION.

IN DECEMBER 2019, THE UN OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS (OCHA) ESTIMATED THAT 5.2 MILLION SOMALIS WERE IN NEED OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, OF WHICH 63% WERE CHILDREN. UP TO 2.1 MILLION SOMALIS WERE FACING SEVERE HUNGER IF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE WAS NOT AVAILABLE; FOOD AND NUTRITION DEFICIENCIES ARE ESPECIALLY PREVALENT IN AGRO-PASTORAL, MARGINALISED AND DISPLACED COMMUNITIES. INADEQUATE WATER, SANITATION AND HEALTH SERVICES IN MANY AREAS INCREASE THE RISKS OF DISEASE OUTBREAKS, INCLUDING CHOLERA, DIARRHEA AND, MORE RECENTLY, COVID-19. FIGURE 1 SHOWS FOOD INSECURITY, POVERTY AND DISPLACEMENT BY REGION.
Figure 1: Levels of food insecurity, poverty and displacement by region


Notes: Humanitarian Needs Overview data on refugees and asylum-seekers, IDPs and total people in need are as of December 2019. Total displaced people do not include returnees. IPC Phase 3 and above figures are projections for October to December 2019 and include people experiencing acute food and livelihood crisis, humanitarian emergencies or famine and humanitarian catastrophe. 85.5% of people in IDP settlements are within the poorest 20% of people (P20) in Somalia, as are 84.5% of people in nomadic populations. The geographical regions include the following administrative regions: Benadir (Mogadishu), Jubaland (Gebo, Lower Juba, Middle Juba), central (Hiraan, Middle Shabelle, Galgaduud), north east (Bari, Mudug, Nugaal), north west (Awdal, Sanaag, Sool, Togdheer, Woqooyi) and South West State (Bay, Bakool and lower Shabelle). IDP = internally displaced people; IMF = International Monetary Fund; IPC = Integrated Food Security Phase Classification; P20 = people in the poorest 20%; UN OCHA = UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.
Natural disasters and environmental shocks: droughts, floods and locusts

With an arid and semi-arid climate, Somalia is prone to recurring droughts as well as to flooding during the annual monsoon season, with erratic weather becoming more frequent in recent years. Since 1960, Somalia has experienced 14 droughts, averaging one every four years and causing severe food insecurity. Between 2010 and 2012, 260,000 people died during a famine triggered by severe drought and worsened by conflict between rival political groups. Another prolonged drought occurred in 2016 and 2017, but the intervention of the humanitarian sector is widely credited with preventing a similar famine.

Extreme and erratic weather, including flash floods, have contributed to widespread food insecurity and displacement in recent years. Floods in 2020 have displaced approximately 500,000 people. In late 2019, desert locust swarms spread into Somalia from Yemen across the Red Sea, after heavy rainfall allowed the insects to flourish. The Ministry of Agriculture declared a national emergency in February 2020. The current locust outbreak is the worst to hit the country in 25 years, with swarms causing crop and pasture loss in areas across the country, impacting the livelihoods of nearly 2.6 million people living in 43 districts. Crop loss has contributed to food insecurity, malnutrition and displacement.

The 2017 pre-famine response fostered increasing acknowledgement that humanitarian assistance alone cannot offer a sustainable or cost-effective solution to recurring climatic shocks in Somalia. Rather, there must be a shift towards longer term investment in forecasting and anticipatory action, risk reduction and resilience. At the same time, the recent locust crisis has tested the international community’s ability to respond to major, unanticipated peaks in need. Efforts to tackle the desert locust crisis are focusing on short-term needs such as food security as well as supporting longer term livelihoods.

Multiple forms of armed conflict and insecurity

Somalia is affected by multiple forms of armed political violence and insecurity, including terrorist attacks by Islamist militant groups, counter-insurgency operations, inter-clan political violence, local inter-communal violence, and organised and individual criminal violence.

The state-building process in Somalia has supported a political settlement between Somalia’s clan elites, with power-sharing arrangements ensuring representation in the federal and member state governments. This has substantially reduced large-scale inter-clan violence, driven by elite competition for power and control of resources. However, Somalia’s political balance remains extremely fragile, as is manifested in disputes between the FGS and the federal member states and between rival clans. Somalia is also affected by recurring and localised inter-communal conflict over resources, particularly involving pastoralist groups competing for water.

Although substantially weakened, al-Shabaab retains control of many rural areas in southern Somalia and continues to launch terrorist attacks within Somalia and
surrounding countries, including truck bombings in Mogadishu in 2017 and 2019, an attack on a Nairobi hotel in 2019, and hundreds of improvised explosive attacks targeting civilians within Somalia. Other militant groups also challenge state authority and pose a security risk. Abnaa ul-Calipha (Islamic State in Somalia) splintered from al-Shabaab in 2015 and was recognised as an official province by the Islamic State in 2017. Active primarily in Puntland, the Islamic State in Somalia has an estimated 200 to 300 active fighters. While much smaller than al-Shabaab, the group carried out terrorist attacks in Puntland and Mogadishu and engaged in frequent clashes with al-Shabaab.

In 2017 and 2019 the UN Security Council approved the withdrawal of a thousand AU troops as part of a transition of security responsibilities to the FGS, with the intention of Somali forces leading security by 2021. However, US and AU forces continue to support the Somali National Army to combat al-Shabaab and other Islamist militant groups and capture territory controlled by them.

Cooperation between HDP actors is challenging in Somalia given the high levels of fragility and volatility, especially where armed non-state groups are active and there is ongoing armed conflict. Armed groups threaten the legitimacy and capacity of the state and can undermine or render development efforts extremely difficult. The focus on stabilisation in these areas makes it challenging to achieve consensus between humanitarian and other external political, security and development actors because of the imperative to safeguard humanitarian principles.

**Large-scale displacement**

Around 2.6 million Somalis are displaced internally within Somalia; more than half were displaced following failed rainy seasons in 2016. In 2019, the leading cause of displacement was disasters (mainly flooding), which displaced 479,000 people, followed by conflict and violence, which displaced 188,000 people, largely in the south east of the country where al-Shabaab is most active. The forced eviction of internally displaced people (IDPs) is a significant cause of secondary displacement, with more than 264,000 IDPs evicted during 2019.

IDP settlements are found throughout the country, with the largest concentration around Mogadishu. Many displaced people have been forced to move to urban areas to access humanitarian assistance, driven from other areas by natural disasters and armed conflict between government forces, their allies and non-state armed groups, as well as clan-based violence. These large-scale population movements add pressure to already constrained resources and services in urban areas. IDPs are now among some of the most vulnerable communities in Somalia.

Many Somalis have fled to other countries over recent decades, and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that more than 905,000 refugees are outside of Somalia, largely spread between Kenya, Yemen and Ethiopia. Since the launch of a UNHCR-assisted repatriation programme in 2014, over 91,000 Somali refugees have voluntarily repatriated (although this rises to 130,000 when considering spontaneous (non-assisted) returns from Kenya, Yemen and other countries). UNHCR
also assists 30,000 refugees and asylum seekers from other countries such as Ethiopia and Yemen.

Somali federal and local governments have made progress developing policies and frameworks to protect IDPs and reach durable solutions for displacement-affected communities. The FGS ratified the Kampala Convention in 2019, affirming the rights of IDPs, and has adopted a national IDP policy. The FGS has also established a cross-government Durable Solutions Secretariat, which includes all ministries and federal institutions and brings together humanitarian and development actors to achieve collective outcomes (covered further in the ‘Programming approaches’ section later). The Durable Solutions Secretariat is making progress on a national durable solutions strategy. At the local level, the Municipality of Mogadishu established the Durable Solutions Unit in the mayor’s office and developed the Mogadishu Durable Solutions Strategy.

A key challenge for the durable solutions agenda is practically applying the HDP nexus, recognising that humanitarian, development, peace and security, and political actors all have a critical role in tackling protracted displacement.

**Additional pressure from the Covid-19 pandemic**

For Somalia, the Covid-19 pandemic comes together with many existing crises and poses a major challenge to a health system left in disrepair after years of civil war and underinvestment. Somalia ranks 194/195 on the Global Health Security Index, with low numbers of healthcare workers and intensive care beds, and is one of the least prepared countries in the world to detect and report epidemics. The World Health Organization (WHO) has warned that impacts from the Covid-19 pandemic risk reversing recent health gains in Somalia and societal impacts include a worsening of violence against women. The WHO is leading the health response to Covid-19 in Somalia, including supporting FGS national plans, and a UN-wide technical task force has been formed to support the FGS.

Covid-19 restrictions have also limited humanitarian responses to existing crises including floods, diarhoea and cholera outbreaks, and locusts, exacerbating vulnerability and the needs of crisis-affected populations. The pandemic has also impacted remittances, although despite remittance inflows initially dropping in April 2020 at the outset of Covid-19, recent data shows they have recovered and been stronger than anticipated.

**Government policies and domestic financing**

**Progress in development policy and strategy**

NDP9 (2020–2024) was drafted by the Ministry of Planning, Investment and Economic Development (MoPIED), building on NDP8 (2017–2019). NDP8 was the first to be drafted by the Somali government since 1986 and followed the 2013 New Deal Compact for Somalia, which functioned as the country’s development and political roadmap. The New Deal Compact for Somalia arose from the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States.
NDP9 was formulated to meet the requirements of an interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper to allow Somalia, as a participant of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative, to apply for debt relief. The principal objective of NDP9 is poverty reduction, and it has four pillars: inclusive politics, security and rule of law, economic development, and social development. It aims to transform the economy by improving the resilience of the traditional livestock and crop production industries to better meet the growing challenges from climate change, while encouraging growth in the private sector to expedite sustainable growth and employment more widely.

**Low domestic revenue and spending**

The FGS has a small budget per capita compared with other countries in sub-Saharan Africa – Somalia's cabinet approved a budget increase for 2020 to US$476.1 million. This is one-sixth the budget of Rwanda, which has a similar population size. As shown in Figure 2, the Federal 2018 budget of US$286.1 million is smaller than that of Somaliland (US$326.3 million), illustrating the fledgling situation of the FGS compared with Somaliland, which has had more established governance for some years.

**Figure 2: Somalia federal and state budgets, 2018**

Notes: Data is in US$ current prices. Domestic public resources refer to government revenue, excluding international grants and federal transfers. Figures refer to budget estimates. 2018 is the latest year with available data on state budgets for Somalia. Hirshabelle and the Banadir Regional Administration are missing from the chart as data is not available. IMF = International Monetary Fund. Most tax revenue raised by the FGS comes from Mogadishu, with the reach of the FGS limited beyond the capital. Member state governments collect customs revenue levied at airports, land borders and the maritime ports of Jubaland, Puntland and Somaliland, which are spent by each state for their own purposes.
The FGS faces significant challenges in increasing tax revenue, with no effective domestic tax system, a weak formal economy and fragile revenue-generating sectors. Somalia’s economy is largely informal with little effective regulation, and it is based primarily on the livestock, agriculture, fisheries, communications and energy sectors. The economy also relies on imported goods and services funded by remittances. While accurate data is lacking, most estimates place Somalia’s GDP per capita among the bottom five countries in the world. Its domestic revenue as a share of GDP also remains very low, estimated at 2.8% in 2017. Tax compliance from citizens and corporations is inconsistent, largely owing to the lack of a functioning tax administration system.

Another barrier to raising tax revenue is low public confidence that paying taxes to government will lead to the provision of public services. This is partly due to budget limitations: most of the FGS budget goes to paying civil servant and security staff salaries, with little left over for public services. This highlights the importance of state legitimacy and public trust in ensuring progress in development efforts. With the relative absence of a functioning state for a long period, strengthening the social contract in Somalia is difficult and has largely come second to more pressing issues such as security. As the FGS continues to establish itself, international development actors such as the World Bank are seeking to support state legitimacy through national safety net programmes (covered further in the ‘Programming approaches’ section later).

**Figure 3: Sector spending by federal and state governments, 2018**

Source: Somali Federal and State Budgets for 2018.

Notes: Data is in US$ current prices. Domestic public resources refer to government revenue, excluding international grants and federal transfers. Figures refer to budget estimates. 2018 is the latest year with available data on state budgets for Somalia. Hirshabelle and Banadir Regional Administration are missing from the chart as data is not available.

FGS spending is dominated by administrative and recurring costs, such as public sector salaries (with administration costs comprising 52% of spending in 2018) and operational costs (where security costs comprised 36% of spending in 2018), with little left for the social sector (only 4.1% in 2018) (Figure 3). State governments allocated 10% or less of
their budgets to social sectors in 2018, apart from Somaliland (18%), which is likely to reflect its comparatively larger budget and established government structures. The capacity for state governments to address vulnerability and support longer term recovery, development and livelihoods is thus minimal. This points to the pressing need for ongoing support from development partners to strengthen the institutional capacity of the FGS and state governments so that government-led social services can be scaled up.

International financing landscape

Somalia receives large volumes of international aid and remittances. For much of the past two decades, donors and international actors have focused on responding to humanitarian crises and state-building and stabilisation. In recent years, the establishment of a nascent federal government and a desire to break out of cycles of humanitarian crises has seen a will among donors to scale up longer term, resilience-focused development programming.

Remittances is the largest category of external finance

The Somali diaspora numbers over 1 million people worldwide. Alongside official development assistance (ODA) and security assistance, remittances are the largest category of external financial support to Somalia. The estimated volume of remittances from Somalis abroad was US$1.5 billion in 2018 and 2019, accounting for one-third of GDP.\(^38\) This is equivalent to the total ODA to Somalia in 2018 (US$1.5 billion) and double the humanitarian assistance (US$713.6 million). An estimated 40% of Somali people receive remittances, but they are not equally distributed; recipients are concentrated in clans, lineages and extended families concentrated in Somaliland and Puntland.

Among the households that receive remittances, the monthly average income from remittances is US$229.\(^39\) As well as improving purchasing power to meet basic needs, access to remittances improves access to credit, with the debt–credit relationship important for the economy and society in the absence of a formal banking system.\(^40\)

Only a minority of people receive remittances from more than one source, so this source of income is vulnerable to changes in the circumstances of the sender. Despite remittance inflows initially dropping in April 2020 at the outset of Covid-19, recent data shows remittance inflows have recovered and been stronger than anticipated.\(^41\)

The country is on a path to debt relief

After more than 30 years of being ineligible to receive financial assistance from international financial institutions (IFIs), in 2020 Somalia took critical steps towards normalising relations and resuming funding. In March 2020, Somalia achieved the milestone of reaching the ‘decision point’ of the HIPC Initiative, restoring access to regular concessional financing and bringing the country closer to debt relief. This has enabled Somalia to fully re-engage with IFIs, including the World Bank’s IDA, which provides funding to the poorest countries. Once Somalia reaches the HIPC Initiative
‘completion point’, its external debt is expected to fall from US$5.2 billion (as at the end of 2018) to US$557 million (in net present value terms). Somalia has been able to access new IDA funds for crisis response and resilience projects, including the Somalia Crisis Recovery Project and Shock Responsive Safety Net for Locust Response programme (see the ‘Programming approaches’ section). Since March 2020, the World Bank has provided nearly US$400 million in financing to Somalia.\textsuperscript{42}

The normalisation of relations with IFIs also signals a transition towards channelling funding through the FGS single treasury account and paves the way for Somalia to access larger scale development finance, although there is still caution among donors and UN agencies about using government systems for financing and providing direct budgetary support.

**Official development assistance is increasing**

ODA received by Somalia has more than doubled since 2009, increasing from US$628.2 million to US$1.5 billion in 2018, peaking at US$1.7 billion in 2017 in response to a surge of drought relief (Figure 4).

Given the absence of government structures and reliance on humanitarian structures for service delivery, humanitarian assistance has been the largest component of ODA, representing 51% of total ODA from 2009 to 2018; in 2018, 47% of ODA was humanitarian assistance. Fluctuations in humanitarian assistance from 72% in 2011 to 32% in 2015 illustrate Somalia’s vulnerability to shocks; a peak in 2017 was in response to drought and instrumental in averting famine.\textsuperscript{43} There was also a gradual increase in developmental ODA between 2009 and 2018, with a peak in 2015 (US$773.9 million) due to increased spending on social infrastructure and services aligned with the New Deal Compact for Somalia. Growing international support for the FGS and momentum on the durable solutions agenda in recent years may sustain this trend towards higher volumes of developmental ODA. While OECD Creditor Reporting System (CRS) data is not yet available for years after 2018, 2019 mapping by MoPIED\textsuperscript{44} shows a steep decline in total ODA to Somalia in 2019, from US$2.2 billion in 2018 to US$1.9 billion in 2019, followed by a further predicted decline to a total of US$0.9 million in 2020.
Figure 4: ODA breakdown by purpose code, 2009–2018

Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC Creditor Reporting System (CRS).

Notes: Data is in US$ millions, constant 2017 prices. ODA is from DAC, non-DAC and multilateral donors. ‘Humanitarian’ includes CRS purpose codes for emergency food assistance; immediate post-emergency reconstruction and rehabilitation; material relief assistance and services; multi-hazard response preparedness; and relief co-ordination and support services. ‘Peace’ includes CRS purpose codes for civilian peacebuilding, conflict prevention and resolution, and participation in international peacekeeping operations. ‘Development’ includes all other purpose codes under total ODA. CRS = Creditor Reporting System; ODA = official development assistance.
While humanitarian assistance was consistently the largest component of ODA between 2009 and 2018, ODA to other sectors varied. The volume of ODA to governance and security gradually increased, although it fluctuated as a proportion of overall ODA, rising to 23.7% in 2016 before dropping sharply to 16.1% in 2017, then rising again to 21.4% in 2018 (Figure 5).
Between 2009 and 2018, the US was the donor that gave the most ODA to Somalia, providing US$2.3 billion over the 10 year period, followed by EU institutions (US$1.7 billion) and the UK (US$1.7 billion). Other donors providing large amounts of ODA were Germany (US$628.9 million), Sweden (US$585.1 million), Norway (US$448.9 million) and Turkey (US$430.3 million) (Figure 6).

Donors outside of the DAC membership have a growing presence in Somalia, with Turkey, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia among the 30 donors giving most ODA to Somalia between 2009 and 2018. The FGS received foreign grants (including from Saudi Arabia), which it managed outside of the treasury and financial management information system, and the full amount of these grants is unknown. Aid from these non-traditional donors differs from traditional Western donors, with a focus on bilateral support to state authorities or infrastructure projects, and there is less distinction between relief, development and post-conflict recovery.

In recent years, the FGS, Somaliland and Puntland received the greatest amounts of ODA (US$219.2 million, US$224.0 million and US$194.4 million in 2019, respectively) (Figure 7). The states experiencing active conflict by comparison received a much lower proportion, for example Galmudug and Hirshabelle received US$78.2 million and US$95.2 million in 2019, respectively. This probably reflects challenges related to access and the weakness of government structures. Volumes of budgeted funding to the FGS more than doubled in 2020, probably because of new IDA funding.

Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC Creditor Reporting System (CRS).
Notes: US$ millions, constant 2017 prices. ODA is from DAC, non-DAC and multilateral donors. CRS = Creditor Reporting System.
Peace and security assistance falls outside of ODA

According to the most recent estimates in 2017, international partners spend an estimated $1.5 billion per year on peacekeeping, counter-insurgency and support to the Somali security sector, which falls outside the scope of ODA. This includes US$750–850 million per year to the AU Mission in Somalia joint military operations, comprising financing provided directly by the EU and logistical support provided through the UN Support Office in Somalia. This figure excludes international maritime anti-piracy measures. The US is the largest contributor of security assistance, providing US$400 million per year in ‘Somalia-focused’ aid in the Horn of Africa, and the EU, Turkey, United Arab Emirates and the UK are the next largest contributors.

Pooled funds and crisis-financing mechanisms are in use

From 2014, a number of multi-partner trust funds were established to deliver FGS national development priorities set out in national development plans within the coordination framework of the Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility (SDRF). These include the UN Multi-Partner Trust Fund, the World Bank Multi-Partner Fund (MPF), and the AfDB’s Somali Infrastructure Fund (SIF), which support government-led institution building, service delivery and infrastructure development. Initiated in 2012, the Somalia Stability Fund is a multi-donor financing mechanism that aims to enhance
local governance and reduce political and communal conflict, designed to respond flexibility and rapidly to needs and opportunities. Global multilateral funds also play a key role, such as the UN Peacebuilding Fund (see Appendix 2 for an overview of financing mechanisms).

Financing the Covid-19 response

There has been significant financing for the response to the Covid-19 pandemic in Somalia, with more than US$60.1 million of Covid-19 disbursements reported to IATI in 2020 (Figure 8). Humanitarian assistance has comprised the majority of ODA to Covid-19; it accounted for 53% of assistance reported to IATI in 2020, and 95% of disbursements reported in Quarter 4 of 2020. This may reflect the predominance of humanitarian structures for service delivery in Somalia as the favoured channel for reaching communities quickly, but it may also be due to differences in the reporting practices of organisations publishing data to IATI. The volume of developmental ODA for the Covid-19 response increased in 2020, from US$2.9 million in Quarter 1 to US$20.6 million in Quarter 3 (mainly representing transactions reported by the World Bank to the Somalia Crisis Recovery Project). A significant amount of development funding used for the Covid-19 response was repurposed from existing donor allocations, following a scale up of the Somalia Covid-19 humanitarian response plan to US$784.3 million in August 2020.

Figure 8: Total disbursements to Covid-19 as humanitarian and development assistance, 2020 by quarter

Source: Development Initiatives based on International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) data.

Notes: Data is in US$ current prices. Data grouped by quarters, with Q1 summing transactions from January–March; Q2 from April–June; Q3 from July–September; and Q4 from October–December 2020. Activities are marked as Covid-19 related according to the IATI Covid-19 publishing guidance. Humanitarian disbursements include transactions marked with the IATI Humanitarian Flag, with all other transactions included under Development disbursements. Data last updated on 06/01/2020. Data extracted from the Covid-19 tracking prototype available at: https://covid19.humportal.org/
Strategy and partnerships

Changes in international actor engagement

Since 2017 there has been a strategic shift in the engagement of international actors in the following ways.

1. While humanitarian assistance has always been, and will continue to be, vital, with the ongoing risk of recurring natural disasters and resurfacing active conflicts, development (and some humanitarian) actors are beginning to address the underlying and structural causes of crises, though opportunities for this vary by state.

2. Development actors are beginning to expand beyond their historical focus on establishing legitimate and capable federal and state institutions to include service delivery. Where government structures are weak or absent, they support the establishment of nationally led programmes, on safety nets for example, as crucial for building state legitimacy and addressing medium- to long-term risk reduction, prevention and recovery. They deliver through the UN and international NGOs, historically the main channels for humanitarian service delivery, until government capacities are strong enough to take over.

3. Development partners, especially IFIs, are beginning to work with and through government systems as capacities and trust is developed. Somalia reaching the decision point of the HIPC Initiative in March 2020 is described as a game-changer, restoring access to regular concessional financing and enabling Somalia to build capacity for government-led development.

Supporting the federal government in service delivery

National development frameworks provide a common strategy for targeting vulnerable populations, though implementation is undermined by limited access, weak capacity and political tensions.

The NDP9 sets out a common vision for addressing the risk and vulnerability of crisis-affected populations in Somalia. It explicitly focuses on strengthening the role of development actors in crises and the interface between humanitarian and development planning, addressing the root causes of poverty and aiming to improve the impacts of poverty experienced by affected populations.

There is buy-in from development partners and alignment of priorities. The New Partnership for Somalia sets out how Somalia and the international community will work together to deliver NDP9. A mutual accountability framework outlines joint priorities and
benchmarks for cooperation (with the most recent framework agreed in December 2020). Most international agencies seek sign-off from relevant government ministries on their strategic priorities, and this is a requirement for UN agencies. Similarly, local NGOs generally work closely with member state authorities, and in alignment with their priorities, as is necessary for gaining access and international funding.

Implementation is, however, undermined by the nascent formation of government and its limited capacity to deliver, lack of political consensus between federal and state governments and limited access to areas not under the control of the AU Mission in Somalia.\textsuperscript{52} In addition, interviewees report that political ambitions behind federal and member state requests to focus on particular geographical areas or sectors continue to undermine aid neutrality and needs-based resource allocation. This remains a critical barrier in building capacity for more government-led development.

**A slow shift towards use of government systems, with some hesitance from bilateral donors**

Given the nascency of the federal government, the weakness of public financial management systems and associated risks, stringent financial controls are put in place by development partners; however, many donors are still hesitant to provide financing on budget or through government systems. Recently there has been increasing encouragement from the UN to ensure that government support is channelled through the FGS treasury rather than to individual ministries. The 2019 Public Financial Management Act also requires funding to ministries to be aligned with country budgeting systems and disbursed through the FGS treasury.

Some bilateral donors have channelled funding for country systems through the World Bank's MPF. Established in 2014 with the support of 10 donors, the World Bank's MPF has tested and incrementally expanded finance through government systems, including those of federal member states. It also provides technical support to strengthen public financial management systems and develop a mutual accountability framework. The use of pooled resources to scale support aligned with country budgeting systems, linked with performance-based benchmarks, monitoring and accountability mechanisms, is expected to increase substantially.

Bilateral donors interviewed generally consider the FGS to be over-optimistic about what it can deliver, pointing to its difficulty managing recurring costs with little experience in managing financial flows.\textsuperscript{53} Corruption continues to pose a real risk. There are also conflict risks, such as the potential to create political competition over aid resources or to contribute to inequalities that lead to grievances. Government representatives, however, contest this and emphasise the need to change this donor perception of risk, arguing that the Auditor General within the Treasury acts as an accountability mechanism for financial flows, identifying and responding to cases of corruption promptly. The sentencing in August 2020 of four senior health officials over corruption and theft of public money is seen by some as an indication of a growing commitment by the government and judiciary to tackle corruption.
One donor stated that “there is a delicate dance between international donors, banks, and the government as to what is appropriate regarding the risk of putting money through government systems”.

Before 2015, a very small proportion of ODA was channelled through public institutions (4.5% in 2014), with most funds allocated through multilateral institutions as a way of minimising risk (51.6% in 2014) (Figure 9). Data from the OECD DAC CRS shows a sharp increase in the proportion of ODA channelled through public institutions in 2015 (27.9%). This mainly comprised ODA grants from Turkey channelled through its own government – a total of US$281.6 million in 2015, accounting for 82% of all funding to public institutions that year and falling to 25% of funding by the following year. In 2018, the proportion of ODA to public institutions followed a downward trend to 12.8%, a total of US$193.3 million. While CRS data for 2019 is not yet available, significant increases in ODA to public sector institutions have been reported in Somalia since 2018, including an EU financing agreement of €100 million to support Somalia’s state and resilience building efforts.\(^5\)

**Figure 9: ODA to Somalia by channel of delivery, 2009–2018**

Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC Creditor Reporting System (CRS).

Notes: US$ millions, constant 2017 prices. ODA is from DAC, non-DAC and multilateral donors. The category ‘Other’ includes ODA channelled through Public–Private partnerships and networks; University, college or other teaching institution, research institute or think-tank; and Other channel of delivery codes. CRS = Creditor Reporting System.

Since 2017, building on historical investments in state-building and in line with aid effectiveness principles, the ambition of development partners has been to increase funding channelled through the government as their capacity strengthens and trust builds. The mutual accountability framework sets out a target for channelling 15% of development funds through the treasury as a minimum as the government progresses in public financial management reforms.\(^5\) The proportion of ODA reported to the OECD...
DAC CRS as channelled through public sector institutions in Somalia increased from below 5% between 2009 and 2014 to 27.9% in 2015, and then it decreased to 12.8% in 2018. This can be explained by a one-off injection of ODA from non-DAC donors in 2015, particularly funding from Turkey channelled through its own government. Data from the Somalia Aid Information Management System, however, shows a gradual increase year on year since 2017 in disbursements channelled through the FGS and local governments, from US$73.7 million in actual disbursements in 2017 increasing to US$75.8 million in 2019. Funding through the government is set to increase now that Somalia has reached the decision point of the HIPC Initiative.

Moving away from project-based interventions and reimbursement of payments to minimise risk, the World Bank, International Monetary Fund and EU are increasingly providing funding aligned with national budgeting systems and taking on more risk than bilateral donors by working through government systems. This aligns with their mandate to provide financial support and capacity building for governments, reportedly viewing setbacks and a level of corruption as an inherent part of making gains in the longer term. The EU led initially on this, and this encouraged others to do the same with the Somalia State Building and Resilience Contract. The World Bank recently approved their first budget support Development Policy Operation, laying the foundations for future budget support. This is part of a multi-year process to support the government, with earlier phases delivering a robust analytical programme to identify key challenges and priorities and a technical assistance to build capacities and strengthen institutions. A high level of risk tolerance among IFIs is associated with the widely shared objective of supporting the government to perform state functions effectively, especially given the strategic relevance of Somalia to national and international political and stability priorities.

Donors interviewed expressed a preference for IFIs to set more ambitious controls and policy benchmarks, with a greater focus on social outcomes and vulnerability. The World Bank has made progress over recent years, in terms of both global crisis financing targeting Somalia and its Country Partnership Framework (which includes allocation criteria on inclusion and social outcomes) and policy action for the government to develop a social registry as a prerequisite for developing social protection programmes. The World Bank’s country partnership frameworks are based on country policy and institutional assessments undertaken annually, which include a focus on social inclusion (gender, social protection, environment, equity of public resource use) and public sector management (governance, financial management and public administration). This system is used for unearmarked country allocations that are aligned with the frameworks. Clear policy and outcome-related benchmarks, combined with ongoing political and policy dialogue reflecting collective positions of donors and technical assistance, can impact on the actions of the government and build capacity over time.

Building government capacity is a long-term process, particularly in areas that are experiencing, or have recently experienced, conflict. Donors should continue to focus on addressing the immediate needs of vulnerable people in parallel to capacity-building efforts. World Bank financing of government-managed projects, with service contracts to UN agencies where capacity is lacking, is an example of how this could be achieved.
Where risks are high, secondments and in-kind support to the government are used

Where development partners consider the risks of providing direct financial support to the government as too high, they have often taken the approach of embedding staff within key government ministries and bodies, directly paying the salaries of government staff and providing in-kind support. For example, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) funds the Special Advisor to the Director General of the Institute for Management Development, and the UNHCR has embedded Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework Officers into the Office of the Prime Minister to advance this agenda. The UNHCR has also embedded positions with the MoPIED and the National High Commission for Refugees and IDPs within the National Displacement and Refugee Agency. There are also secondments at the state level, such as the Enhancing Integration of Displacement Affected Communities in Somalia secondment to the South West State Ministry of Planning Monitoring and Evaluation department. The government has requested that international actors go beyond capacity development and secondments to institution building through mentorship and peer support, and technical assistance on planning and budgets.

Interviewees also highlighted the need for greater transparency between international agencies on the in-kind support provided to governments as necessary for greater coordination in engaging with the government. A capacity injection tool exists to keep track of declarations of support, but according to interviewees this is not used by all agencies, limiting its ability to improve transparency.

The government’s role in crisis response and service delivery is a vital part of building state legitimacy

Prior to 2017 the government had no role in humanitarian responses, given the clear risks posed to humanitarian principles. The focus of development and security actors was establishing legitimate government institutions and consolidating their control over internal security. More recently, growing international recognition of the FGS has opened doors for stronger collaboration between humanitarian and development actors and strengthened partnerships with the government in service delivery.

Humanitarian actors have reportedly started to engage in more depth with the government, such as in the development of national strategies on social protection, health and education. However, according to interviewees, the government remains frustrated with the low level of engagement and coordination by humanitarian actors, especially concerning durable solutions programming. While it is vital to safeguard humanitarian principles, as a minimum information-sharing, coordination and complementarity is possible.

Many interviewees argue that development partners’ historical focus on state-building, security and top-level reforms, while necessary, should be balanced with social development and service delivery priorities, which are crucial for addressing poverty and vulnerability. Development actors have supported a range of stabilisation initiatives in areas captured from or at risk of al-Shabaab control, aimed at strengthening the
legitimacy of state and local authorities through social and economic recovery activities. However, federal and state systems remain critically weak. For example, the Covid-19 pandemic has exposed the absence of a public health system as a critical challenge, with most health services provided by humanitarian actors.

While it may take many years for the government to develop the capacity to deliver services, over time it could play a stronger role in decision-making and be a lead partner in crisis response and resilience programmes. This is crucial for a durable approach, reducing dependency on humanitarian assistance and building a social contract between the state and society – although this remains challenging in the absence of a genuinely inclusive electoral process.

Development partners have already begun to take steps towards supporting the government to take a stronger leadership in crisis management, response and resilience. The World Bank’s Country Partnership Framework (2019–2022) prioritises strengthening institutional capacity for service delivery and restoring economic resilience as its two focus areas, and the EU prioritises governance and security, food security and resilience, and education as the focus areas of its 2014–2020 National Indicative Programme. Positive programming examples include the following.

- The World Bank’s Somali Crisis Recovery Project (US$137 million from IDA), approved in May 2020, supports a government-led response to the areas hardest hit by multiple shocks, specifically Covid-19, locusts and flooding. The project provides basic services and livelihood support, including a cash-for-work scheme for vulnerable households, desert locust population controls, restoring and protecting agricultural production capacity, promoting household hygiene and treatment, and the government’s systems and capacity for disaster preparedness and integrated flood and drought preparedness and risk management. A national emergency operations centre will be established under the leadership of the Office of the Prime Minister.

- The World Bank’s Shock Responsive Safety Net for Human Capital Project, known in Somali as the ‘Baxnaano’ Programme (US$65 million), supports institutional capacity-building towards a government-led safety net programme, while at the same time supporting the UN World Food Programme (WFP) and UN International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) to deliver a cash transfer programme.

- The Building Resilient Communities in Somalia (BRCiS) consortium is discussing with the Ministry of Finance the potential to scale-up community-level resilience pilots into a government-led national shock responsive programme.

- International actors such as the EU, the UK, Denmark and the World Bank are building government capacity on durable solutions and supporting national leadership of this agenda. The government is also developing a five-year water resource management strategy with support from international actors.

- The government is establishing a new national emergency operations centre to coordinate disaster management and response and early warning systems.
Working with non-government actors in service delivery

Local NGOs can play a vital role in service delivery given their reach to, and relationships with, crisis-affected communities. Even in contexts where the government is capable of leading service delivery, local NGOs and the private sector are key partners complementing the government, for example by extending its reach in remote areas, developing market linkages, promoting accountability and advocating for community interests. Local NGOs can also implement programmes at lower cost than international agencies and can often access areas or respond quicker in contexts where international agencies face bureaucratic hurdles or security-related restrictions. In the case of the Covid-19 response, the international presence on the ground has been diminished as a result of restrictions. Local NGOs typically have a long-term outlook and work across the continuum of immediate response and longer term preparedness, resilience and recovery, and so strengthening the nexus can be an inherent by-product of supporting a localised response.

Compared with other crisis-affected countries, Somali NGOs play a substantial role in aid delivery, for several reasons. Firstly, most international agencies have historically managed their programmes from outside the country due to security concerns, and they have therefore relied heavily on Somali partners for operations on the ground. As a consequence, local partners conduct vulnerability assessments, identifying target beneficiaries, and lead the distribution of aid, including planning and evaluation. Secondly, as federal and local governments are building their capacity, development and peacebuilding actors have placed a strong emphasis on working with non-state actors. This has included developing representative platforms for civil society and the private sector to voice concerns that transcend narrower clan or political interests. Somali NGOs are well-established advocacy actors on a range of issues, including the localisation agenda, nationally and internationally.

As shown in Figure 9, NGOs and civil society organisations have consistently received a significant proportion of ODA funding over the last decade, constituting 29% of ODA to Somalia in 2009 and 23% in 2018, with marginal rises and falls in between. Nonetheless, the total proportion of funding directly channelled to Somali NGOs continues to be small.

While there are clear benefits, there are also risks associated with channelling aid to local NGOs. For example, local NGOs may not be politically neutral (i.e. they may have interests linked to particular political interests, clans or communities), particularly in urban areas, or they may have weaker governance and financial controls than international agencies. Interviewees report instances of governments requesting development agencies comply with state-level regulations regarding NGOs, in effect requiring agencies to use government-affiliated NGOs. Some donors are making progress in funding Somali NGOs focusing on resilience and durable solutions through consortia, as a way of managing risks and reducing management costs (see Box 2). NGO consortia, such as BRiCiS, have reportedly made progress in developing early warning systems to monitor indicators, contingency planning and establishing systems for rapid decision-making. However, Somali NGOs report that they have not received funding on par with international NGOs through these consortia. They are often led by international humanitarian agencies; there is a need to shift leadership to Somali NGOs for greater
sustainability and ownership. The BRCiS consortium has expanded membership to include three Somali NGOs in recent years. Ensuring local NGOs are included and have decision-making power should be addressed from the outset of NGO consortia design.

Some donors are developing third-party monitoring frameworks for Somali NGOs receiving funds as a way of managing risks, which could be widely used. For example, The Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation is developing a framework for third-party monitoring in partnership with the Heritage Institute for Policy Studies. The planned formation of a national NGO office and code of conduct will also support monitoring and accountability.

Box 2: NGO consortia

- **Building resilient communities in Somalia (BRCiS):** a humanitarian consortium supporting Somali communities in the southern and central regions to develop their capacity to resist and absorb minor shocks. The first phase of the programme ran from 2013 to 2017, and the second phase from 2018 to 2022. It is funded by the UK through the Somalia Humanitarian and Resilience Programme, with additional funds from the European Commission’s Agency for International Cooperation and Development (DEVCO). It is led by Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) in partnership with the Italian Development and Cooperation Organisation, Concern Worldwide (CWW), the International Rescue Committee and Save the Children International. The consortium incorporates local partners and capacity building activities as important for a localised response. The second phase expanded the focus on resilience to include nutrition as necessary for durable solutions, by merging with the Save the Children-led strengthening nutrition services. Impact evaluations have highlighted the benefits of working at the community level to build lasting resilience.

- **Somalia Resilience Programme (SomReP):** a consortium of seven NGOs (World Vision, Action Against Hunger, CARE, Cooperazione Internazionale, the Adventist Development and Relief Agency, the Danish Refugee Council and Oxfam) established in 2011 and funded by the EU, FAO and governments of Sweden, Denmark, Australia and Switzerland. It seeks to build resilience to recurrent droughts and chronic vulnerability. SomReP includes the Somalia Response Innovation Lab, which aims to strengthen the impact of humanitarian and development interventions to improve resilience. SomReP is a well-established consortium of donors and NGO partners working to test innovative resilience and shock-responsive models for linking short-term assistance and development. Building resilience at the community level is a focus, with many agencies working to strengthen market access, livelihoods and water systems, and where possible to embed these initiatives within nationally led frameworks and priorities for greater sustainability.
• **Enhancing Somalia’s responsiveness to the management and reintegration of mixed migration flows (RE-INTEG):** a programme that seeks to develop durable displacement solutions in Somalia (see Box 3 for more information). Four NGO-led consortia have been established to deliver this programme:

  - **Jubaland:** The Jubaland Solutions Consortium, led by NRC. Local NGO members include CWW and the Jubaland Foundation, with the Regional Durable Solutions Secretariat (ReDSS) as a learning partner.

  - **South West State:** The Enhancing Integration of Displacement Affected Communities in Somalia Consortium, led by CWW. Local NGO members include CWW and Gargaar Relief Development Organisation, with ReDSS as a learning partner.

  - **Somaliland:** The Somaliland Durable Solutions Consortium, led by World Vision. Local NGO members include Taakulo Somaliland Community, with ReDSS as a learning partner.

  - **Durable Solutions for IDPs and Returnees in Somalia:** led by CARE, with IMPACT Initiatives as the knowledge management lead.

Recent impact evaluations of RE-INTEG and documentation of lessons learnt found that inclusion of Somali NGOs is enabling a localised response and greater buy-in from host communities. It also highlights the need for more investment in consortium management structures and support for consortia to join up for greater harmonisation and learning on community engagement.62

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**Box 3: RE-INTEG programme**

Enhancing Somalia’s responsiveness to the management and reintegration of mixed migration flows (RE-INTEG) is a multi-year programme (2017–2020) funded through the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, which aims to support the reintegration of refugees. The programme seeks to "contribute to Somalia’s transition out of fragility by creating innovative, durable solutions-strengthening stability and security and by creating a favourable environment for economic and social development and build resilience".63 It also supports migration management in countries of origin and transit. Interviewees report that it has improved support to IDPs by aligning urbanisation, land and displacement rights, employment opportunities and tackling longer term and structural issues. The three-year programme (a longer timeframe than traditional humanitarian programmes) has created opportunities for learning and adaptation. The programme is delivered by multiple UN agencies and three consortia of international and local NGOs. Delivery agencies work in collaboration with, and to build capacity of, local governments.
Over 28 national and local institutions and non-state actors have been supported through capacity building on migration management.

A recent assessment of lessons learnt undertaken by ReDSS found the RE-INTEG programme has moved beyond traditional short-term humanitarian programming and created a resilience- and development-focused approach to addressing displacement. It also found the multi-sector nature of the programme supported the implementation of area-based approaches, created more space for the programme to engage government representatives and communities collaboratively rather than as individual agencies. However, the absence of a clearly articulated strategy around engagement and capacity development with different levels of government hinders progress.

**Localising the response requires a holistic approach including capacity building, local government and private partners**

Localising the response needs not only funding to local and national NGOs but also involvement of local authorities and private actors. This should be beyond financing and the targets set at the World Humanitarian Summit (i.e. for 25% of humanitarian funding to be directly targeted to local and national NGOs) and include ways of working, capacity building and approaches to delivery.

“The whole debate is skewed towards financing rather than actual delivery, ownership and effectiveness. But we need to broaden the localisation discussion to include local government, CSOs etc to look at what delivery actually means at the local level, and what is in the best interest of the people they are serving.”

Coordination and ownership by diverse actors at the local level has been enabled by a shift from a sector to a community-led, area-based prioritisation approach. For example, the BRCiS consortium has developed a community-led process for identifying resilience-related challenges and prioritising strategies for managing shocks; the UN and NGOs have worked together to help the government establish technical durable solutions working groups in Baidoa and Kismayo towns to develop capacity and support local authorities to form urban strategies and plans.

Strong examples of localised responses and involvement of private actors are established in cash and livelihood programming. The FAO works through local traders in southern Somalia, where security is an issue, to support farmers by sourcing quality inputs such as local seed varieties through a network of 300 agro-dealers. The FAO provides cash and livelihood inputs to rural communities digitally, through their e-Platform for Mobile Money and Livelihood Assistance, where cash and electronic vouchers for livelihood assistance reach people in need by SMS. As of October 2020, nearly 435,000 rural households (comprising 2.6 million people) are registered on the e-Platform.
Coordination, prioritisation and planning

Strength of coordination mechanisms

Existing coordination mechanisms at federal government and member state levels should be better aligned and strengthened

In Somalia, humanitarian and development actors generally have separate coordination mechanisms. Separation is sometimes necessary, for example to safeguard humanitarian principles, and this is especially relevant in situations of active conflict or in areas that are controlled by non-state armed groups. However, as a minimum, in these contexts complementarity and information-sharing should be sought. Where possible, in more stable states where government structures are in place and coordination does not threaten humanitarian principles, coherence and joined-up planning and programming should be a goal. For this, the establishment of coordination mechanisms that bring together HDP actors will be crucial, such as the proposed nexus working groups, working alongside and connecting humanitarian and development coordination mechanisms. Key to this success will be participation and buy-in of actors outside the UN, including the government and multilateral development banks.

The Humanitarian Country Team and Inter-Cluster Coordination Group provide strong formal coordination of the humanitarian response, although some interviewees report little engagement within the UN. While the government seeks to play a stronger role in humanitarian coordination, its capacity remains limited. There are also weak incentives for international partners to participate in formal coordination mechanisms, with interviewees reporting unhelpful and politicised interference from the government.

Government-led development coordination bodies are in place, with the Aid Coordination Unit coordinating pillar working groups and the SDRF under the New Deal and New Partnership arrangements. The SDRF also acts as the steering committee for the UN Multi-Partner Trust Fund (UN MPTF), the World Bank’s MPF and the AfDB’s trust fund. Sectoral pillar working groups, chaired by government ministers, co-chaired by donors and supported by the UN, meet on a regular basis. These development forums and their associated sub-working groups are intended to encourage focused policy debate and information-sharing. Other cross-cutting initiatives also have an important role to play in supporting longer term efforts. The Durable Solutions Secretariat, for example, strengthens coordination between government and international actors on longer term programming in forced displacement contexts, offering lessons for broader uptake (see the ‘Programming approaches’ section).
Bilateral donors coordinate through pooled funding mechanisms and align their support with the pillars of the NDP9, although interaction between the Humanitarian Donor Group, Infrastructure Donor Group and the development-focused Somali Donor Group is reportedly minimal. This is, however, beginning to shift in the donor coordination groups for durable solutions and health, where efforts are underway to move from a primarily humanitarian donor membership to include development donors, such as the World Bank. This should become standard practice as appropriate to humanitarian principles and in more stable and government-controlled states.

While there are examples of positive coordination within existing structures, there is a lack of coherence and work across the spectrum of humanitarian and peace structures. This can entrench either development or humanitarian focuses, rather than fostering a common approach.

**Initiatives to strengthen HDP coordination are underway but require leadership from both humanitarian and development actors**

The UN has increasingly taken leadership to break down siloes, finalising the first integrated UN Cooperation Framework for Somalia as a basis for a joined-up approach. The framework is for UN agencies, but was widely consulted with government and other development partners. The UN has also led the process to develop collective outcomes. The UN and the World Bank have also worked together on development initiatives in crisis settings, including the Humanitarian Development Peace Initiative (HDPI), established following the World Humanitarian Summit in 2016 to identify collective outcomes and deliver integrated responses in multiple crisis countries, including Somalia.

The UN is also in the process of establishing new structures to improve coordination between the humanitarian and development sectors, with the aim of operationalising the nexus approach. Some interviewees report that previous initiatives have largely engaged UN agencies with limited ownership among IFIs, government and other development players. To have a wider impact and buy-in, new nexus structures must include, and be driven by, government representatives and include IFIs and other key development players. Ensuring representation of federal member state officials and/or establishing state-level coordination structures will be vital to success, as will a focus on coherent and strengthened planning, programming and funding across HDP actors.

A lack of incentives to collaborate across the humanitarian, development and peace sectors can be a challenge to implementing nexus approaches. Actors working across the nexus have different interests and incentives and tend to default to existing, separated ways of working. Taking a nexus approach requires HDP actors to work in new ways. However, the ‘path dependency’ established after many years of specialised humanitarian programming, competition for resources, pressure from donors to produce measurable and timely results, and an institutional focus on avoiding fiduciary and reputational risk, run counter to a spirit of innovation that enables nexus programming.
**Stronger coordination is seen at the local level**

Formal UN and donor coordination mechanisms are equally siloed between the humanitarian and development sectors in federal member states. However, coordination takes place at a practical and programmatic level between humanitarian and development actors operating in the same geographic areas. This is especially clear in community-based and area-based programmes, which facilitate dialogue and joint planning. This approach has been used in durable solutions programmes targeting refugees, host communities and returnees holistically, in resilience and peacebuilding programmes (see the ‘Programming approaches’ section). For example, multi-stakeholder community action plans for durable solutions have been established at the municipality level in the cities of Baidoa and Kismayo through a collaborative effort between UN agencies, NGOs and municipalities, in connection with existing durable solutions programmes.70

There are some examples of coordination between Somali NGOs across the humanitarian and development continuum. The long-established Somalia NGO Consortium and an active and strong local NGO base play a central role. However, interviewees highlight earmarked funds and the hesitancy of donors to provide overheads and unrestricted funding as obstacles to their coordination capacities, as well as the high level of competition for resources, which may become worse as funding pressures increase as a result of the Covid-19 pandemic.

**The response to Covid-19 is beginning to break down humanitarian–development silos in coordination and planning**

Strengthened coordination of development and humanitarian actors working on health has been a clear outcome of the Covid-19 response. The formation of the Somalia Health Donor Group has brought together humanitarian and development donors to coordinate responses to Covid-19, allocations of Gavi (the Vaccine Alliance) and the Global Fund, and health district programming. This donor group has sought to link short-term health assistance with the longer term priorities of the Ministry of Health. In addition, the EU delegation and European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) report that coordination between short and longer term activities is now an explicit internal priority, and that Covid-19 has accelerated this. Similarly, a joint donor working group is in formation for coordinating work on safety nets.71

The Covid-19 response has also strengthened humanitarian–development cooperation within the UN. There are informal networks in place, weekly reporting to UN OCHA and the federal government’s Covid-19 task force to share real-time information and response updates. Some interviewees argue, however, that coordination in response to Covid-19 has been more effective at a technical than strategic level (i.e. with the health system response to Covid-19 cases than planning to address longer term socioeconomic impacts or wider public health issues). The long-term response to Covid-19 is under development and is intended to be integrated into the UN Cooperation Framework.
Progress on joint or complementary planning and outcomes

Strengthening nationally managed data systems would improve coordination and government-led disaster management and social protection responses

While a significant gap in data and evidence continues to undermine opportunities for joint planning, as is the case in most fragile contexts, there has been progress in establishing data and reporting systems. The Somalia Aid Management Information System, managed by MoPIED, is evidence of this, and MoPIED has been working with the World Bank and the UN to map aid flows for three years.

Regarding drought response, there is a relatively strong data collection and analysis system in place that informs collective efforts. This includes the FAO Dashboard, the Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit (FSNAU) and the Somalia Water and Land Information programmes, for example.

Data collected for measuring the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) is also improving, as evidenced by the recently completed UN Common Country Analysis 2020.72 The World Bank supports the government to develop a social registry as the foundation for social protection programmes that can be used to inform joined-up humanitarian and development programming. The government is recruiting a Statistics Director to oversee national systems for data collection and analysis, which will support national capacities and ownership.

The real challenge, however, is the lack of coordination and transparency in the management and use of data. Fundamental to this is stronger coordination and information-sharing mechanisms between the government and international HDP actors. Integrating FAO and FSNAU data for early action in disaster responses into national disaster management systems in the medium to long term, coupled with investment in government institutional capacity development, will be vital to move towards a longer term development approach, such as the planned national emergency operations centre.

While joined-up data and assessments are often necessary for collaborative programming and are appropriate in certain contexts (such as Somaliland where government structures are stronger), in other contexts independent assessments and protection of humanitarian data is vital for safeguarding humanitarian principles. In these areas, information-sharing and complementarity may be possible where collaborative programming is not. Appropriate joining up of assessments and programming is thus highly context specific and varies across Somalia. As data systems are strengthened, ensuring data protection and security will also be key.
Progress has been made in joined-up planning, but different mandates and disconnected assessments remain a challenge

There has been some progress in joining up assessments and planning. The 2020 UN Common Country Analysis is designed to be an independent, impartial and collective assessment of the situation in Somalia. The analysis is structured around the SDGs and informs the UN Cooperation Framework. UN agencies regularly share information on beneficiaries and do joint analysis on vulnerabilities between clusters. There are also examples of collaboration in assessments of priorities relevant to the HDP nexus. The UN, World Bank and the EU collaborated on the 2018 Somalia Drought Impact and Needs Assessment and Recovery and Resilience Framework, which was led by the FGS, to assess the impact of ongoing drought on lives, livelihoods and sectors of the economy and identify preventative and sustainable development solutions to promote resilience to disaster risks and climate change trends. The needs assessment was explicitly designed to complement the humanitarian response plan and create a framework for humanitarian and development cooperation.

Interviewees suggest that joining up humanitarian and development programmes is easier within multi-mandate organisations than between agencies. Many multi-mandate agencies produce annual country programme documents or frameworks that include both short-term responses and longer term development activities, or otherwise link these two sectors. For example, UNICEF is links the quadrennial country programme documents, which focus on strengthening the government’s management of population issues (e.g. health and nutrition), with the annual Humanitarian Action for Children strategy. This includes joint planning among internal teams towards sustainable approaches to water provision, from water trucking to borehole rehabilitation and public–private partnerships. In some multi-mandate organisations, however, there are separate humanitarian and development teams that lack an overarching strategy, programmatic framework or unifying management structure.

While coordination mechanisms and complementary and regular assessments are prerequisites for joined-up planning and outcomes, the fundamental challenge is the different mandates and planning cycles for development and humanitarian actors. For example, in the case of the EU, DEVCO plans seven-year strategies whereas planning is undertaken on much shorter timeframes within ECHO, and decentralised decision-making is stronger on the development side. Changing this would require fundamental organisational and institutional adjustment. For some donors and agencies, reviewing mandates and embarking on organisational change processes is possible, although systemic change inevitably takes time. For others, separation is necessary for safeguarding humanitarian principles, and moving towards greater complementarity between development and humanitarian assessments, planning, budgeting, and decision-making processes should be sought as a minimum.
Progress has been made identifying collective outcomes for durable solutions in forced displacement contexts

The UN conceived the concept of collective outcomes as a starting point for HDP collaboration to address crisis-related vulnerabilities, in preparation for and follow-up to World Humanitarian Summit and the UN-IASC recently adopted Light Guidance on Collective Outcomes.\textsuperscript{74} Within Somalia, a technical working group of humanitarian and development actors agreed four collective outcomes in January 2018.\textsuperscript{75} However, interviewees report because the UN led the process with limited involvement of the government despite efforts to engage them, and because humanitarian data and needs assessments were the primary sources informing prioritisation, development actors feel less ownership over the outcomes. Agreeing outcomes that are broad enough to encompass the mandates of humanitarian and development agencies but specific enough for accountability purposes is a challenge.

Nonetheless, the process has created momentum to strengthen monitoring of results and accountability, particularly in relation to durable solutions to forced displacement where there has been substantial progress and involvement of the government. The ReDSS has been working with the UN Resident Coordinator’s Office to develop a set of outcome-level indicators (based on the IASC durable solutions framework) across the HDP spectrum to establish a common basis for monitoring progress in social cohesion and responding to the protracted displacement crisis – the Local Reintegration Index. The durable solutions programming principles endorsed by the FGS explicitly include commitments on joined-up HDP approaches and agreement of multi-stakeholder collective outcomes. The Refugee Self Reliance Initiative is the first global scored survey tool for measuring the progress of refugee households toward self-reliance over time. It was developed by RefugePoint and Women’s Refugee Commission, although it is too early to assess impact, learning and potential for its use elsewhere.\textsuperscript{76}

The results framework embedded within the national development plan, which is reviewed twice-yearly, provides an opportunity to identify collective outcomes. A monitoring framework is in development to assess the mutual undertakings that drive the agreement. For greater coordination, there is a need to develop common tools and standards for monitoring and evaluation. Interviewees report that more could be done to systematically embed perceptions of local communities into monitoring frameworks and outcomes, and there is a need to close feedback loops through the inclusion of displaced communities in decision-making.\textsuperscript{77}
Programming approaches

This section outlines several programming approaches and models used by development actors to address vulnerability and risk and build resilience, peace and recovery in Somalia, as captured in the research. It highlights areas of best practice and key challenges, for learning purposes in Somalia and globally.

Supporting durable solutions in parallel to lifesaving assistance

Somalia is a strong example of where progress has been made in supporting durable solutions in displacement contexts and addressing the structural causes of crisis in parallel to immediate lifesaving assistance.

Momentum at the international policy levels on fostering durable solutions in displacement situations, as articulated in the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework and the Global Compact for Refugees, has been matched by an expansion of the range and scale of programming on longer term approaches in Somalia since 2016. Notable progress has been made in a short period. The EU, donors (notably the UK, Denmark and Switzerland), UN agencies (including IOM, UNDP and UNHCR) and international and local NGOs, with support from ReDSS, have played a key role in pushing this agenda at both the policy and operational levels.

At the policy level, these actors focus on building the capacity of government ministries and authorities on a durable solutions approach – at both FGS and member state levels – through secondments of international agency staff to national authorities and pushing for political buy-in to this agenda within Somalia and regionally. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development has played a key role in driving this and supporting governments in the Horn of Africa region to develop national action plans for durable solutions, notably in alignment with the Kampala Declaration on Jobs, Livelihoods and Self-Reliance for Refugees, Returned and Host Communities (March 2019).

In Somalia, durable solutions are identified as a development priority in NDP9. The Durable Solutions Secretariat, housed under MoPIED, led the development of a national durable solutions strategy (supported by the Danwadaag Solutions Consortium) and the National Action Plan on Durable Solutions for Somali Returnees and IDPs (supported by UNHCR). This progress has been instrumental in furthering the prioritisation of durable solutions within national development plans and supporting the FGS to develop and adopt a set of endorsed programming principles on durable solutions, with support from ReDSS and the UN Resident Coordinator’s Office. These principles focus on government leadership, area-based, joined-up HDP and community-driven approaches, inclusion and sustainability. Interviewees report that secondees from UNHCR to MoPIED initiated the formation of the Durable Solutions Secretariat, which is the coordination body for cross-government collective progress on this agenda. Furthermore, UNHCR has
played a lead role in supporting the FGS to ratify the Kampala Convention, key for the protection of IDPs, and the development of domestic displacement legislation.

At the operational level, three key programmes have emerged from the political focus on durable solutions and seek to test the endorsed programming principles:

1. Enhancing Somalia’s responsiveness to the management and reintegration of mixed migration flows (RE-INTEG) programme. Learning from the delivery of durable solutions programming principles, which include criteria around the provision of capacity development and secondments, have informed a similar approach in the Durable Solutions Programme and the Danwadaag programme.

2. The Danwadaag programme (2018–2022), led by IOM with NRC, CWW, Juba Foundation, Gargaar Relief Development Organisation and ReDSS members and funded by the UK. This programme incorporated learnings captured in RE-INTEG. Danwadaag has a focus on early solutions planning and local integration.

3. The Durable Solutions Programme 2017–2020, led by the Danish Refugee Council with Tetra Tech and ReDSS as partners, and funded by Denmark, seeks to facilitate successful (re)integration of displaced communities by ensuring physical, material and legal safety is achieved through a combination of protection, livelihoods and basic needs programming.

Key challenges to date include the need for greater coordination between HDP actors, shared data and greater transparency, localised approaches and government leadership of the durable solution agenda with appropriate capacity building support from international actors.

Another challenge is the application of the government’s recognition of IDP rights. Although the FGS’ ratification of the Kampala Convention in 2019 was a positive step, some interviewees are pessimistic as to how this will be applied in practice. Gaining greater acceptance from politicians and clans to allow rights for IDPs living in their communities will be important to continue progress on this agenda.

Community-based resilience and preventative action to address the risk of crises

Interviewees unanimously argue that a crisis is not a crisis if it happens every year. This highlights the need for sustainable development investments in preparedness, early action and resilience to address the risk of flooding, drought and, now, the locust crisis.

Interviewees suggest a cost-effective and sustainable solution to recurring (often bi-annual) flooding in Somalia (e.g. in the city of Baidoa) is to invest in infrastructure to rebuild the river embankment through development assistance, as opposed to the current reactive short-term humanitarian assistance. The cost benefits of investing in disaster prevention and in resilient communities and systems is captured in the NDPl9 and the Recovery and Resilience Framework (RRF) and reflected in partner strategies (e.g. of the UN, World Bank, EU and individual donors). Development investments in preparedness and resilience are crucial given the constraints faced by humanitarian actors and the challenge of focusing beyond immediate lifesaving assistance within finite resources.
Somalia has been a target of much innovative resilience work over recent years, especially since the 2011 famine. NGO consortia have played a key role in testing community-based resilience efforts in Somalia, particularly BRCiS and SomReP. While there has been significant progress through community-based initiatives, interviewees highlight the need to scale-up project-level interventions and connect them strategically to government policies and agendas for greater sustainability and impact. Donors interviewed highlight the need for resilience to be embedded holistically within national priorities on safety nets, social protection, food systems and livelihoods. The RRF provides the policy framework for this, but practically this requires greater coordination of actors working on resilience, safety nets and recovery towards shared outcomes, and a scale up of development investments in these areas, shifting from a historically humanitarian-led resilience agenda.

In other countries in the Horn of Africa region where government structures are well established, donors have supported national safety nets and livelihoods programmes to embed shock-responsive mechanisms for addressing peaks in needs; for example, the Productive Safety Nets Programme in Ethiopia. Development partners should seek to support the government to establish similar nationally led programmes in Somalia. The World-Bank-funded Shock Responsive Safety Net for Human Capital Project ‘Baxnaano’, and the Shock Responsive Safety Net for Locust Response Project that builds on it, may be the foundation for this. Embedding shock-responsive mechanisms within the national safety nets programme will enable development actors to scale up and down in response to changing contexts. Documenting and publicly sharing lessons will be vital to inform the scaling up of national shock responsive safety nets programmes in Somalia (through an iterative process as government capacity develops) and elsewhere.

Building on effective existing resilience and preparedness programmes will be key, such as BRCiS, SomReP and the FAO, WFP and UNICEF joint resilience programme. The BRCiS consortium is in discussions with the Ministry of Finance to scale up pilots trialled through the programme in partnership with the World Bank. This is funded under the early recovery component of the World-Bank-funded Somalia Crisis Recovery Project (see ‘Financing tools’ section), and BRCiS is scoping opportunities to link it to the World Bank national safety nets cash transfer programme.

Disaster risk reduction is also an important point of synergy for humanitarian, development and peace actors. Drought and flooding are among the most common hazards in Somalia and are major causes of socioeconomic risk, and the intersection of drought, famine and violent conflict has contributed to internal and cross-border displacement. The Somalia Drought Impact Needs Assessment is a significant example of close collaboration between humanitarian responses and development investment in this area, gathering 180 sector experts from across the FGS, UN, EU and the World Bank. In 2017, the FGS established the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management, with disaster risk reduction interventions within its remit. The FGS also adopted the Somalia National Disaster Management Policy, setting out the legislative framework for disaster management and improving governance at the federal and state levels. The Drought Impact and Needs Assessment was an important step that led to the development of the RRF, which provides a comprehensive framework for policymaking in this area. According to interviewees, however, the status of the RRF is currently unclear.
Medium- to long-term support for risk reduction, prevention and recovery

Some major development partners are beginning to support medium- to long-term recovery and development efforts in Somalia, addressing the structural drivers of crisis and supporting durable approaches to managing disasters, conflicts or forced displacement in parallel with immediate lifesaving assistance. The World Bank, which has been described by interviewees as a ‘game-changer’ on this agenda, established the ‘Baxnaano’ government-led national safety nets programme in collaboration with the Ministry of Labour to lay foundations for longer term social protection systems. This programme supports vulnerable households “to increase their income and consumption and to improve their ability to cope with shocks through predictable access to transfers, while enhancing and protecting human capital”. The Shock Responsive Safety Net for Locust Response Project builds on this existing safety net programme and focuses on the locust-oriented protection of food security and livelihoods (adding a US$40 million IDA grant to the safety nets programme). It targets the immediate impact on poor and vulnerable households through short-term food security and consumption needs and safeguarding livelihoods and human capital assets through emergency cash transfers.

The safety net programme is delivered through UN agencies and international NGOs with pre-existing programmes (in partnership with WFP and UNICEF). This is a transitional measure until government structures are established and have the capacity to lead in government-held areas, and where this is appropriate in terms of safeguarding humanitarian principles. While the Ministry of Labour is a lead agency, decentralising the management of this programme to member state and local government levels will be crucial for developing the social contract between the government and society for greater sustainability and impact. The branding of the programme as a nationally led initiative has also been key for building state legitimacy. Channelling development finance through humanitarian structures is relatively rare, though it has been trialled in other countries such as Yemen and Bangladesh. Yet, to meet policy ambitions to scale up and prioritise developmental responses to crises, this approach should become standard, with lessons shared for uptake in other contexts.

The EU also plays a key role in the delivery of safety net programming. EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa funding is channelled through existing humanitarian cash transfer structures with the aim of transforming them into predictable, scalable and sustainable programmes with embedded mechanisms for responding to shock. The EU has also supported a separate pilot safety nets programme as the third component of the Inclusive Local Economic Development Programme funded through the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa since 2019 (€98 million).

There is a clear division of responsibilities between humanitarian and development actors working in parallel to complement each other in the delivery of national safety net programming. The World Bank aims to address the livelihood and recovery needs of vulnerable families, and ECHO to support transitory needs in response to shocks. ECHO is piloting the provision of humanitarian assistance to top up assistance provided through the national safety nets programme in the context of heightened needs resulting from the triple impact of floods, locusts and Covid-19. A key learning is that targeting the
same communities enables close collaboration across the nexus. The safety net programme targets the same beneficiaries of developmental nutrition and health programming to enable coordination across humanitarian and development assistance.

**Foundations for development and recovery during a crisis**

Parallel HDP programming is evident in active crises where development and peacebuilding actors work to lay the foundations for recovery alongside ongoing humanitarian assistance. Examples include:

- **Strengthening longer term education for displaced communities provided by development actors in parallel to humanitarian assistance**: ECHO and DEVCO work collaboratively to provide education services for displaced communities in hard-to-reach areas, with DEVCO supporting longer term ambitions through teacher and vocational training and distance learning since the emergence of Covid-19.

- **Strengthening capacities of local government**: The Joint Programme for Local Governance is a five-year (2018–2023) joint UN programme led by UNDP, UNICEF, IOM, UN Capital Development Fund and UN Human Settlements Programme that complements humanitarian assistance. It builds local government capacity in early recovery areas where humanitarian assistance is active, specifically in terms of systems for public procurement, budgeting and tax collection, and supports service delivery in health, market access and education. The programme has not only strengthened local institutions but also demonstrated that (re)building a local tax base is a durable way to raise revenue for local authorities and solve chronic deficiencies in public service provision while improving accountability to and participation of citizens. The programme has enabled municipalities to complement humanitarian and development assistance through locally raised tax revenues to finance service delivery. Interviewees report that humanitarian actors, such as NRC and WFP, also prioritise capacity building for local government institutions to support durable solutions, sustainable food systems and safety nets.

- **Laying foundations to strengthen health systems through the Covid-19 response**: the UN Population Fund (UNFPA), UNICEF and WHO support parallel lifesaving and longer term responses to Covid-19. For example, UNICEF supports the establishment of COVID emergency sites within existing health clinics, working closely with WHO and UNFPA who support the longer term needs of the health facility to reduce transmission and training. UNFPA Somalia produces Covid-19 vulnerability mapping by risk factor and related indicators from the Somali Health and Demographic Survey for major towns in the country, designed to guide humanitarian partners for targeted Covid-19 risk communication and community engagement activities. UNFPA supports activities to help prevent the spread and transmission of Covid-19 in emergency obstetric care and neonatal care facilities.89
- **Strengthening market access and agricultural value chains to support recovery and longer term development:** Development actors have a clear role to play in transitioning from humanitarian-led livelihoods and cash-for-work programmes to longer term private-sector-led recovery and development. The Promoting Inclusive Markets in Somalia programme (2014–2018), funded by the UK and Denmark, aimed to strengthen private sector development and market systems by improving productivity, livelihoods and job creation in key agricultural value chains (livestock production, fisheries, poultry and crop production). The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) Growth, Enterprise, Employment and Livelihoods Programme and the UN Joint Programme on Youth Employment also pursued similar objectives. The Promoting Inclusive Markets in Somalia programme integrated a cash-for-work component to rehabilitate market infrastructure, which created durable assets with long-term economic benefits to farmers. It also promoted productivity-enhancing inputs and practices (e.g. high-yielding seeds, suitable fertilisers and harvesting techniques). A key challenge is the limited access to finance for smallholders and learning around the need to address this issue in parallel to market system strengthening efforts.\(^90\)

- **Stabilisation providing conditions for longer term government-led service delivery in liberated areas:** Stabilisation and security actors (e.g. the African Union Mission in Somalia and USAID through the Office of Transition Initiatives) work to liberate areas held by al-Shabaab. While this creates conditions for recovery and enables access, there is a significant time lag between liberation and transition to government-led service delivery. UNDP is scoping ways to support appointed district governments in advance of a formally elected government to establish services. There is a need to identify interim solutions where development actors can support durable approaches to recovery and service delivery in recently liberated areas where local government structures are not yet in functioning.\(^90\)

**Role for development actors in promoting peace**

Over the last decade, key donors have focused on state-building, governance and security as a prerequisite for socioeconomic recovery and development. The EU committed €286 million to programming in Somalia from 2014 to 2020, of which €119 million was for state-building and peacebuilding;\(^91\) the US provided extensive support for state-building and security, including military support to reduce the threat posed by al-Shabaab.\(^92\) Many development actors support security and state-building objectives in Somalia, such as UNDP’s support for security sector reform, and some actors incorporate conflict-sensitivity tools and approaches into development programming.

The approach to stabilisation, including internationally backed military operations to clear territory controlled by al-Shabaab, has clear political and security objectives. It is therefore a departure from conflict-sensitive and peacebuilding approaches that many development actors have adopted. In many ways it has overshadowed investment in community-based peacebuilding and social cohesion. There has been an effort recently to address this and scale up programming on social cohesion and community
peacebuilding. The UN Peacebuilding Fund has been an enabler for the UN to link recovery, stabilisation, local governance and peacebuilding in Somalia. Since 2015, it has invested close to US$40 million in programmes seeking to improve governance by enabling local authorities and communities to rebuild trust around the delivery of services, resolve local conflicts and strengthen employment. The ‘Midnimo’ project seeks to strengthen community-driven responses to displacement and instability. It is led jointly by the FGS, and the ministries of interior of South West State and Jubaland and is implemented by IOM, UN Human Settlements Programme and UNDP. Through the risk-taking and catalytic nature of this fund, development actors can support durable approaches and recovery in areas previously accessed only by humanitarian actors. The challenge now is to scale up community-based approaches to peacebuilding and conflict-sensitive recovery. Interviewees highlight the need for social cohesion efforts to also include rural areas where peacebuilding efforts between returning IDPs and local communities is vital.

There is a lack of consensus in Somalia on how to include ‘peace’ in a joined-up HDP approach where active crisis persists. Engaging closely with stabilisation and counter-insurgency efforts in these regions is particularly sensitive for humanitarian agencies, who are concerned about safeguarding humanitarian principles. Nonetheless, there may be scope for greater cooperation in contexts in which both humanitarian and stabilisation actors target the same beneficiaries. For example, IOM’s stabilisation programme works with women associated with al-Shabaab who are in IDP camps served by humanitarian actors. As a minimum, humanitarian agencies accept social cohesion and conflict-sensitivity and ‘do no harm’, and the Durable Solutions Secretariat and related programming efforts are making progress in generating lessons for this.
Financing tools

Crisis financing modalities to strengthen development actors’ engagement

The World Bank and other multilateral development banks have established a range of crisis financing modalities that are now benefiting Somalia. Somalia has received funding through the World Bank’s IDA Crisis Response Window, which is funding the Somalia Crisis Recovery Project and the Emergency Locust Response Programme. It also received funding through the Crisis Response Window for the Emergency Drought Response and Recovery Project, implemented by the FAO and International Committee of the Red Cross, which supported the immediate needs of drought-affected people following the 2017 drought and recovery through the provision of livelihood opportunities and restoration of agricultural and pastoral production. An impact evaluation in 2019 found that this approach strategically addressed gaps in the immediate and early recovery response and helped to avert a potential famine.

The World Bank’s IDA also established a Window for Host Communities and Refugees. This window is only available to refugee hosting countries, however, and not for IDP situations, meaning Somalia is not eligible to access it to support durable solutions to internal displacement. Nonetheless, there are clear parallels between refugee and IDP situations and, based on learning from refugee contexts, the World Bank might consider developing a vehicle based on similar principles for IDP contexts.

Multilateral development banks have also recently established financing vehicles to respond to Covid-19, dramatically scaling up their response. Existing grants have also been modified in response to unforeseen needs, for example the Somalia Crisis Recovery Project was originally established to address flooding and the locust crisis and was adapted to address Covid-19 with additional funding from the global Covid-19 facility.

Overall, interviewees see the World Bank’s engagement through these vehicles as filling a gap in larger scale funding to address the medium- to long-term issues that increase vulnerability to disasters. For example, the Somalia Crisis Recovery Project includes objectives on rehabilitating flood control and water and sanitation systems, measures to control the locust population, investments in flood and drought preparedness and risk management, and the establishment of national social safety net and social protection programmes to help manage shocks. The role of development actors here complements that of humanitarian actors, whose focus is on addressing acute and immediate needs. In addition, development actors also have a role in developing national capacities and systems to respond to shocks and peaks in need through safety net programmes. Notably, the World Bank finances government-managed projects with service contracts to UN agencies to provide support with delivery of safety net programmes where government capacity is lacking. Given the nascency of many of these mechanisms,
further evidence on their impact is needed to generate lessons and assess areas of success for broader uptake.

**Flexibility of development funding**

The volatile context in Somalia has pushed development actors to fundamentally consider the way they work in fragile, conflict-affected contexts, including embedding risk and adaptability into programming. In line with principles for aid effectiveness in fragile states, donors have established a number of pooled financing mechanisms that aim to increase coordination and alignment among donors. In addition, although development planning and budgeting is generally long term and lacks flexibility, Somalia is a context in which donors have trialled contingency financing mechanisms and have used crisis-financing windows to scale up responses to unforeseen crises.

*Covid-19 has pushed donors to offer greater funding flexibility than previously experienced, highlighting lessons for broader uptake*

Responding at short notice to Covid-19 has demonstrated how flexibility takes place in practice (Box 4). The main donors in Somalia (the UK, Germany, EU, World Bank and USAID) have all, according to partner agencies, requested that they repurpose existing development plans to make them more responsive to Covid-19. The SomReP programme is an example of timely adaptations to the Covid-19 response. Other examples include: UN agencies reprioritising humanitarian response plan priorities; the UK’s encouragement of partners to give some programmes a greater health and nutrition focus, looking at preventing the spread; and World Vision International adapting programmes to focus on water provision and building resilience to the longer term socioeconomic impacts of Covid-19, working with village savings and loans associations.

While repurposing has demonstrated how funding can be flexible in response to a rapid-onset crisis, it may also reflect that little new funding was available to respond to Covid-19, and the delivery of many existing programmes was likely to be negatively impacted by Covid-19 and the restrictions imposed.

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**Box 4: Adapting to Covid-19 through flexible programming**

The well-established SomReP programme (see Box 2) has adapted in response to Covid-19, which is encouraged by its donors. Through the Somalia Response Innovation Lab, SomReP is working with various partners to develop public health messaging in Somalia and deliver accurate public health information with endorsement from the Somali government. Additionally, the lab has been working with sector partners to undertake local assessments, identify challenges and gaps in the Covid-19 response, and source solutions to meet those challenges. Such assessment identified the need to quickly address rising levels of misinformation driving stigmatisation and gender-based violence resulting from Covid-19. Efforts are underway to document and share learnings in responding effectively to Covid-19 at
the local level, to mobilise the private sector to scale up messaging and make links to longer term resilience.

Delivery agencies report that donors were quicker at approving programme changes because of Covid-19 than for other crises. This demonstrates that flexibility (and the overriding of bureaucratic systems) is possible where there is political motivation, as with Covid-19 and its implications in donors’ own countries. For example, IOM reported that it was able to adapt programmes funded by Germany in response to Covid-19 in a much faster timeframe than was previously the case, where it would often take four or more months for a decision to be made.

At the onset of Covid-19, FAO transitioned fully to mobile money cash transfers and dissemination of livelihood input entitlements through e-vouchers sent by SMS. FAO, however, report that even though there has been flexibility in responding to new crises, as a result of Covid-19 and travel restrictions there is a gap in terms of personnel to deliver. Learning from the timely and flexible responses accelerated by Covid-19 could encourage such an approach to be systematised and scaled up in response to all unforeseen crises.

**Impact of donor practices on the partner’s ability to be flexible**

Interviewees report that certain UN agencies and international NGOs can adapt their budgets more than others, but this is largely a result of differing practices of their donors (e.g. where the UK’s and the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development’s partnership agreements enable greater flexibility than others, notably USAID). This depends on a variety of factors, including whether:

- Decision-making on budgets is decentralised enabling a timelier response or subject to a slow and bureaucratic process involving central teams. Covid-19 has demonstrated that this depends on whether pre-agreements for responses are in place with partners on the basis of risk assessments, whether stockpiling is underway and if supply chains pre-identified.95
- There are demarcations between humanitarian and development activities within country budget allocations restricting joining up and flexibility in response to contextual change.
- Internal risk financing facilities are in place and embedded in partnership agreements.
- Funds are earmarked or not, with vulnerability-based targeting enabling greater flexibility than sector-based targeting.

While flexing existing funds is one way to scale-up responses, re-allocating resources alone may not be sufficient to deal with the rapid onset of a crisis and may divert funding away from other urgent priorities, highlighting the need for additional financing in parallel.
Contingency financing mechanisms have been trialled in Somalia; the challenge now is to systematise them into development programmes

Contingency mechanisms have enabled international actors to be flexible and scale up in response to unforeseen events, most notably with regards to the 2017 drought and perceived prevention of a famine. This has largely been through the scale up of humanitarian assistance, given the history of Somalia as a largely humanitarian context until recently, and because contingency or reserve financing rooted within humanitarian assistance is a lifesaving and time-sensitive mechanism.

There is a variety of donor and UN reserve and pooled funds that humanitarian actors can draw on in the case of unforeseen events to scale up responses. Examples include the UK’s Crisis Reserve Fund, the Central Emergency Relief Fund, the Country-Based Pooled Fund, and UNHCR’s emergency reserve, which paid out US$5 million in May 2020 enabling a timely response to flooding. Crisis modifiers are also embedded in ECHO, USAID and Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation humanitarian programmes and partner agreements up to a threshold. BRCiS and SomReP programmes also include crisis modifiers, enabling members to scale up activities in response to peaks in needs.

At the donor level, the UK’s Internal Risk Facility (IRF) provides the option to embed contingency financing into programme design and is available for humanitarian and development assistance; however, our research on the UK’s approach to the nexus found the IRF is largely used in humanitarian programmes, with great potential to widen uptake in development programmes.96 The IRF worked quickly and effectively to scale up responses to the 2017 drought demonstrating the ‘no regrets’ approach in practice, responding to triggers flagged through the FAO Early Warning Dashboard.97 The IRF also enables the BRCiS programme to scale up community safety nets programming in collaboration with the cash consortium in response to peaks in needs identified through this Dashboard.

Development programmes traditionally have not had the flexibility to re-allocate funding to address surges in need. Contingency funding mechanisms, such as crisis modifiers, can allow development actors to better respond to them, helping to bridge the gap between development work and humanitarian responses. This is particularly important in fragile contexts such as Somalia, where contingency financing mechanisms enable development actors to invest in programming to address the root causes of vulnerability while being able to respond flexibly to anticipated shocks and short-term needs.

In addition to the UK’s IRF, other development actors in Somalia are making progress in this area. The World-Bank-funded Baxnaano Shock Responsive Safety Net and the Shock Responsive Safety Net for Locust Response programmes are recent examples of mechanisms embedded at the national level. Lessons from the expansion of these programmes are valuable for the World Bank and other development actors.

While these are examples, contingency financing mechanisms are not currently systematised in development programming. Although interviewees are not specific about the barriers preventing wider uptake or use of these mechanisms, other research has
indicated a pressure to ensure such funds are fully allocated and a lack of understanding or willingness to use these mechanisms outside of humanitarian programming. Contingency financing mechanisms are vital for a timely early response to crisis and should be a standard feature of development programmes. The actions needed are firstly to generate widespread buy-in and commitment to the establishment of internal risk financing mechanisms by development actors; secondly to provide advice and learning on the technical aspects of doing this effectively; and thirdly to establish systems to broaden uptake. It is important, however, to recognise that early and effective responses are not solely about money. For contingency financing mechanisms to work quickly and effectively, there must be pre-arrangements in place for decision-making processes on who can be funded, within what time scale, and via which delivery mechanisms.

Operationally, interviewees feel adaptation and scale up of development activities to address recovery and development needs of crisis-affected communities is more effective within (e.g. multi-mandate organisations) than between agencies. There are many examples of where programmes implemented by development teams in multi-mandate organisations are complemented by humanitarian teams who scale up assistance for the same target group considering heightened needs. For example, during the 2019 drought in Sanaag, CARE drew upon contingency financing from the EU to scale up school feeding programmes with support from humanitarian teams to expand the number of pupils reached and address risks of heightened food insecurity in rural areas.

**Pooled development funds for coordination and flexibility**

As part of the 2013 New Deal Compact for Somalia, the FGS and development partners established the SDRF as a mechanism to enhance donor coordination and country ownership. The SDRF aims to address the legacy of fragmented and project-based aid, providing a common governance framework for three aligned funds set up to pool donor contributions: the UN MPTF, the World Bank MPF, and the AfDB’s multi-partner SIF. Total contributions to SDRF funds have increased year on year since 2014, rising from US$47.8 million in 2014 to US$225.0 million in 2019.

The UN MPTF aims to enable collective and coordinated programming, with oversight from the government helping to ensure strategic alignment with national priorities and greater coherence across funding sources. The fund also seeks to facilitate the integration of the UN system within Somalia. Up until recently, it has been used as a conduit to fund joint programmes but lacked the dedicated management capacity at country level to play a more strategic role. Interviewees noted challenges with the UN MPTF, including the reluctance of some donors to provide unearmarked funding, instead reportedly earmarking funds to specific projects as pressure mounts in home countries for greater accountability, or a desire for greater visibility leading some donors to fund more bilaterally. There is also a sense among donors that the UN MPTF is not operating effectively or at the strategic level and is constrained by bureaucracy, ‘clunky’ approval processes and weak delivery and monitoring. The recent appointment of a dedicated manager raises hopes that the fund can gain greater donor confidence and deliver on its potential by improving its strategic direction, facilitating increased coordination between the SDRF funds and better aligning programming.
Donor contributions to the UN MPTF dropped from US$91.1 million in 2018 to US$75.5 million in 2019, before a further decrease to US$72.6 million in 2020. There are reports that donors are beginning to shift and channel funds through bilateral aid programmes as opposed to the UN MPTF to enable greater control over how funds are spent and reduce levels of bureaucracy. This has implications in terms of transparency and accountability and raises questions on the effectiveness of existing UN trust fund management systems and how to strengthen value for money and localise responses. Some interviewees allude to a likely scale up of alternative funds channelled through the government for greater sustainability or managed nationally or by IFIs, especially given Somalia’s new status as a HIPC and qualification for debt relief. Established in 2013, the World Bank MPF was the primary source of financing for the World Bank’s early re-engagement in Somalia. The fund has focused on strengthening both federal and state government systems through financial governance, oversight and advisory services, as well as economic opportunities. The MPF has experienced an increased volume of funding and a number of supporting donors since its inception, and the 2019 mid-term review of the MPF indicated that the fund has been a catalyst for building and strengthening government institutions and enabled harmonisation of policy dialogue. While the World Bank MPF has made significant progress in strengthening government capacity and aligning international assistance with government priorities, as with the UN MPTF, it has been identified as needing greater capacity to respond dynamically and flexibly to the fragile operating context.

The AfDB’s multi-partner SIF became operational in 2016 and supports and accelerates Somalia’s inclusive and sustainable economic recovery, peace and state-building, with a focus on infrastructure rehabilitation and development. Recent examples of SIF contributions include improvements in water, sanitation and roading infrastructure; improved economic and financial governance through the establishment of a Debt Management Unit in the Ministry of Finance; and helping build government capacity through supporting the recruitment of civil servants at both FGS and federal member state levels.

The Somalia Stability Fund is another multi-donor instrument, which was established in 2012 and entered a second phase in 2016 to strengthen local governance and mitigate conflict. While much smaller in scale than the above funds, it has been effective and offers lessons regarding the management of pooled development funds and improving development practice through adaptive, bottom-up and decentralised ways of working. The Somalia Stability Fund’s governance model places the Secretariat’s office, a separate entity from the donor committee, at the centre of decision-making, enabling management decisions to be driven by the local context and knowledge of local staff based within the Secretariat (prompter than if led from outside the country).

A key challenge for pooled development funds in Somalia is maintaining a focus on addressing the structural causes of vulnerability while supporting responses to emerging or short-term crises. This could be done through increasing funding to existing programmes financed by pooled funds while working with donors to address concerns around transparency and accountability. Further decentralising the management of these funds through nationally situated and staffed mechanisms is also likely to enable greater alignment to local needs, understanding of the context, flexibility and cost effectiveness.
Conclusion and recommendations

For over 30 years Somalia has experienced a complex mix of political instability, frequent conflict, and violence and cyclical environmental (and now, disease-related) shocks, driving protracted internal displacement and widespread vulnerability. The scale and intensity of crisis in Somalia and its political relevance to international security agendas has meant it continues to be a priority country for most donors and agencies. The political transition in 2017 has opened doors to shift from a purely humanitarian and stabilisation context, lacking legitimate or functioning government structures, towards recovery and longer term development as government capacity develops.

Below are recommendations drawing on this research for strengthening the effectiveness of development actors in Somalia in addressing risk and vulnerabilities and building resilience, recovery and peacebuilding, and lessons that can be drawn for other contexts. These recommendations are intended primarily for international development actors – working specifically in Somalia and globally.

Recommendations

Strategy and partnerships

There should be a focus on federal and state government capacity for service delivery

IFIs are changing the landscape and embracing risk by testing approaches that provide finance through government systems in parallel with supporting the government with financial reforms. This should be scaled up cautiously; it is vital for donors to collectively manage risks of corruption and political competition and impacts on conflict, including by supporting the national treasury to ensure accountability in financial management.

Donors should support Somalia’s political settlement and promote a decentralised model of service delivery in government-held areas, alongside strengthening public financial planning, management and accountability mechanisms. It will be important to navigate ongoing uncertainties and political tensions around the functions of different levels of government. Genuine institution-building must be a clear part of this ambition – going beyond secondments and short-term approaches to invest in long-term capacity development at different levels of the government as collectively prioritised by international actors and the government. Developing governmental capacity across the country is a long-term effort and donors should find ways to address the immediate needs of vulnerable populations concurrently. The World-Bank-funded safety net programmes are example of this. Donors should also work with non-state actors, including NGOs and the private sector, to develop their capacity to strengthen governance and accountability.
While to date the focus of development partners has been on state-building, there must now be greater emphasis on supporting the government to play a greater role in service delivery and ensure the most vulnerable populations are prioritised in resource allocation, in line with the SDGs and NDPs. Many donors set out development priorities in their country strategies and guiding documents. As the FGS builds capacity for service delivery, the World Bank and other development partners should ensure their partnerships and dialogue with the FGS prioritise service delivery, social protection systems, livelihoods, economic development initiatives aimed at expanding the government’s fiscal base, and other interventions necessary to achieve medium- to long-term solutions to achieve the SDGs. This could include benchmarks that focus explicitly on social outcomes in accountability and country partnership frameworks, such as the development of a social registry recently proposed by the World Bank. Adequate staffing of ministries focusing on social development at federal and state levels will be key. It will also be crucial to ensure that donor non-crisis financing to infrastructure and economic development is conflict sensitive, and that providing the government with finance has been assessed in terms of its impact on conflict. The establishment of Somalia’s federal structure is an opportunity for development partners to expand technical and financial support to government-led service delivery at the state and municipality level, although it will be important to navigate uncertainties and political tensions around the functions of each level of government.

Localised responses should be scaled up through financing and capacity building for Somali NGOs, with the inclusion of private sector actors

Local and national NGOs are well established in Somalia, having played a key role in humanitarian responses since the drought in 2011 and in advocacy on the localisation agenda. The establishment of NGO consortia, for example through BRCis, SomReP and RE-INTEG, and the move to increase the participation of Somali NGOs is positive. However, to further localisation commitments made at the World Humanitarian Summit, a change in the way that donors approach and finance partnerships with local NGOs is needed. Somali NGOs should be included in consortia from the outset and involved in decision-making and management structures. Donors should consider options for scaling up direct funding to Somali NGOs through pooled development funds, learning from similar humanitarian funds (e.g. the Country-Based Pooled Fund). Scaling up capacity-building programmes for Somali NGOs and strengthening third-party monitoring structures will help to manage associated risks of partnering with local NGOs, as will plans to establish an NGO office and code of conduct. Local private actors also play a key role in delivery (e.g. in cash programming) and should be included in capacity building and financing considerations alongside local and national NGOs.

**Coordination, planning and prioritisation**

Organisational change should take place to deliver the nexus, not just informal collaboration

Our research found that UN agencies and NGOs with mandates encompassing humanitarian and development (and sometimes political or peace) were better able to coordinate programming than those with a more limited mandate. Nonetheless, even
within donors and agencies with encompassing mandates, humanitarian, development and political portfolios or programmes were often handled by different teams, with limited systematic internal cooperation. This highlights that collaboration, coherence and complementarity between HDP actors may require a fundamental review of organisational mandates and a process of organisational change, which will require strong leadership. This should break down silos in planning processes and budget allocation, create formal coordination mechanisms or re-organise humanitarian, development and political teams (e.g. around sectoral or geographic area based priorities). For agencies where clear separation is regarded as necessary for safeguarding humanitarian principles, building complementarity and information-sharing should be sought as a minimum.

Existing coordination mechanisms and development plans should be better aligned and built on as the basis for identifying shared outcomes and strengthening coordination among HDP actors

Somalia has an elaborate aid architecture, in which humanitarian and development actors have separate structures for coordinating among themselves and with government. While there are some examples of coordination across the HDP nexus, this is not systematic. There are multiple coordination platforms at the federal, member state and district levels, which could be better aligned and inclusive of actors that are currently not well represented (such as peacebuilding and private sector actors). Regular joint analysis, drawing together expertise from across the HDP nexus, is not yet the norm, although the latest UN Common Country Analysis is considered a good example.

Given the complexity of existing coordination mechanisms, there is little appetite in country to establish new standalone nexus coordination structures. Ideally, existing coordination mechanisms and development planning processes should be built on to better link up HDP actors around joint analysis, planning and the implementation of collective outcomes. The UN has taken the lead in nexus coordination and planning and collective outcomes initiatives, and there is limited engagement and ownership by the government and key development players, including IFIs. While four collective outcomes were agreed by a group of humanitarian and development actors in 2018, the extent of buy-in among non-UN actors for their implementation is unclear and there is a lack of ownership by development actors.

For nexus collaboration to be effective, leadership and buy-in is required from both development and humanitarian actors, with government. The UN and World Bank should play such a role, formally leading strategic nexus coordination and planning and shared outcomes initiatives, in line with the IASC Light Guidance on Collective Outcomes, jointly with government counterparts. Coordination should go beyond UN actors, and be as inclusive as possible while still functioning effectively.

The NDP9 and accompanying cooperation frameworks could provide a strong basis for coordination between government and all international actors, but they are currently more effective at coordinating development and security actors and have not managed to bring together the full range of HDP actors. The new aid architecture under NDP9 is starting to be operationalised and provides the foundation for the recently signed UN Cooperation
Framework. The new nexus coordination mechanism proposed by the UN should seek to complement and support these nationally led coordination efforts.

There has been strengthened coordination of development and humanitarian actors working on health as a result of the Covid-19 response. This success could be built on across sectors, and area-based programming models that are strengthening coordination at local levels could be scaled up. Sub-national HDP coordination mechanisms could be established with the involvement of government, depending on the context.

At both national and sub-national levels it is, however, vital to maintain separation of humanitarian coordination and the independence of the Humanitarian Country Team. This is particularly important for assistance to states where conflict is active, where areas are controlled by non-state armed groups, and where coherence is not an option, both practically and to safeguard humanitarian principles. In certain circumstances, the humanitarian sector’s duty to respect the humanitarian principles of neutrality and independence in order to access people in need must take precedence over greater collaboration across the HDP nexus. Establishing mechanisms that bring together HDP actors should therefore complement and not replace separate humanitarian coordination mechanisms.

Donors should reconsider funding and system requirements to provide greater incentives to work collaboratively across the humanitarian, development and peace sectors

Entrenched ways of working and a lack of incentives to collaborate across the humanitarian, development and peace sectors can be a barrier to implementing nexus approaches in practice. Funding is a powerful incentive, and donors should create an environment conductive to collaboration and innovation. Channelling greater volumes of funding through joint programmes or pooled funds can help, as can sharing clear expectations on nexus commitments with all recipients of core and programme funding and supporting partners’ staffing capacities. Flexible funding is key to allow partners the space to iterate and innovate, but at the same time clear requirements and accountability to ensure that partners will make connections within and between themselves are needed. Donors should explore how this can be built into contracts without restricting partners or adding to reporting burdens.

Consensus should be sought on the opportunities and limits to collaboration in stabilisation or active conflict settings

In Somalia and elsewhere, the most challenging aspect of the nexus is understanding how peace and humanitarian components align. Humanitarian actors accept the principle of ‘do no harm’ (as a minimum) or conflict sensitivity (as a maximum) and have begun to integrate social cohesion or peace components into their programmes. However, there are clear limits to how humanitarian action can and should be joined up with development and peace initiatives that have clear political or security objectives. This is particularly true in areas of active conflict or where counter-terrorism or stabilisation efforts are ongoing, given the importance of safeguarding humanitarian principles. Dialogue is needed between humanitarian and political, peace and security actors on the opportunities, limits and principles for coordination, and systems for communication and information-sharing should be strengthened at a minimum.
The government should be supported to establish a shared data system on vulnerability and poverty that embeds tools for inclusive monitoring and evaluation; however, this should not replace independent humanitarian assessments and data

While agencies produce their own data to inform programming, there is a need to join up data systems as a prerequisite for collaborative programming and identification of outcomes between HDP actors. International actors should support the government to develop national data systems on disaster management, recovery and social protection to inform sustainable and collaborative responses to the immediate and longer term needs of crisis-affected populations, and transparent standards for data management. Data systems currently managed by international actors (such as FAO’s Early Warning Dashboard and FSNAU) should be embedded into these national data frameworks in the medium to long term, coupled with related investment in government institutional capacity development. Such data systems should also capture qualitative indicators on community perceptions and embed this feedback into mutual government and international monitoring frameworks.

Joined-up data and assessments are often necessary for collaborative programming and are appropriate in areas where government structures are strong. In other areas, independent assessments and the protection of humanitarian data is vital for safeguarding humanitarian principles. In these contexts, information sharing and complementarity may be possible where collaborative programming is not. Appropriate joining up of assessments and programming is thus highly context specific and varies across Somalia.

Programming approaches

Community-level resilience and peacebuilding approaches should be scaled up and run in parallel to longer term national efforts

Humanitarian agencies have developed innovative resilience programmes over recent years, making significant yet small scale progress at the community level. For greater impact and reach these should now be scaled up based on learnings from successful programmes (e.g. BRCiS and SomReP). In the longer term, resilience approaches should be embedded more holistically into national efforts to address structural sources of vulnerability and poverty, including national frameworks for shock responsive safety nets, social protection and livelihoods. This will require greater development investments in what has traditionally been a humanitarian-led resilience agenda in Somalia, although the need for parallel complementary humanitarian and development-led programmes will continue in the medium term. This will also depend on a range of sub-national contextual factors including the capacity of and trust in local government structures, the local conflict context and access. Community-based peacebuilding and conflict-sensitive recovery approaches should be scaled up and run in parallel to longer term national efforts. Donors interviewed highlighted the need for resilience to be embedded more holistically within national priorities on safety nets, social protection, food systems and livelihoods.
Durable solutions programming should increasingly be led by development actors

Much progress has been made on the durable solutions agenda for IDPs in Somalia, including buy-in from government and donors. Given the nascent government structures and reliance on parallel humanitarian delivery systems, humanitarian actors have largely led programming in this area. For greater sustainability there is a need to transition leadership and reporting lines to the government and include a broader set of development actors in durable solutions outcomes. Using development finance for this purpose will be a key part of this, scaling up investments from IFIs and mobilising the private sector to strengthen access to finance for displaced communities and small-to-medium enterprises.

Financing tools

The SDRF and multi-partner funds should be reviewed and reinvigorated as mechanisms to enhance coordination and flexibility

The SDRF was established to address the legacy of fragmented and project-based aid by providing a common governance framework for three aligned trust funds set up to pool donor contributions. The SDRF is not yet used to its full potential, however, and donors continue to channel much support bilaterally and outside of government systems. Donor confidence in the UN MPTF has waned, with a preference to earmark funds and channel ODA through bilateral funding agreements where overhead costs are lower. The World Bank MPF, which has supported government capacity, economic opportunity, policy dialogue and alignment of development assistance to national development priorities, has made incremental progress and is looking towards working at a greater scale. While much smaller, the Somalia Stability Fund is an agile, flexible and context-driven pooled fund that can potentially be built on. Pooled development funds in Somalia need to maintain a focus on addressing the structural causes of vulnerability while also supporting responses to emerging or short-term crises. This could be done through increasing funding to existing programmes financed by pooled funds while working with donors to address concerns around transparency and accountability. To enable trust funds to provide funding flexibility there is a need to protect funds from earmarking in alignment with donor’s own political ambitions. To avoid this, a vulnerability criterion for allocation of trust funds could be agreed, and a flexible funding window could be created within the trust funds. Further decentralising the management of these funds through nationally situated and staffed mechanisms is also likely to enable greater alignment to local needs, understanding the context, flexibility and cost effectiveness.

Flexibility and contingency financing should be embedded into development programmes

Contingency financing mechanisms are vital for enabling a timely response to crises but are not yet systematised across development actors, with most progress to date in humanitarian contingency financing. Contingency financing mechanisms, such as crisis modifiers or internal risk financing models, should be embedded into development programmes as standard practice in the planning phase. Development actors should enable a high degree of budget flexibility to re-allocate funds in response to changing needs, with decentralised authorisation and reduced earmarking underpinned by coherent country strategy, planning and budget processes that include humanitarian and development support.
Shock-responsive mechanisms should continue to be embedded into national safety nets and social protection programmes to enable them to be scaled up in response to cyclical environmental shocks. In time, as government capacities are strengthened and trust is built, bilateral aid programmes and direct country partnership frameworks between the government and donors are likely to increase. To ensure that these donor development interventions are crisis responsive and conflict sensitive, it is important to embed contingency financing mechanisms into these country partnership frameworks. This could help strengthen access to contingency risk and crisis finance mechanisms at the national level to complement and better connect country-level strategy with global decision-making associated with dedicated global crisis financing modalities.

Covid-19 has demonstrated that the speed of responding to unforeseen crisis is crucial; rapid finance is important, but so is the ability to plan and deliver quickly (e.g. pre-agreeing response priorities with partners based on risk assessments, managing stockpiling and pre-identifying supply chains). Donors should review and capture learnings from the Covid-19 response and how the speed and scale of response, risk and due diligence are balanced in future crisis financing. Donors should provide flexible funding to respond to Covid-19 and food insecurity issues while addressing long-term socioeconomic impacts and chronic displacement. Operational partners need flexibility to re-programme funds and adapt projects as the pandemic evolves and is compounded by food insecurity caused by continued desert locusts and shifting climatic patterns. Funding re-programmed for short-term Covid-19 responses should not be at the expense of the multi-year funding essential to address longer term socioeconomic impacts of the pandemic on displaced populations and address chronic displacement issues.

**Strengthen evidence on the impact and comparative advantage of global crisis financing mechanisms**

The World Bank and other development finance institutions, notably the AfDB in response to Covid-19, have established a range of global crisis financing modalities that are now benefitting Somalia. As of 2020, Somalia met the requirements for accessing the World Bank’s IDA Crisis Response Window, which is funding the Somalia Crisis Recovery Project and the Emergency Locust Response Programme.

While partners receiving these global funds are extremely positive about their added value, there are questions regarding the impact of these crisis financing modalities, specifically on vulnerable populations, highlighting the need for greater evidence on lessons for broader uptake. The World Bank, UN, AfDB and partners should consider ways to document and share publicly evidence of impact. For stronger alignment with local needs, contextual relevance and local ownership, decentralising the management of these global funds to regional and national levels should be considered. For this, senior analytical capacity on conflict and resilience and the appointment of senior staff with decision-making autonomy at country level will be key.
## Appendix 1: Interviewees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviewee</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Organisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Martijn Goddeeris</td>
<td>Chief of Party</td>
<td>BRCiS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pilly Omara</td>
<td>Conflict Analyst and Policy Advisor - DDG</td>
<td>Danish Refugee Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johan Heffinck</td>
<td>Head of Somalia Office</td>
<td>ECHO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jonathan Brooks</td>
<td>Senior Programme Advisor</td>
<td>FAO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johanna Erhardt</td>
<td>Head of Strategy and Resource Mobilisation</td>
<td>FAO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andrew Lanyon</td>
<td>Resilience and Social Protection Coordinator</td>
<td>FAO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seb Fouquet</td>
<td>Humanitarian, Health and Resilience Team Leader</td>
<td>FCDO Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdirashid Hashi</td>
<td>Executive Director</td>
<td>Heritage Institute for Policy Studies Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matthew DeCristofano</td>
<td>Programme Coordinator</td>
<td>IOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michael Doherty</td>
<td>Programme Manager</td>
<td>IOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David Womble</td>
<td>Programme Coordinator, Recovery and Durable Solutions</td>
<td>IOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asad Yusuf</td>
<td>Head of Donor Engagement Office and Principal Advisor</td>
<td>MoPIED, FGS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victor Moses</td>
<td>Country Director</td>
<td>NRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suze Van Meegan</td>
<td>Global Advocacy and Media Adviser</td>
<td>NRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cindy Issac</td>
<td>Deputy Head of Office</td>
<td>OCHA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tareq Talahma</td>
<td>Head of Office</td>
<td>OCHA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviewee</td>
<td>Position</td>
<td>Organisation</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdurahman Sharif</td>
<td>Senior Special Advisor</td>
<td>Office of the Prime Minister, FGS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdullahi Abdi Hassan</td>
<td>Programme Manager, Somalia</td>
<td>ReDSS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rufus Kinyua Karanja</td>
<td>Durable Solutions Manager, Somalia</td>
<td>ReDSS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cate Osborn</td>
<td>Policy and Coordination Specialist</td>
<td>ReDSS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nimo Jirdeh</td>
<td>Governance and Policy</td>
<td>Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Oertle</td>
<td>Regional Director of International Cooperation, Horn of Africa</td>
<td>Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nimo Hassan</td>
<td>Executive Director</td>
<td>Somalia NGO Consortium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kevin Mackey</td>
<td>Chief of Party</td>
<td>Somali Resilience Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sarah Cramer</td>
<td>UN-World Bank Aid Coordination Officer</td>
<td>UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jocelyn Mason</td>
<td>Resident Representative</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mahsa Izadpanah</td>
<td>Special Assistant</td>
<td>UNHCR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sara Karimbhoy</td>
<td>Chief of Emergencies and Resilience</td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adam Abdelmoula</td>
<td>Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator</td>
<td>UN Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tariq Chaudhry</td>
<td>Director, Political Affairs and Mediation Group</td>
<td>UN Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joanna Nickolls</td>
<td>Head of the Integrated Office</td>
<td>UN Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afrah Alawi Al-Ahmadi</td>
<td>Senior Social Protection Specialist</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matthias Mayr</td>
<td>Senior Operations Officer</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simon Nyabwengi</td>
<td>Country Director</td>
<td>World Vision Somalia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Appendix 2: Key financing mechanisms and frameworks

### UN Multi Partner Trust Fund

**Flexible instrument for funding any of the NDP’s pillars, delivered by government institutions, NGOs and the private sector as partners of UN agencies**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Established</th>
<th>Aim</th>
<th>Donors</th>
<th>Numbers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Fund programmatic and operational work according to priorities identified under peacebuilding and state-building goals of the Somali Compact</td>
<td>Denmark, EU, Finland, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, UN Peacebuilding Fund, USA</td>
<td>Cumulative source of funds as of 31 December 2019: US$354,173,389</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### World Bank Multi-Partner Fund (MPF)

**Supports core state functions and largely executed by government entities; some funds are also allocated for World-Bank-financed small-scale activities**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Established</th>
<th>Aim</th>
<th>Donors</th>
<th>Numbers</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Support development of Somalia with a focus on core state functions and socioeconomic recovery</td>
<td>Denmark, EU, Finland, Germany, Italy, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, USA, World Bank State and Peacebuilding Fund</td>
<td>Total pledged contributions from donors as of 31 December 2020: US$523.7 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### African Development Bank (AfDB) Somali Infrastructure Fund (SIF)

Earmarked for long-term development, infrastructure and institutional capacity building projects; can undertake certain activities at the government’s request and is one of the three financing windows under the Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Established</th>
<th>Aim</th>
<th>Donors</th>
<th>Numbers</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>Support and accelerate Somalia’s inclusive and sustainable economic recovery, peace and state-building within the AfDB’s Strategy for Addressing Fragility and Building Resilience in Africa (2014–2019); with focus on rehabilitation and development of infrastructure and related skills development and institutional capacity building</td>
<td>EU, Islamic Development Bank, Italy, UK</td>
<td>Total contributions from donors: US$60.5 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Somaliland Development Fund

Supports the Government of Somaliland to deliver infrastructure relevant for inclusive economic development; focuses on sustainable investments that lead to job creation and fast growth, while laying the foundation for long-term resilience and development

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Established</th>
<th>Aim</th>
<th>Donors</th>
<th>Numbers</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Phase 2: inclusive economic development for the people of Somaliland</td>
<td>Denmark, Netherlands and UK</td>
<td>Total budget for phase 2: US$38 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### UN Peacebuilding Fund

Financial instrument to sustain peace in countries at risk or affected by violent conflict; addresses immediate needs in countries emerging from conflict when sufficient resources are not available from other funding mechanisms

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Established</th>
<th>Aim</th>
<th>Donors</th>
<th>Numbers</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Support countries emerging from or at risk of conflict, to address critical gaps in the process, to support peacebuilding activities contributing to post-conflict stabilisation</td>
<td>Denmark, EU, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, UK</td>
<td>Approved US$191 million of investments in 2019</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Somalia Stability Fund**

Multi-donor fund that works with governments and communities to support the development of stability and security in Somalia; addresses structural reasons for conflict and instability at a political and communal level.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Established</th>
<th>Aim</th>
<th>Donors</th>
<th>Numbers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Enhance government legitimacy and reduce political and communal conflict, supporting decentralised decision-making, to strengthen local governance</td>
<td>Denmark, EU, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, UK</td>
<td>Total funds from donors as of 8 December 2020: US$ 49,214,944</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix 3: Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AfDB</td>
<td>African Development Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRCiS</td>
<td>Building Resilient Communities in Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRS</td>
<td>Creditor Reporting System (OECD DAC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CWW</td>
<td>Concern Worldwide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DANIDA</td>
<td>Denmark’s Development Cooperation under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEVCO</td>
<td>European Commission’s Agency for International Cooperation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development (UK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECHO</td>
<td>European Community Humanitarian Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FGS</td>
<td>Federal Government of Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSNAU</td>
<td>Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIZ</td>
<td>Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Internationale Zusammenarbeit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDP</td>
<td>Humanitarian—development—peace (nexus)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDPI</td>
<td>Humanitarian Development Peace Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIPC</td>
<td>Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (Initiative)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IASC</td>
<td>Inter-Agency Standing Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDA</td>
<td>International Development Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally displaced person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFI</td>
<td>International financial institution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPC</td>
<td>Integrated Food Security Phase Classification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRF</td>
<td>Internal Risk Facility (DFID)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPF</td>
<td>Multi-Partner Fund (World Bank)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoPIED</td>
<td>Ministry of Planning, Investment and Economic Development (FGS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>National Development Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORAD</td>
<td>Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRC</td>
<td>Norwegian Refugee Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official development assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ReDSS</td>
<td>Regional Durable Solutions Secretariat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RE-INTEG</td>
<td>Enhancing Somalia’s responsiveness to the management and reintegration of mixed migration flows (programme)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RRF</td>
<td>Recovery and Resilience Framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDGs</td>
<td>Sustainable Development Goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDRF</td>
<td>Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIDA</td>
<td>Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIF</td>
<td>Somali Infrastructure Fund (AfDB)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SomReP</td>
<td>Somalia Resilience Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNFPA</td>
<td>United Nations Population Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>UN High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>UN International Children’s Emergency Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN MPTF</td>
<td>UN Multi-Partner Trust Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN OCHA</td>
<td>UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>Word Food Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organization</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Notes

1 Development Initiatives, with support from the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), is leading the wider policy study under the umbrella of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Results Group 5 (on Humanitarian Financing). The other focus countries are Cameroon and Bangladesh.


8 NRC, FAO and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 2019. Financing the nexus: Gaps and opportunities from a field perspective. Available at: www.nrc.no/resources/reports/financing-the-nexus-gaps-and-opportunities-from-a-field-perspective/


10 Development Initiatives, with support from the FAO and NRC, is leading the wider policy study under the umbrella of the IASC Results Group 5 (on Humanitarian Financing). The other focus countries are Cameroon and Bangladesh.


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22 Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre. Somalia. Available at: www.internal-displacement.org/countries/somalia (accessed 18 December 2020)


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OECD, 2016. Good development support in fragile, at-risk and crisis affected contexts. Available at: www.doi.org/10.1787/5jm0v3s71s5-en (accessed 4 January 2021)


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UN, 2018. Global Compact on Refugees. Available at: www.unhcr.org/uk/the-global-compact-on-refugees.html


The African Union (AU) Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced People (IDPs) in Africa.


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