global humanitarian assistance report 2020
global humanitarian assistance report 2020
acknowledgements

We would like to thank the many people who have been involved in helping us put the Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2020 together: our colleagues at Development Initiatives; Steve Green at Definite.design, Sharon Mah and Jenny McCarten at Soapbox, and Dave Cuvelot, freelance designer; and Nina Behrman, copy-editor.

We would also like to thank the many experts who provided information and advice – Claudia Manili at ACAPS; Ruth McCormack at Cash Learning Partnership; Howard Mollett at Catholic Agency For Overseas Development; Jon Gascoigne, Ruth Hill and Yi Yang at the Centre for Disaster Protection; Joram Jesper Co at International Committee of the Red Cross; Kirsten Hagon at International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies; Jordan Menkveld and Lindsay Michiels at International Organization for Migration; Arnaud Levéry at Médecins Sans Frontières; Anita Kattakuzhy at Oxfam; Ihsan Samarral at Sorouh for Sustainable Development; Xiaodong Cai, Awa Dabo, Johannes Fromholt, Romano Lasker, Hanayo Nakano and Bettina Woll at United Nations [UN] Development Programme; Hiroko Araki and Luke McCallin at UN High Commissioner for Refugees; Jonas Berntsson, Josephine Ferreiro, Tasleem Hemani-Tuan, Lavina Jethani, Jelen Jovanovic, Yulia Krieger and Najet Tenoutit at Unicef; Adriana Carvalho-Friedheim and Jean Verheyden Mohannad Ali at UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs; Chiara Capozio, Rima Dabbagh and Sam Rose at UN Relief and Works Agency; Aydrus Daar at Wajir South Development Association; Franco Ferrentino, Otto Reichner and Lorenzo Violani at World Food Programme; and Rafael Rovaletti at World Health Organization.

We would like to extend our gratitude to the following people for providing us with data for our private funding calculations: Luis Jabonero Diaz at Action contra el hambre; Ayub Khan at Afghanaid; Camille Chemin at Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development; Donna Diane at American Near East Refugee Aid; Joseph Rwanjagarara at Catholic Agency For Overseas Development; Richard Dixon at Concern; Florence Joigneault at International Catholic Migration Commission; Joram Jesper Co at International Committee of the Red Cross; Olivier Van Bunnun at International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies; Hajrija Hota at International Medical Corps; Daphne Jasyasinghe at International Rescue Committee; Haroon Kash at Islamic Relief; Jim Jackson at Medair; Arnaud Levéry at Médecins Sans Frontières; Lance Cole at Mercy Corps; Luca Peciarolo at Norwegian Refugee Council; Gina Flavelle at Oxfam; Aftab Alam at Plan International; Stefano Di Russo and Sebastien Laroze Barrit at UN High Commissioner for Refugees; Jelena Jovanovic at Unicef; Sam Rose at UN Relief and Works Agency; Stefan Jahn at Welthungerhilfe; Desideria Cosi at World Food Programme; and Bernie Fortes at World Vision International.

We would like to thank the programme’s funders for their support: the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development, Canada; the Stabilisation and Humanitarian Aid Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Netherlands; the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Denmark.
This report was authored by Amanda Thomas and Angus Urquhart. The project was managed by Tom Urry. Data analysis was led by Daniele Milani and Niklas Rieger, with extensive analysis and research across the report by Carina Chicet, Sophie Hanna and Duncan Knox. Research and analysis on specific areas was provided by Bill Anderson, Dean Breed, Mark Brough, Sarah Dalrymple, Lewis Sternberg, Rob Tew and Dan Walton. Alice McAndrew managed editorial production, with support from Georgina Carver and Simon Murphy. Harpinder Collacott and Daniel Coppard provided editorial guidance. Communications support was provided by Telche Hanley-Moyle, James Harle, Anna Hope and Charlie Zajicek.

thank you
People leave Antananarivo, the capital of Madagascar, as the country’s health system comes under strain due to the Covid-19 pandemic.

Credit: World Bank/Henitsoa Rafalia
## contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Foreword</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive summary</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter 1</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People and crisis</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty and protracted crisis</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People affected by crisis</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Displacement and vulnerability to the Covid-19 pandemic</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter 2</strong></td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International humanitarian assistance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International humanitarian assistance</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How did assistance compare with requirements set out in appeals?</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International government funding: largest donors</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International government funding: donor regions</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private donors</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Which countries did humanitarian assistance go to?</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODA for disaster risk reduction</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter 3</strong></td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding for effectiveness and efficiency</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Channels of delivery for international humanitarian assistance</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct funding to local and national actors</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pooled funds</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality funding</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash and voucher assistance</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter 4</strong></td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crisis financing to the Covid-19 pandemic response</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resource flows for Covid-19 pandemic response</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Which countries are receiving international funding for response to Covid-19, and in what volumes?</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Requirements and funding: how do responses to the Covid-19 pandemic and other humanitarian crises compare?</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Who is providing funding for Covid-19 pandemic response</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Channels of delivery for funding the Covid-19 pandemic response</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methodology and definitions</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data sources</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronyms and abbreviations</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notes</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
For 20 years, Development Initiative’s annual Global Humanitarian Assistance [GHA] report has comprehensively assessed international financing at work in humanitarian situations. Now, the Covid-19 [coronavirus] pandemic presents a new challenge to the world. As the global crisis unfolds, and the response continues to take shape, the GHA Report 2020 frames the crisis financing landscape in which the pandemic has become the pre-eminent feature.

The Covid-19 pandemic has exposed existing weaknesses in national and global systems, structures and leadership. We cannot yet see the scale of the global fall-out, but early evidence already shows disproportionate impact on the world’s most vulnerable people – those already living in fragility and poverty, already in or at risk of crisis. As ever, the GHA Report 2020 looks back to analyse existing crises and vulnerabilities, and the financing at work to help those in need. This year, we have added new analysis to examine the financing response to Covid-19, illustrating a humanitarian system under immense strain.

Covid-19 has spread in a world in which humanitarian need was already widespread and growing, due to ongoing conflict, disasters associated with natural hazards, and forced displacement. An estimated 216 million people needed humanitarian assistance in 69 countries in 2019. Millions continued to need assistance as a result of conflict in Yemen and Syria; a cyclone and flooding in southern Africa devastated communities in Mozambique and neighbouring countries; and millions were displaced from Venezuela as the consequence of ongoing political and economic turmoil.

The pandemic has also exposed the vulnerabilities of governments not usually in need of international humanitarian assistance. It continues to spread at speed around the world, dominating the Americas, extending widely throughout the Indian sub-continent, while Europe fights to reduce transmission rates. Globally, new cases continue to rise, having topped 10 million by June 2020. Wealthier nations are struggling to meet the immediate healthcare needs of their citizens, and mitigation efforts have weakened even the strongest economies.

All this presents the humanitarian system with new challenges, of an unanticipated scale and complexity. Governments and institutions that traditionally support international humanitarian response are feeling the direct effects of this pandemic, and facing pressure to tackle the widening inequalities exposed by it at home. The pandemic also presents the humanitarian system with immediate challenges. How to deliver assistance in a public health emergency in which travel restrictions and duty of care do not allow for the typical presence of international aid workers in crisis contexts? How to sustain assistance for pre-existing crises alongside newly emerging requirements related to Covid-19? How to address all of these challenges in the shadow of spreading global economic recession?
Yet, the response to the Covid-19 pandemic also highlights ongoing efforts to reform the delivery of humanitarian assistance. There is evidence of significant changes in how humanitarian financing is being delivered, perhaps most notably the greater flexibility of funding. We wait to see if these positive changes will become routine practice and whether progress can be accelerated in other areas of reform, particularly the empowerment and increased funding of local and national actors. The pandemic has shone a light on the importance of response delivered by community-based organisations, yet ensuring financing reaches them directly remains a challenge.

As we have consistently highlighted in previous reports, there remain significant challenges in accessing and making sense of data on financing to crisis contexts. Key challenges include tracking funding through the transaction chain, and aligning humanitarian and development flows. These challenges are increasingly evident now, as the system demands good, accurate, localised and disaggregated real-time data to inform urgent decision-making in the Covid-19 response. We will continue to explore and seek solutions to improve the impact and effectiveness of humanitarian financing to the Covid-19 response.

Development Initiatives remains committed to providing relevant, accessible and trusted analysis to decision-makers and practitioners. We hope that this year’s GHA report meets your needs.

Thank you for your interest.

Harpinder Collacott
Executive Director
Bangladesh, 2018

People pump water in Balukhali Rohingya refugee camp in Chittagong district, Bangladesh.

Credit: UN Women/Allison Joyce
executive summary
humanitarian assistance in numbers

**International humanitarian response***

- Total international humanitarian assistance drops by US$1.6 billion

**where does it come from?**

- **2016**: US$27.6bn (US$22.1bn) private, US$5.5bn public sector
- **2017**: US$29.1bn (US$23.2bn) private, US$5.9bn public sector
- **2019**: US$29.6bn (US$23.2bn) private, US$6.3bn public sector

**where is it going?**

- **2018**
  - **US**: US$7.0bn
  - **Turkey**: US$5.3bn
  - **UK**: US$3.1bn
  - **EU institutions**: US$2.3bn
  - **Saudi Arabia**: US$1.4bn
  - **Sweden**: US$1.0bn
  - **Palestine**: US$1.0bn

**how does it get there?**

- **2018**
  - **Private**: US$5.9bn
  - **Governments**: US$4.2bn
  - **OECD DAC governments**: US$21.0bn
  - **Other**: US$21.0bn
  - **Total international humanitarian assistance**: US$31.2bn

**NGOs**

- **2015**: US$5.3bn
- **2016**: US$5.5bn
- **2017**: US$6.2bn
- **2018**: US$6.4bn

**multilateral organisations**

- **2015**: US$13.8bn
- **2016**: US$13.8bn
- **2017**: US$13.8bn
- **2018**: US$13.8bn

**public sector**

- **2015**: US$1.2bn
- **2016**: US$1.2bn
- **2017**: US$1.2bn
- **2018**: US$1.2bn

**other**

- **2015**: US$0.3bn
- **2016**: US$0.3bn
- **2017**: US$0.3bn
- **2018**: US$0.3bn

**Notes:**

- Data for 2019 is preliminary.
- Data consists only of humanitarian assistance directed internationally by donors.
- Contributions of EU member states include an imputed amount of the EU institutions’ expenditure. Contributions are also included separately for comparison and are stated differently by delegating their government donors. Turkey is stated differently because the humanitarian assistance it voluntarily reports to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Development Assistance Committee is largely made up of operating on hosting Syrian refugees within Turkey. Therefore, it is not strictly comparable with the international humanitarian assistance totals from other donors in this figure.

**how does it get there?**

- **2018**
  - **Private**: US$5.9bn
  - **Governments**: US$4.2bn
  - **OECD DAC governments**: US$21.0bn
  - **Other**: US$21.0bn
  - **Total international humanitarian assistance**: US$31.2bn

**NGOs**

- **2015**: US$4bn
- **2016**: US$4bn
- **2017**: US$4bn
- **2018**: US$4bn

**multilateral organisations**

- **2015**: US$1.4bn
- **2016**: US$1.4bn
- **2017**: US$1.4bn
- **2018**: US$1.4bn

**public sector**

- **2015**: US$0.1bn
- **2016**: US$0.1bn
- **2017**: US$0.1bn
- **2018**: US$0.1bn

**other**

- **2015**: US$0.2bn
- **2016**: US$0.2bn
- **2017**: US$0.2bn
- **2018**: US$0.2bn

**international humanitarian response***

- Total international humanitarian assistance drops by US$1.6 billion

**international humanitarian response***

- Total international humanitarian assistance drops by US$1.6 billion

**total international humanitarian assistance**

- **2015**: US$26.3bn
- **2016**: US$27.6bn
- **2017**: US$29.1bn
- **2018**: US$31.2bn
- **2019**: US$29.6bn

**NGOs**

- **2015**: US$5.3bn
- **2016**: US$5.5bn
- **2017**: US$6.2bn
- **2018**: US$6.4bn

**multilateral organisations**

- **2015**: US$13.8bn
- **2016**: US$13.8bn
- **2017**: US$13.8bn
- **2018**: US$13.8bn

**public sector**

- **2015**: US$1.2bn
- **2016**: US$1.2bn
- **2017**: US$1.2bn
- **2018**: US$1.2bn

**other**

- **2015**: US$0.3bn
- **2016**: US$0.3bn
- **2017**: US$0.3bn
- **2018**: US$0.3bn

**largest five donors by volume**

- **US**: US$7.0bn
- **Germany**: US$5.3bn
- **UK**: US$3.1bn
- **EU institutions**: US$2.3bn
- **Saudi Arabia**: US$1.4bn

**largest five recipients by volume**

- **2018**
  - **US**: US$7.6bn
  - **Turkey**: US$5.0bn
  - **Yemen**: US$2.3bn
  - **Syria**: US$1.3bn
  - **Iraq**: US$0.8bn

**Notes:**

- Data for 2019 is preliminary.
- Data consists only of humanitarian assistance directed internationally by donors.
- Contributions of EU member states include an imputed amount of the EU institutions’ expenditure. Contributions are also included separately for comparison and are stated differently by delegating their government donors. Turkey is stated differently because the humanitarian assistance it voluntarily reports to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Development Assistance Committee is largely made up of operating on hosting Syrian refugees within Turkey. Therefore, it is not strictly comparable with the international humanitarian assistance totals from other donors in this figure.

For full sources and full notes see Figures 2.1, 3.4, 3.6, 3.10, 3.14, 3.16, 3.18 and 3.20.
The Covid-19 (coronavirus) pandemic presents an unprecedented challenge to the humanitarian system in both scale and complexity. An already strained humanitarian system is having to adapt and respond to the emerging needs of those impacted by the pandemic. At the same time, humanitarian actors must continue to provide assistance to the millions of people affected by conflict, displacement and natural disasters. It is, therefore, more important than ever to have evidence on the state of global humanitarian financing, so that donors and aid agencies can make informed decisions and target those in greatest need.

Total international humanitarian assistance declined in 2019, for the first time since 2012. However, humanitarian appeals require more funding than ever before, with the Covid-19 pandemic further increasing the number of people in need. As the pandemic places additional demands on a strained humanitarian system, it is also eroding the capacity of governments and institutions to respond, with the risk that already limited sources of humanitarian and development finance could decline further and faster. The combination of these factors presents a perfect storm for a humanitarian system that is already under immense stress.

This report paints a detailed picture of the humanitarian financing landscape in 2019 as well as the current humanitarian financing response to the Covid-19 pandemic. Chapter 1 examines who is affected by, or at risk of, crisis and what makes them vulnerable. It examines the connections between poverty and crisis, trends around the growing number of forcibly displaced and the locations of people most in need in 2019. In Chapter 2 we present trends in international humanitarian assistance. This includes information on who provides assistance, the total levels provided, and where it goes.

New analysis, in Chapter 3, examines funding that can enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of humanitarian assistance. Four years on from the Grand Bargain agreement, we evaluate progress towards meeting commitments on funding to local and national actors, cash and voucher assistance and flexible funding.

In Chapter 4, we take a deep dive into crisis financing to the Covid-19 pandemic response. We examine the main sources of funding, where funding is going and how it is being channelled, as well as the extent to which Covid-19 humanitarian appeals are being met currently in relation to other humanitarian needs.

**Research findings**

**Over one billion people are living in countries affected by long-term humanitarian crisis**

16% of the world’s population is now living in countries experiencing protracted humanitarian crisis. The number of countries experiencing protracted crisis has more than doubled over the last 15 years, from 13 in 2005 to 31 in 2019. These countries are home to over half of the world’s people living in extreme poverty.

Crisis exacerbate existing inequalities and vulnerabilities for women and girls, yet a lack of gender-disaggregated data continues to obscure the extent to which they are affected. Our analysis of official development assistance (ODA) from Development Assistance Committee donors and multilateral organisations finds that an increasing number of donors are reporting that ODA has the purpose of ending gender-based violence, yet this still represents less than 1% of total ODA allocations.
Conflict and forced displacement continue to drive humanitarian assistance needs. Our analysis shows that 215.6 million people were in need of humanitarian assistance in 2019, an increase of almost 10 million from the year before.

The numbers of displaced people globally have increased for the eighth consecutive year. The majority of displaced people are internally displaced and one third are refugees. Venezuelans displaced abroad comprise 4.5% of globally displaced people in 2019.

**Humanitarian assistance dropped for the first time since 2012, while requirements continue to grow**

In 2019 the volume of international humanitarian assistance dropped by US$1.6 billion, to US$29.6 billion, from US$31.2 billion in 2018. This 5.3% reduction is the first since 2012. It was driven by a fall in contributions from public donors, as funding from governments and EU institutions decreased by US$2.1 billion.

In response to growing need, funding requirements for UN-coordinated appeals are higher than they have ever been. In 2019 the UN called for US$30.4 billion through these appeals. Despite the overall fall in international humanitarian assistance, funding committed through UN-coordinated appeals rose to a record high of US$19.3 billion. This means that the proportion of funding requirements met increased to 64%, while more than a third of requirements were still not fulfilled.

Funding for disaster risk reduction (DRR) is critical in addressing the impacts of climate change on the most vulnerable. Our analysis shows that funding of activities with DRR as a primary focus appears to be well-targeted to countries with a high vulnerability to the effects of natural hazards. In 2018 (the latest year for which data is available), 76% of total ODA with a primary focus on DRR went to countries at ‘very high’ or ‘high’ risk of experiencing natural hazards. However, for countries that received it, funding for DRR constituted only 1.0% of their total allocated ODA.

**Despite progress in providing more cash and voucher assistance, signatories to the Grand Bargain are off track to meet other key commitments**

Reporting on key Grand Bargain commitments remains insufficient, which makes assessing progress on commitments difficult. To support understanding of progress, we have directly collected and analysed data on cash and voucher assistance and unearmarked funding. We also examine publicly available data on funding to local and national actors.

Humanitarian assistance provided in the form of cash or vouchers can offer greater flexibility and choice to beneficiaries, compared with assistance provided as in-kind goods. Cash can also empower recipients and help strengthen local markets. We find that humanitarian cash and voucher programming increased by 20% in 2019, to a new high of US$5.6 billion.

How international humanitarian assistance is channelled to first-level recipients has changed little over the past five years. In 2018, government donors allocated the majority of their assistance (62%) to multilateral organisations. Conversely, over three quarters of assistance from private donors is provided to NGOs. In 2016, Grand Bargain signatories committed to channelling at least 25% of international humanitarian assistance to local and national actors as directly as possible by 2020. In the absence of better reporting, we do not have a clear picture of how much funding is passed indirectly. However, trends in direct funding are cause for concern. Our analysis shows that direct funding to local and national actors dropped from 3.5% in 2018 to just 2.1% of total humanitarian assistance in 2019.
Unearmarked and multi-year funding provides recipients with greater flexibility and predictability. Our analysis of nine UN agencies indicates that the percentage of unearmarked humanitarian funding received by these agencies has dropped for the fifth consecutive year, to 14% of total humanitarian contributions in 2019, and the total volume of this funding is at its lowest point in five years, at US$2.6 billion.

The Covid-19 pandemic is adding demands to an already strained humanitarian system, while eroding the capacity of governments and institutions to respond

As the economies of donor governments contract and international concerns increasingly compete with domestic priorities, the Covid-19 pandemic threatens to create a funding vacuum for both humanitarian assistance, and recovery and long-term development. Our analysis finds that total ODA could fall from US$153 billion in 2019 to US$134 billion in 2021 in the worst of three scenarios. These projected reductions in ODA are likely to severely affect countries already experiencing humanitarian crisis.

Response to the Covid-19 pandemic is putting increased strain on already limited funding for humanitarian response. In June 2020, UN appeal requirements not related to Covid-19, at US$30.4 billion, were already slightly higher than mid-year requirements in 2019 (US$30.2 billion). With additional Covid-19 requirements, total UN humanitarian appeal funding requirements had already reached US$37.7 billion in June 2020 — this is 25% higher than in June 2019.

The impacts of the Covid-19 pandemic are compounding existing humanitarian challenges, with many countries vulnerable to the impacts of the pandemic already experiencing humanitarian crisis. The UN’s Global Humanitarian Response Plan (GHRP) sets out the funding requirements for the 63 countries identified as being in need of humanitarian assistance as a result of the Covid-19 pandemic. Our analysis shows that more than half of these countries (34 of 63) are experiencing protracted crisis, along with the broader ongoing socioeconomic, capacity and resilience challenges that this entails. Of these countries experiencing protracted crisis, three quarters are at high (17) or very high risk (8) from the impacts of Covid-19.

The Covid-19 pandemic has created an exceptional level of need. Donors have committed more funding to appeals but, as requirements also increase, appeal targets remain far from being met. As of 29 June 2020, 20% of total requirements for both Covid-19 and other appeals were met. While this is lower than the proportion of appeals met at the same time in 2019 (23%), the volumes disbursed are US$578 million higher than the US$6.9 billion allocated by mid-year 2019. This funding appears to be equally supporting Covid-19 and other humanitarian responses.

Just three and a half months since the World Health Organization declared the Covid-19 outbreak as a pandemic, we also find that donors have made sizeable commitments: at least US$3.8 billion in humanitarian and development grants to the pandemic have been allocated. The Covid-19 pandemic highlights the need for a broad, joined-up response to crises between humanitarian, development and peace actors. And it is clear that financing needs to be broad too, including both humanitarian grants and wider development finance. Our analysis therefore also considers Covid-19 financing from five large development finance institutions, including the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, to get a better picture of the state of wider crisis financing. As of 10 June 2020, US$28.0 billion of the total US$47.9 billion committed by the five institutions to the Covid-19 response had been directed to countries within the GHRP.
A concentration of pre-existing delivery patterns reinforces the need to implement the Grand Bargain commitment of passing funding to local and national actors, when responding to the Covid-19 pandemic. As of 24 June 2020, almost three quarters (73%) of total international humanitarian assistance to the Covid-19 response was channelled through multilateral organisations. This is considerably higher than the corresponding proportion for 2014–2018, which was 61% for government donors.

In the absence of the Covid-19 pandemic, this edition of the *Global Humanitarian Assistance Report* would have continued to detail the many challenges faced by the international humanitarian community in 2019 – from the rising number of protracted crises and growing humanitarian needs on the one hand, to the first absolute reduction in assistance since 2012 and slow progress in critical areas such as unearmarked funding and localised assistance. The Covid-19 pandemic is increasing demand by both compounding existing crises and adding new ones. Initial response in 2020 has been strong, with assistance higher than levels observed for the same time last year. Concerns that the Covid-19 response may be prioritised over pre-existing crises are yet to be realised. Certain funding has also become more flexible. The key challenges will be to ensure that such efforts are sustained and to reconcile competing priorities.
Libya, 2019

A Syrian refugee works as part of the Women’s Economic Empowerment programme run by UN Women in Tripoli.

Credit: UN Women/Gonzalo Bell
Crises are increasingly complex and long-lasting. Currently, over one billion people (16% of the world’s population) live in countries experiencing protracted crisis. The number of countries experiencing protracted crisis rose from 13 in 2005 to 31 in 2019. These countries are home to half the world’s people living in extreme poverty. A strategic approach is required to meet the immediate and longer-term needs of those experiencing crisis, including strengthening their resilience to new shocks.

Crises exacerbate inequalities and vulnerabilities for women and girls, yet a lack of gender-disaggregated data masks the extent of this. An increasing volume of official development assistance is being reported with the purpose of ending gender-based violence, although in 2018 this accounted for under 1% of total ODA allocations.

Severe and prolonged crises persisted in 2019. Conflict and forced displacement drove many of these crises, with an estimated 215.6 million people assessed to be in need of humanitarian assistance. In five countries – Yemen, Syria, South Sudan, Central African Republic and Palestine – the equivalent of more than half the population required humanitarian assistance. Numbers of displaced people globally increased for the eighth consecutive year in 2019, with the majority being internally displaced.

Displaced people may be particularly vulnerable to the effects of the Covid-19 (coronavirus) pandemic. In 2019, almost one in five displaced people were in countries classified as being at very high risk in terms of health and humanitarian impacts of the pandemic. Displaced persons are already vulnerable, often facing protection challenges and a lack of access to shelter, food and other basic services.
Poverty and protracted crisis

Figure 1.1
On average 30% of the population in protracted crisis countries live in extreme poverty
Average share of the population living in poverty and extreme poverty in protracted crisis countries, compared to other low- and middle-income countries

Protracted crisis countries Other low- and middle-income countries

$3.20 poverty line

53% of the population live in poverty
21% of the population live in poverty

$1.90 poverty line

30% of the population live in extreme poverty
6% of the population live in extreme poverty

The impacts of crises are felt disproportionately by people living in poverty, as crises exacerbate existing vulnerabilities and inequalities. Protracted crises are becoming increasingly prevalent, requiring humanitarian assistance to be provided in longer-term responses. Protracted crises often involve more than one crisis happening at once (such as conflict, displacement and natural disasters). They combine acute and long-term needs, requiring strategic support to meet immediate needs and to address structural causes and reduce vulnerabilities to new shocks.

• Over one billion people live in countries experiencing protracted crisis. The number of countries experiencing protracted crisis has increased over the past 15 years: from 13 in 2005, to 20 in 2010, and 31 in 2019.

• Compared to other low- and middle-income countries, countries experiencing protracted crisis have significantly higher poverty rates, with almost one third (30%) of people living in extreme poverty (on less than $1.90 a day).4

Source: Development Initiatives based on World Bank PovcalNet, World Development Indicators, International Monetary Fund World Economic Outlook and various national survey sources.

Notes: People living in poverty are defined as living on less than $3.20 a day (2011 PPP); people living in extreme poverty are defined as living on less than $1.90 a day (2011 PPP). Protracted crisis countries are defined as countries with at least five consecutive years of UN-coordinated humanitarian or refugee response plans as of 2019. No poverty data is available from Cambodia, Grenada, Kosovo and the People’s Democratic Republic of Korea (PDR Korea).
• Countries experiencing protracted crisis are home to half of the world’s people living in extreme poverty (357 million of the 712 million people living in extreme poverty), despite accounting for only 16% of the world population overall. More than half of people living in countries experiencing protracted crisis live in poverty (defined as living on less than $3.20 a day).

• Crises hinder and reverse progress, leaving places and populations even further behind. In countries experiencing protracted crisis, poverty rates tend to stagnate or even increase over the course of the crisis. Since 2015, the share of people living in poverty in countries experiencing protracted crisis has remained at 30%, while in other low- and middle-income countries, poverty rates dropped from 8% to 6%.

Access to water, sanitation and hygiene is key to ensuring positive health outcomes. Many people living in poverty, however, experience poor access to water, sanitation and hygiene, exacerbating their vulnerability to the impact of crises. Proper handwashing is a key prevention measure against Covid-19, yet household surveys show that access to handwashing facilities is lower in countries experiencing protracted crisis.

• In 2018, 43.7% of households in countries experiencing protracted crisis had access to handwashing facilities. This compares with 60.7% in other developing countries.

• Access to handwashing facilities drops further for households that are also in the poorest 20% of the world’s population. Only 30.5% of households in both a country experiencing protracted crisis and the poorest 20% of the global population have access to handwashing facilities.
**Box 1.1**
**The gender data gap**

Women are often disproportionately affected by humanitarian crises, including the Covid-19 pandemic. While women are often first responders in a crisis, they are also disadvantaged by existing gender inequalities and vulnerabilities. Such pre-existing imbalances are often exacerbated in crises.

- Women face unique challenges in the Covid-19 pandemic. Women are more likely to be front-line healthcare workers, hold low-wage jobs, and be responsible for the care of family members.
- Natural disasters on average kill more women than men, or kill women at an earlier age.\(^7\)
- Women and girls experience high rates of gender-based violence (GBV) in humanitarian settings.\(^8\)

Despite the disproportionate effect of crises on women and girls, there is a lack of gender-disaggregated data in aid spending. While the gender data gap is not a new issue, it continues to obscure the extent to which women and girls are affected in humanitarian crises, and hinders the design of effective responses and gender-responsive programming for recovery. A gender-informed and targeted response is crucial to an effective response to Covid-19, yet it is difficult to identify how much aid is targeted at women and girls and reducing GBV.

In 2016, the Development Assistance Committee Creditor Reporting System of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development introduced a new ‘ending violence against women and girls’ purpose code. This is to monitor aid focused on ending violence against women and girls, in order to improve accountability and tracking.

To obtain a fuller picture of ODA directed at the prevention of and response to violence against women and girls, Development Initiatives combined existing data from the specific purpose code with newly identified flows from the Creditor Reporting System. These flows were identified using a keyword search methodology, flagging projects with a primary or partial focus on GBV.

**Figure 1.2**
**ODA relevant to gender-based violence (GBV) has increased gradually since 2016**

**ODA relevant to gender-based violence (GBV), 2016–2018**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Partial focus on GBV</th>
<th>Primary focus on GBV</th>
<th>ODA relevant to GBV as % of total ODA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>922</td>
<td>475</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>1,225</td>
<td>706</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>1,266</td>
<td>528</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC Creditor Reporting System (CRS).

**Notes:** ODA: Official development assistance. Data is in constant 2018 prices. Included in the analysis of ODA relevant to GBV are projects reported to the CRS by donors and coded with the purpose code 15180 – ending violence against women and girls, and flows identified by keyword search as having a primary or partial focus on GBV. Total ODA refers to total gross bilateral ODA as recorded in the CRS.
Box 1.1 (continued)

The analysis showed that ODA from Development Assistance Committee donors and multilateral organisations reported under the ‘ending violence against women and girls’ purpose code more than tripled over three years: from US$138 million in 2016 to US$427 million in 2018. This spike was largely due to a significant increase in EU funding for GBV connected with the Spotlight Initiative.9

While reporting to the specific purpose code increased over the three-year period, a substantial amount of funding for GBV prevention and response did not use the new purpose code. The keyword search analysis showed US$300 million in aid that was targeted to GBV prevention and response activities each year, but not marked accordingly.

A further US$528 million was identified as having a partial focus on GBV in 2018. This includes projects that might be part of a wider programme of work or a cross-cutting area, and for which a clear separation of GBV activities might not be possible due to reporting gaps and inconsistencies.

When combined, these categories total US$1.3 billion in aid to GBV in 2018. This represents less than 1% of total ODA allocations in that year.
People affected by crisis

Figure 1.3
Severe crises are concentrated in sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East.
People in need, type and severity of crisis, and funding requirements, 2019

Country summaries

Order by number of people in need

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>People in need</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>24.2m people in need</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>11.7m people in need</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>10.9m people in need</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>9.3m people in need</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>9.2m people in need</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>9.1m people in need</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>8.9m people in need</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>8.8m people in need</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>8.7m people in need</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>8.6m people in need</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>8.6m people in need</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>8.5m people in need</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>8.5m people in need</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>8.2m people in need</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>7.5m people in need</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>7.3m people in need</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>7.2m people in need</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>7.1m people in need</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>7.1m people in need</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>7.0m people in need</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>6.8m people in need</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>6.6m people in need</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>6.6m people in need</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>6.5m people in need</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia Herzegovina</td>
<td>6.5m people in need</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>6.3m people in need</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>6.3m people in need</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>6.3m people in need</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>6.2m people in need</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>5.4m people in need</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>5.4m people in need</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Development Initiatives based on ACAPS, Food and Agriculture Organization, UNHCR, UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Financial Tracking Service data.

Figure 1.4
Procrasted crisis country

Source: Development Initiatives based on ACAPS, Food and Agriculture Organization, UNHCR, UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Financial Tracking Service data.

Key for map of severity scores

- 1 – Very Low
- 2 – Low
- 3 – Medium
- 4 – High
- 5 – Very High

Notes: CAR: Central African Republic; DRC: Democratic Republic of the Congo; IMF: International Monetary Fund; PRF: refugee response plan. Procrasted crisis countries are defined as countries with at least five consecutive years of UN-coordinated humanitarian and refugee response plans. Countries with fewer than an estimated 0.7 million people in need are not shown. For further information on coding crisis types, see our ‘Methodology and definitions’.
Severe and ongoing crises persisted in 2019. Conflict and violence fuelled high numbers of people in need in Yemen, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Syria, while ongoing socioeconomic and political crisis in Venezuela saw high numbers in need.

- In 2019, an estimated 215.6 million people living in 69 countries were assessed to be in need of humanitarian assistance. More than half (57%) of those in need lived in just 10 countries.

- A high number of people in need were concentrated in just 6 of these 10 countries, with more than 10 million people in need identified in each of the following: Yemen (24.2 million people in need), DRC (15.9 million), Venezuela (14.3 million), Syria (11.7 million), Afghanistan (11.3 million) and the People’s Democratic Republic of Korea (PDR Korea) (10.9 million). These six countries made up more than two fifths (41%) of people in need globally, totalling 88.3 million.

UN humanitarian and regional response plans and appeals set out the need of populations affected by humanitarian crises, as well as proposed responses and funding requirements.

- Only 4 of the 10 countries with the highest numbers of people in need (Yemen, DRC, Syria and South Sudan) are among the 10 countries receiving the largest volumes of funding through UN appeals.

In 2019, conflict and forced displacement continued to drive the crises impacting the largest populations of people in need. Many countries experienced more than one form of crisis (conflict, natural disaster and displacement).

- Of the 10 countries with the highest numbers of people in need, 8 experienced conflict: Yemen, DRC, Syria, Afghanistan, Nigeria, Sudan, Ethiopia and South Sudan. The remaining two countries are Venezuela and PDR Korea; they did not experience high levels of violent conflict but did experience ongoing socioeconomic and political crisis, and poor harvests coupled with severe food shortages, respectively.

- Displacement crises occurred in 47 countries, with 176.8 million people in need. Of the 10 countries with the highest numbers of people in need, 9 experienced displacement: Yemen, DRC, Venezuela, Syria, Afghanistan, Nigeria, Sudan, Ethiopia and South Sudan.

- Eleven countries experienced both conflict and displacement, with a total of 69.4 million people in need, 32% of the global total.

- Nine countries experienced conflict, displacement and natural disasters, accounting for 64.5 million (30%) of all people in need globally: DRC, Afghanistan, Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia, Chad, Iraq, Niger and Mozambique. Four of these were in the top 10 countries experiencing the highest numbers of people in need: DRC (15.9 million), Afghanistan (11.3 million), Sudan (9.3 million) and Ethiopia (8.9 million).

- Of 69 countries assessed as needing humanitarian assistance, 8 were classified by the INFORM Epidemic Risk Index as being at very high risk of the impacts of the Covid-19 pandemic: DRC, Afghanistan, South Sudan, Somalia, Chad, Haiti, Central African Republic and Burundi. Of the 69 countries, 36 were classified as high risk and 23 as medium risk; 2 were classified as low risk; and none of the countries were classified as very low risk.

- Of the 10 countries with the highest numbers of people in need, 3 were at very high risk from effects of the Covid-19 pandemic (DRC, Afghanistan and South Sudan), 4 were high risk (Yemen, Nigeria, Sudan and Ethiopia) and 3 were medium risk (Venezuela, Syria and PDR Korea).
• Of the 28 countries in Figure 1.3 that are experiencing protracted crisis, 7 are at very high risk from the impacts of the Covid-19 pandemic (DRC, Afghanistan, South Sudan, Somalia, Chad, Haiti and Central African Republic), 13 were high risk, and 8 were medium risk (Syria, PDR Korea, Iraq, Turkey, Ukraine, Libya, Myanmar and Jordan).

Despite the limitations of collecting population data in crisis contexts, the proportion of a population identified as in need can give an indication of the extent of crisis and need.

• In 2019, five countries had a total number of people in need that was equivalent to more than half of their population: Yemen (equivalent to 84.8% of its domestic population), Syria (69.3%), South Sudan (63.8%), Central African Republic (55.7%) and Palestine (54.7%).

Displacement and vulnerability to the Covid-19 pandemic

Numbers of displaced people around the world increased for the eighth consecutive year in 2019, almost doubling since 2009 (see Figure 1.4). The past decade has seen an increasing number of displaced people in long-lasting displacement situations, as fewer refugees and internally displaced people are able to return home. Conflict and crisis continue to drive displacement, with the majority of displaced people being internally displaced, while one third are refugees.

• In 2019 the total number of displaced people increased to 79.5 million, up 8% (6.1 million) from a total of 73.3 million in 2018. This is almost double the 2009 total of 41.1 million.

• Of all displaced people in 2019, 57% (45.6 million) were internally displaced, while 33% (26.1 million) were refugees and 5.2% (4.1 million) were asylum seekers.

• In 2019, 10 countries hosted more than half (55%, 44.0 million) of all displaced people worldwide. The 10 countries hosting the highest numbers of displaced people all saw an increase in their displaced populations in 2019, with the exception of Turkey, which saw a slight decrease to 5.0 million from 5.1 million in 2018.

• Yemen was the country with the biggest increase in the number of displaced people in 2019, increasing to 3.9 million from 2.6 million in 2018. Of the total number of displaced people in Yemen in 2019, 92% (3.6 million) were internally displaced, with the remainder (300,000 people) being refugees.

• The South of Sahara region hosted the largest number of displaced people in 2019, with around a third (33%, 26.1 million) of all displaced people. The Middle East and North of Sahara region hosted over a quarter (28%, 21.9 million) of all displaced people, followed by Europe (13%, 9.9 million), South America (12%, 9.9 million) and South and Central Asia (10%, 7.7 million).

Numbers of displaced people in South America rose significantly in 2019, driven in part by the number of Venezuelans displaced abroad. Venezuelans displaced abroad are recognised as a distinct group of people of concern, although they do not fit the typical criteria for being considered as refugees.
• The total displaced population in South America reached 9.9 million people in 2019. This was an increase of 13% (1.1 million) from 2018. Over half (57%, 5.6 million) of the displaced people in South America were internally displaced.

• The number of Venezuelans displaced abroad reached 3.6 million in 2019, up 38% from 2.6 million in 2018. Venezuelans displaced abroad comprised over a third of the total displaced population in South America, and 4.5% of the total number of people displaced globally in 2019.

• Colombia was the country hosting the largest displaced population in the world in 2019, with 5.6 million internally displaced people and 1.8 million displaced Venezuelans.

**Figure 1.4**
**Numbers of displaced people increase for the eighth consecutive year**
20 countries with the largest numbers of displaced people and vulnerability to Covid-19 pandemic, 2018 and 2019

Source: Development Initiatives based on UNHCR, UNRWA, Index For Risk Management and Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre data.

Notes: The 20 countries are selected based on the size of displaced populations hosted in 2019. ‘Displaced population’ includes refugees and people in refugee-like situations, internally displaced persons (IDPs), asylum seekers and other displaced populations of concern to UNHCR (including Venezuelans displaced abroad). The number of IDPs is the total reported by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre at the end of 2019. Data is organised according to UNHCR’s definitions of country/territory of asylum. According to data provided by UNRWA, registered Palestine refugees are included as refugees for Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and Palestine. UNRWA data for 2019 is based on estimates.
Covid-19 poses a challenge for all countries, yet populations of displaced people may be particularly vulnerable, especially where they are hosted in countries at high risk from the impacts of the Covid-19 pandemic.

- In 2019, almost one in five displaced people (19%, 14.8 million) were displaced in countries classified as at very high risk from the impacts of the Covid-19 pandemic. Almost one third (31%, 24.9 million) of displaced people were in countries classified as at high risk from the impacts of the pandemic.

- Of the 20 countries with the biggest populations of displaced people, 14 were classified as at high or very high risk from the impacts of the Covid-19 pandemic.

- The South of Sahara region saw a 12% (2.7 million) increase in displaced people in 2019, reaching 26.1 million people. Of these, 11.7 million were in countries at very high risk from the impacts of the Covid-19 pandemic; 14.1 million were in high-risk countries, and 0.3 million were in medium-risk countries.
Mozambique, 2020

A project run by Young Africa International is helping more than 700 young people in Sofala and Manica provinces enhance their employability potential and income earning capacity.

Credit: European Union
chapter 2
international humanitarian assistance

The humanitarian landscape has been starkly altered by the advent of the Covid-19 (coronavirus) pandemic. The following analysis of key trends in international humanitarian assistance in 2019 highlights the foundation on which response to the pandemic is being built. It illustrates patterns in funding and issues with resourcing responses that will shape international humanitarian assistance in future, which will in turn be shaped by the broader economic and political impacts of the pandemic.

In 2019, international humanitarian assistance fell for the first time since 2012, with the majority of the largest donors reducing their contributions. However, humanitarian need continued to rise.

International humanitarian assistance from governments and private donors decreased to US$29.6 billion in 2019, down 5% from the previous year. This reduction was driven by a fall in contributions from public donors, as funding from governments and EU institutions decreased by US$2.1 billion. Almost half of the 20 largest donors reduced their contributions by more than 10%. Funding from the United Arab Emirates (UAE) fell by 71% (US$1.5 billion) in 2019, following a rise of US$1.8 billion in 2018.

The volume of funding requested for UN-coordinated appeals continued to grow in 2019, reaching a new high of US$30.4 billion. Despite the overall fall in international humanitarian assistance, funding committed through UN-coordinated appeals rose by 11% in 2019, to a record high of US$19.3 billion. The gap reduced between requirements and funding provided: 60% of appeal requirements were met in 2018 and 64% in 2019 (the highest since 2013).

The latest comprehensive data on assistance targeted to respond to need shows that Yemen, rather than the Syrian Arab Republic, was the largest recipient of international humanitarian assistance in 2018. Funding to Yemen rose sharply by 145%, to US$5.0 billion.

Funding for disaster risk reduction (DRR) is critical in addressing the impacts of climate change on the most vulnerable. Reporting indicates that DRR funding is well targeted. In 2018, 76% (US$973 million) of total official development assistance with a primary focus on DRR went to countries at ‘very high’ or ‘high’ risk of experiencing natural hazards.
International humanitarian assistance reduced by 5% from 2018 to 2019, following a period of steady, sustained growth in the preceding four years.

- In 2019, total international humanitarian assistance from governments and EU institutions and estimated contributions from private donors decreased by US$1.6 billion to US$29.6 billion.
- The fall in volumes of total international humanitarian assistance from 2018 to 2019, follows four years of steady growth during which total assistance grew by US$4.9 billion, an 18.6% increase over 2015–2018. Indeed, this marked the first fall in total assistance since 2012. Nonetheless, total international humanitarian assistance in 2019 remained 12% (US$3.3 billion) higher than in 2015.
- The reduction in total international humanitarian assistance was driven by a fall in funding from governments and EU institutions, which decreased by 8% (US$2.1 billion).
- The reduction in 2019 from governments and EU institutions interrupts a trend of sustained growth in which funding increased by US$5.2 billion, a 26% increase, between 2015 and 2018. Despite the fall in 2019, contributions from governments and EU institutions are 15% (US$3.1 billion) higher than in 2015.
- Estimated contributions of international humanitarian assistance for 2019 from private donors indicate that the total volume of assistance increased again after a drop in 2018. Funding from private donors is estimated to have grown by 8% from 2018 to 2019, to US$6.4 billion.
- Over the period 2015 to 2019, contributions of private international humanitarian assistance are estimated to have grown by 3% (US$192 million).

Source: Development Initiatives based on Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC), UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Financial Tracking Service (FTS), UN Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) and our unique dataset for private contributions.

Notes: Figures for 2019 are preliminary estimates. Totals for previous years differ from those reported in previous Global Humanitarian Assistance reports due to deflation and updated data and methodology (see our ‘Methodology and definitions’). Data is in constant 2018 prices.
The UN Consolidated Appeals Process seeks to provide a strategic approach to coordinating the planning, funding, implementing and monitoring of humanitarian action. Through this process, consolidated appeals are developed that identify humanitarian need in major crises and the assistance provided by UN agencies and NGOs, based on Common Humanitarian Action Plans. In 2019, the volume of assistance requested through these UN-coordinated appeals grew for the fourth consecutive year, reaching a new high.

- In 2019, US$30.4 billion was requested through UN-coordinated appeals, a 5% rise from 2018.
- This increase represents the fourth consecutive annual increase in appeal requirements. Appeal requirements in 2019 were 49% higher than in 2015 (a rise of US$10.0 billion) and 136% higher than in 2010 (a rise of US$17.5 billion).
- In 2019, the number of UN appeals increased by 2 from 2018, to 36.
- The aggregate increase in appeal requirements was driven by large growth in requirements in Yemen and the emergence of new appeals for 2019.
- Appeal requirements for the crisis in Yemen grew by US$1.1 billion (an increase of 35%) to US$4.2 billion. However, despite this rise and a 4% fall in the requirements for the Syria Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan [3RP], the Syria crisis still demanded the greatest volume of resources, with total requests for US$5.4 billion. Together these two appeals accounted for almost a third [32%] of all appeal requirements.
- Other than that in Yemen, the appeal in Sudan was the only one among the ten largest (by requirements) that saw an increase in funding requested. Requirements for the UN-coordinated appeal in Sudan increased by US$142 million (a 14% rise).

### Source
Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS and UNHCR data.

### Notes
From 2012 data, including the regional response plans and regional response and resilience plans to Syria, South Sudan, DRC, Burundi, Nigeria, CAR, Yemen, Building Resilience and Solutions for Afghan Refugees in South-West Asia and Regional Refugee and Migrant Response Plan for Europe and for Refugees and Migrants from Venezuela coordinated and tracked by UNHCR. Data is in current prices.
Large decreases in requirements from 2018 to 2019 were seen for appeals in Somalia (decreasing by US$465 million, a 30% reduction) and in Ethiopia (decreasing by US$333 million, a 28% reduction).

Counter-balancing these decreases were new regional and country appeals responding primarily to the Venezuelan refugee crisis and the impact of cyclones, flooding and food insecurity in Mozambique and Zimbabwe. In 2019, the regional response plan for Venezuela requested US$738 million. In southern Africa, appeals for Mozambique had requirements of US$621 million, and for Zimbabwe of US$468 million.

As requirements for UN-coordinated appeals increased in 2019, so did funding to meet these requirements. Total funding committed towards UN-coordinated appeals increased for the fourth consecutive year, to its highest-ever level. With large increases to a number of appeals and funding to new appeals, the funding gap between requirements and funding closed.

In 2019, total funding of US$19.3 billion was provided towards UN-coordinated appeals, an 11% increase from 2018 and the highest volume of funding ever committed.

The gap between requirements and funding reduced by volume, decreasing from US$11.7 billion in 2018 to US$11.1 billion in 2019, and as a proportion of requirements met, from 60% in 2018 to 64% in 2019. This represents the second-highest proportion of appeal requirements met in the past decade, although remains consistent with the trend for the period.

Large increases in funding (in excess of US$100 million) were evident for the existing appeals in Yemen (up 36%, to US$3.6 billion), Lebanon (up 18%, to US$1.2 billion) and Iraq (up 30%, to US$657 million).

New appeals also contributed significantly to the growth in total funding. Five new country plans (HRPs) and a new regional plan (RRP) were launched in 2019. In total, US$1.0 billion was committed to new appeals, including US$387 million to the regional plan for Venezuela (and for country plans), US$295 million for Mozambique and US$239 million for Zimbabwe.

Six countries with appeals in 2018, through which US$148 million was provided, no longer had appeals in 2019.

In 2019, the number of UN-coordinated appeals grew to 36, from 34 in 2018. As in previous years, there was wide variation between individual appeals in the volume of funding required and the extent to which appeal requirements were met (see Figure 2.3).

The 36 appeals in 2019 ranged in size from the Syria 3RP, requesting US$5.4 billion, to the Iran appeal requesting US$25.0 million.

Eight appeals accounted for 65% (US$19.6 billion) of all funding requested for UN-coordinated appeals in 2019. These eight appeals (Yemen, Syria 3RP, Syria, DRC, South Sudan, South Sudan RRP, Sudan and Somalia) each requested more than US$1 billion.
Figure 2.3
Wide variation in coverage of appeal requirements continues, but the number of appeals receiving 75% or more of requested funding rises in 2019
UN-coordinated appeal requirements and proportion of requirements met, 2019

As in previous years, there is great variation in the proportion of appeal requirements met. However, in 2019 a larger number, and proportion, of appeals received 75% or more of funding requested, compared to 2018.

- The proportion of total requirements met in 2019 varies from 22%, for the DRC RRP, to 94%, for the Iraq HRP.
- Of the 36 appeals in 2019, 9 received more than 75% of the funds requested (Madagascar, Myanmar, Afghanistan, Iraq, Ethiopia, Bangladesh, Somalia, South Sudan and Yemen). This compares to just 4 of 34 appeals in 2018 that received more than 75% of appeal requirements.
- Just under a third [11] of the 36 UN-coordinated appeals in 2019 received 50% or less of their funding requirements, of which only the DRC HRP (22%) received less than 25%. This compares to 13 of 34 appeals in 2018.

Increases and decreases in the coverage of appeal requirements in excess of 10% occurred in more than a quarter of appeals.

Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS and UNHCR data.
Notes: CAR: Central African Republic. DPR Korea: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. DRC: Democratic Republic of the Congo. The five regional response plans (RRPs) and one refugee and migrant response plan (RMRP) are shaded to avoid double counting with country humanitarian response plans (HRPs). Data is in current prices.
The coverage of appeal requirements increased in seven crises by more than 10%, with six of these appeals having over 20% more of their funding requirements fulfilled in 2019 than in 2018. These seven appeals were: Ethiopia (coverage up by 28%), Somalia (up 28%), State of Palestine (up 27%), Libya (up 27%), Haiti (up 23%), Central African Republic (up 21%) and Ukraine (up 14%).

The proportion of appeal requirements met reduced by more than 10% in 2019 from 2018 in three appeals: Pakistan (down by 33%), Burkina Faso (down 14%) and the DRC RRP (down 16%).

In 2019, 25 countries were identified as ‘forgotten crises’ in European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations’ (ECHO’s) latest assessment.1

Among this group of 25 were 14 countries with HRPs and 3 that were part of RRPs. The average request from each of the 14 countries with HRPs was US$315 million; 5 of these 14 countries received 50% or less of requirements, while the average received was 54%.

The volume of funding received by these forgotten crises with appeals ranged from US$14 million to Burundi, as country-component of DRC RRP, to US$608 million to Sudan’s HRP.

The eight forgotten crises without appeals, or requirements as part of regional response plans, were in the Philippines, Algeria, Mauritania, Senegal, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Mexico.

Red Cross appeals

The international Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (RCRC) sets out its requirements separately from UN-coordinated appeals. In 2019, following three years of consecutive growth, funding to the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) fell sharply, while funding to the ICRC grew slightly, continuing a pattern of steady growth.

IFRC emergency appeals relate mostly to disasters associated with natural hazards.

- In 2019, funding to the IFRC increased by 4%: from US$382 million in 2018, to US$398 million in 2019.
- The coverage of IFRC appeal requirements in 2019 decreased sharply in comparison to previous years, reducing to 63% (from 79% in 2018), having ranged between 89% and 79% over the period 2015 to 2018.

ICRC appeals respond mainly to conflict-related situations.

- In 2019, the ICRC received US$1.7 billion, a slight increase from 2018 of US$5 million (up 0.3%). Between 2015 and 2019, ICRC funding has grown every year, increasing by 20% over this period.
- In 2019, 92% of ICRC’s US$1.9 million appeal requirements were met, consistent with the average (92%) for the period since 2015.
In 2019, the volume of international assistance provided by the 20 largest donors reduced for the first time since 2012. The majority of donors within this group reduced the volume of assistance provided, with significant falls, in excess of 10%, from almost half.

- In 2019, the volume of international humanitarian assistance provided by the 20 largest public donors decreased by 8%, from US$24.4 billion in 2018 to US$22.4 billion.
- Despite this fall, these donors continued to provide the vast majority of all international humanitarian assistance from public donors, contributing 97% of all allocations, the same proportion as in 2018.

This reduction in contributions in 2019 appears consistent with the gradual slowing in the pace of growth in allocations evident between 2014 and 2017.

- During this period, contributions from the 20 largest donors increased but, year-on-year, by decreasing proportions, rising by 23% in 2014, 12% in 2015, 9% in 2016 and 3% in 2017.

**Source:** Development Initiatives based on OCED DAC, UN OCHA FTS and UN CERF data

**Notes:** UAE: United Arab Emirates. 2019 data for OECD DAC is preliminary. Data is in constant 2018 prices. Contributions of EU member states include an imputed amount of their expenditure (see our ‘Methodology and definitions’).

*Turkey is shaded differently because the humanitarian assistance it voluntarily reports to the DAC is largely comprised of expenditure on hosting Syrian refugees within Turkey, and is not therefore strictly comparable with the international humanitarian assistance from other donors in this figure.

**EU institutions are also included separately for comparison and are shaded differently to distinguish from government donors.
• This trend of slower growth was interrupted in 2018 by an exceptional, near sevenfold rise in contributions from the United Arab Emirates (UAE), increasing by US$1.8 billion. However, in 2019, the volume of assistance provided by the UAE fell almost as sharply, reducing by US$1.5 billion.

The three largest donors of international humanitarian assistance in 2019 remained the US, Germany and the UK, with contributions from the UK rising sharply.

• Contributions from the US, Germany and the UK accounted for 58% of all international humanitarian assistance from public donors.2

• The UK increased its contributions of international humanitarian assistance by almost a quarter (24%), an increase of US$588 million, to US$3.1 billion. Notably, growth was also evident from Denmark, up 14% to US$601 million, and Finland, up 15% to US$163 million.

• Overall, 13 governments reduced the volume of international humanitarian assistance they provided in 2019, including 9 that did so by more than 10%. Of these donors, four decreased the volume of assistance provided by more than 20%: the UAE by 71%, Australia by 44% (a fall of US$103 million), Kuwait by 25% (US$94 million) and Italy by 22% (US$130 million).

Countries across the globe continued to host refugees, asylum seekers and internally displaced persons (IDPs) in 2019, with their numbers continuing an established trend of year-on-year growth. The majority of expenditure by governments on efforts to support refugees within their own borders is not reported.3 However, guidance from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) does allow for the reporting of a proportion of expenditure as official development assistance (ODA), where certain criteria are met.4

In 2019, the available data indicates that spending on hosting refugees in-country decreased. However, the absence of a breakdown of ODA contributions from one government suggests total aggregate expenditure is likely to have fallen by less.5

• The volume of reported ODA spent on in-country refugee hosting costs decreased by 13%, from US$10.8 billion in 2018 to US$9.4 billion. This decrease would represent the third consecutive fall in expenditure and would be almost a third (28%) lower than in 2015, when it stood at US$12.9 billion.

• In 2019, three countries accounted for nearly three quarters of all in-country refugee hosting expenditure: Germany (34%), the US (20%) and France (20%).

• Among the 15 countries with the highest in-country refugee hosting expenditure, large increases in expenditure, in excess of US$100 million, were seen in France (up 54% to US$1.2 billion), the UK (up 26% to US$620 million) and the US (up 13% to US$1.8 billion).
The proportion of GNI spent on international humanitarian assistance indicates the significance of humanitarian spending relative to the size of a country’s economy and other spending priorities. Three Middle Eastern states considerably increased humanitarian spending in 2018, but all allocated a smaller proportion of GNI in 2019.

- The proportion of GNI provided as international humanitarian assistance by the UAE decreased sharply from 0.55% to 0.15%, while Kuwait reduced from 0.26% to 0.19% and Saudi Arabia decreased from 0.21% to 0.18%.
- Despite these reductions, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the UAE were the first-, second- and seventh-largest donors by proportion of GNI, and were among only eight countries contributing over 0.1% of GNI as international humanitarian assistance.
- Of the three largest donors of international humanitarian assistance by volume (the US, Germany and the UK), only the UK increased the proportion of its GNI as assistance, up by 0.02% to 0.11%.

Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC, UN OCHA FTS, UN CERF, World Bank World Development Indicators and International Monetary Fund World Economic Outlook data.

Notes: UAE: United Arab Emirates. GNI data for 2019 has been estimated using historical data on GNI and real GDP growth rates for 2019. 2019 data for OECD DAC is preliminary. Data is in constant 2018 prices.

*Turkey is shaded differently because the humanitarian assistance it voluntarily reports to the DAC is largely comprised of expenditure on hosting Syrian refugees within Turkey, and is not therefore strictly comparable with the international humanitarian assistance from other donors in this figure.
International government funding: donor regions

Figure 2.6
Aggregate funding from donors in Europe grows but reduces in all other regions
International humanitarian assistance from governments by donor region, 2010–2019

The large rise in contributions from governments in the Middle East and North of Sahara in 2018 was not sustained in 2019, with the volume of assistance reducing sharply. Aggregate contributions from European governments and EU institutions and countries in North and Central America varied much less starkly.

- Contributions from governments in the Middle East and North of Sahara fell by 44% (a fall of US$1.8 billion), establishing a trend over the past decade of fluctuating volumes of international humanitarian assistance.
- However, despite this reduction in 2019, the volume of assistance provided by countries within the Middle East and North of Sahara region has increased by 383% since 2010, a rate of growth three times higher than from European governments and EU institutions and more than fourteen times higher than from governments in North and Central America.
- Driving the sharp fall in volumes of assistance from countries in the Middle East and North of Sahara was the US$1.5 billion reduction in contributions from the UAE.
- Combined bilateral contributions from European governments and EU institutions increased slightly in 2019, up 1.9% from 2018 levels. The UK and Germany contributed more than half of this assistance in 2019.
- The overall regional increase from Europe was primarily supported by a large rise in international humanitarian assistance from the UK, rising by 24% (US$633 million), with smaller but notable increases also from Denmark, rising 14% (US$75 million), and Norway, rising 9% (US$63 million).
- Having plateaued in 2018, the aggregate volume of international humanitarian assistance from governments in North and Central America fell slightly, by 3% in 2019.

Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC, UN CERF and UN OCHA FTS data.

Notes: OECD DAC data for 2019 is partial and preliminary. Funding from OECD DAC donors includes contributions from EU institutions. OECD country naming has been used for regions, with the exception of Middle East and North of Sahara, which has been combined. “Other” regions includes the combined total of regions where funding was below US$5 billion over the 10-year period. Calculations include only humanitarian assistance spent internationally, not in-country. See our ‘Methodology and definitions’ Data is in constant 2018 prices.
Private donors

Figure 2.7
The proportions of total assistance from different types of private donors have remained constant in recent years
Sources of private international humanitarian assistance, 2014–2018

Private donors play a significant role in supporting international humanitarian response. Between 2015 and 2019, contributions from private donors have consistently made up just over a fifth of total international humanitarian assistance (see Figure 2.1). Data for 2017 and 2018, and estimated contributions for 2019, indicate that total funding from private donors has stabilised at close to US$6.4 billion.

The latest year for which detailed account breakdowns are available to allow analysis of individual sources is 2018. This analysis shows that the proportion of funding from different sources altered from 2017 to 2018. However, these shifts saw a general return to funding patterns evident over the period 2014 to 2018. In 2018, funding from national societies recovered, having reduced sharply in 2016, and funding from individuals reduced, following a marked rise in 2017.

- In 2018, the volume and proportion of total private funding from national societies decreased from US$948 million in the previous year, or 16% of total contributions, to US$656 million, or 11%, the same proportion seen in 2014 and 2015.
- Funding from individuals remained the largest single source of private funding. Funding from individuals grew from 61% to 69% as a proportion of total private contributions, between 2016 and 2018, increasing from US$3.4 billion to US$4.1 billion. The proportion in 2018 (68%) is close to the proportions in 2014 and 2015.
- Funding from foundations and from companies and corporations increased by volume and as a proportion of total private contributions in 2018. For foundations, funding increased from US$404 million (7%) in 2017 to US$576 million (10%) in 2018, while for companies and corporations, contributions grew from US$233 million (4%) in 2017 to US$360 million (6%) in 2018.

Source: Development Initiatives based on our unique dataset of private contributions.

Note: Data is in constant 2018 prices.
The latest comprehensive data from the OECD DAC on where assistance has been targeted in response to need is for 2018. For the first time in seven years, the crisis in Syria did not receive the largest volume of assistance. Large increases in funding provided by Middle Eastern donors in 2018 drove a sharp rise in assistance directed to the crisis in Yemen (see Figure 2.8). Overall, the well-established trend of a small number of crises receiving a large proportion of total humanitarian assistance allocated to specific countries (country-allocable humanitarian assistance) remained unchanged.

- In 2018, international humanitarian assistance to Yemen more than doubled, increasing by US$2.9 billion to US$5.0 billion, a rise of 145%. This rise was driven by large increases in contributions from the UAE and Saudi Arabia. In 2017, 29% of total funding to Yemen came from these two donors. By 2018, this proportion had grown to 69%.

- For the second consecutive year, the volume of assistance channelled to Syria reduced, decreasing by US$182 million to US$2.3 billion, a fall of 7%. This meant that, for the first time since the escalation of civil war in the country in 2012, Syria was not the largest recipient of international humanitarian assistance.

Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC, UN OCHA FTS and UN CERF data.

Note: Data is in constant 2018 prices.
For more than a decade, the ten largest recipients of country-allocable humanitarian assistance have received the majority of available funding, typically just under two thirds of total assistance.

- In 2018, 66% of all country-allocable humanitarian assistance was directed to the ten largest recipients, marking a slight but not untypical increase in the concentration of funding from the 63% of funding channelled to the ten largest recipients in 2017.

The make-up of this group of largest recipients tends to remain relatively stable year-on-year, despite some large variations in the volumes of assistance to individual countries.

- Of the ten countries receiving the most humanitarian assistance, nine were the same in both 2017 and 2018. The new addition in 2018 was Jordan, which replaced Turkey. In 2017, Turkey was the eighth-largest recipient. However, a 33% fall in contributions (from US$803 million to US$541 million) meant Turkey became the thirteenth-largest recipient in 2018.

- The relative stability among the membership of the group of largest recipients is a product of the nature of crisis in these countries. In 2018, all of the ten largest recipients were experiencing protracted crisis.7

- In addition to the large increase in assistance to Yemen in 2018, large variations in the volume of funding between the ten largest recipients were also evident. Contributions to South Sudan fell by 42% (from US$1.4 billion to US$828 million), to Somalia by 32% (from US$1.1 billion to US$774 million) and to Ethiopia by 23% (from US$896 million to US$691 million).

- Overall, seven of the ten largest recipients witnessed falls in the volume of assistance they received from 2017 to 2018. In addition to Yemen, Nigeria and Jordan were the only other two countries among the ten largest recipients to see increases in assistance provided, rising 4% (US$30 million) and 7% (US$43 million), respectively.

Outside the ten largest recipients, there were large rises and falls in the volume of funding to a number of other crises.

- Notable increases in the volume of international humanitarian assistance from 2017 to 2018 were seen, with growth of 62% in Bangladesh (11th-largest recipient in 2018), in response to the Rohingya refugee crisis, from US$413 million to US$668 million, in DRC (12th) of 23%, from US$508 million to US$624 million, in Chad (18th) of 47%, from US$153 million to US$224 million, and in Niger (20th) of 28%, from US$172 million to US$220 million.

- In addition to the decrease in assistance to Turkey, highlighted above, a notable fall outside the ten largest recipients was seen in contributions to Uganda (19th-largest recipient in 2018), with a 36% reduction, from US$350 million to US$223 million.

The income-group profile of the ten largest recipients of international humanitarian assistance remained unchanged in 2018 from 2017.

- Five of the ten largest recipients were low-income countries in 2018 (Yemen, Syria, Somalia, South Sudan and Ethiopia). These low-income countries received 46% of all country-allocable humanitarian assistance.

- Two of the ten largest recipients were lower-middle-income countries (Palestine and Nigeria), accounting for 8% of country-allocable humanitarian assistance, while three were upper-middle-income countries (Iraq, Lebanon and Jordan), receiving 13% of assistance.
Despite immediate global attention on the Covid-19 pandemic, climate change is likely to have more profound and long-lasting impacts on people’s lives. This is already evident in the increased occurrence of disasters associated with natural hazards, resulting in more vulnerable people in need of humanitarian assistance. In 2019, 21 of the 42 countries with the largest populations in need of humanitarian assistance experienced disasters caused by natural hazards (see Chapter 1, Figure 1.3). Therefore, it is critical to make humanitarian and developmental investments in broader resilience, as well as in disaster risk reduction (DRR).

Recent improvements in the reporting of ODA for DRR to the OECD DAC Creditor Reporting System include a new DRR purpose code and in 2018 a DRR marker. Donors can now clearly indicate where funded projects have DRR as their primary focus. Analysis was conducted for 2018, the first year for which data with the marker is available. This used the purpose code and marker, combined with a keyword search applied to all projects reported to the OECD DAC, to capture instances where the marker may not have been consistently applied. This analysis shows that funding of activities with DRR as a primary focus appears to be well targeted to countries at ‘very high’ and ‘high risk’ of natural hazards, although a small number of countries receive a large portion of this funding.

- In 2018, ODA of US$1.3 billion was provided for activities with DRR as a primary focus.
- Of this total, 36% (US$452 million) went to 11 countries at very high risk of experiencing natural hazards, with a further 41% (US$521 million) to 49 countries at high risk.
- Nine countries received just over half of all funding for activities with DRR as a primary focus. The two countries receiving the largest amounts were Turkey (high risk), allocated US$168 million (13% of all primary-DRR funding), and Bangladesh (very high risk), allocated US$138 million (11%).

**Figure 2.9**
ODA focused on disaster risk reduction is targeted to countries most in need, although a small number receive a large proportion

ODA with primary focus on disaster risk reduction (DRR) to country recipients, by exposure to natural hazards, 2018

---

**Source:** Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC CRS and Index for Risk Management.

**Notes:** Data is in constant 2018 prices. Analysis includes projects under the disaster risk reduction (DRR) purpose code, projects marked with a 2 in the DRR marker and projects flagged by a keyword search on CRS 2018 data. Figures include country-allocable aid only. Total ODA refers to total gross bilateral ODA as recorded in the CRS. Countries grouped by Index for Risk Management exposure to natural hazards indicator scores: 6.9 or higher grouped as ‘very high’, 4.7–6.9 grouped as ‘high’, 2.8–4.6 grouped as ‘medium’, 2.7 or lower grouped as ‘low’. 
Although it is well targeted, funding for activities with DRR as the primary focus accounts for only a small proportion of total ODA to most countries. The proportion varies however, from less than 1% in a majority of the 60 countries at very high or high risk from natural hazards, to 5–13% in just five of these countries. Other DRR activities are also implemented through projects where DRR is not the primary focus.

- In 2018, for countries that received DRR funding, this funding constituted only 1% of their total ODA allocated.
- Among the 11 countries deemed at very high risk from natural hazards, most received more than 1% of their total ODA for DRR activities. The exceptions were India (0.5%), China (0.3%) and Somalia (0.5%). Five ‘very high risk’ countries received more than 2% of ODA for DRR activities, with the largest proportions to the Philippines (5.6%), Haiti (3.7%) and Bangladesh (2.7%).
- Of the 49 countries at risk of experiencing natural hazards, 21 received more than 1% of their ODA for DRR activities. Particularly large proportions of the total ODA allocated to individual countries were for DRR activities in Tonga (12.6%), Dominica (7.9%), Turkey (5.4%) and Jamaica (5.1%).

Both bilateral and multilateral donors provide significant volumes of funding for projects with DRR as the primary focus.

- In 2018, bilateral donors provided 55% (US$1.0 billion) of total funding for DRR and multilateral organisations provided 45% (US$840 million).
- On average, multilateral organisations provided 2.0% of their total ODA allocations for DRR activities, compared with an average of 0.9% among bilateral donors. The mandates of some multilateral organisations include a more distinct focus on climate change and disaster reduction.
- EU institutions and the International Development Association provided the largest volumes of funding for DRR activities among multilateral organisations, contributing US$307 million and US$218 million in 2018, respectively.

Among bilateral donors, there is wide variation in the volume and proportion of ODA provided for activities where DRR is the primary focus.

- The four largest bilateral donors of ODA for DRR activities, all contributing more than US$100 million in 2018, were the US (US$180 million), Japan (US$152 million), France (US$135 million) and Germany (US$119.3 million).
- The bilateral donors contributing the largest proportion of their total ODA for DRR activities were Ireland (3.3%), Switzerland (2.8%), South Korea (2.3%), New Zealand (2.2%) and Sweden (2.1%), compared to an average of 0.9% for all bilateral donors.

Bilateral donors are consistent in targeting their funding for projects with DRR as a primary focus to countries identified as ‘very high’ or ‘high’ risk of natural hazards, with nine out of ten of the largest donors providing more than two thirds of their funding to recipients in these risk categories.

- When funding to very-high- and high-risk countries is combined, five donors targeted more than 80% of their funding for projects with DRR as a primary focus to these countries: Korea (94%), the Netherlands (88%), Canada (87%), Switzerland (83%) and the UK (81%).
Yemen, 2019

An EU-supported health worker prepares a vaccination shot at a mobile health clinic in a camp housing thousands of displaced Yemeni people.

Credit: European Union/Peter Biro
To meet the needs of people affected by humanitarian crises, sufficient funding is crucial; but how assistance is delivered is also key to the effectiveness and efficiency of response. Change is evident in some aspects of how assistance is delivered but not all. Progress against key Grand Bargain commitments is uneven and reporting on these commitments remains inadequate.

How international humanitarian assistance is channelled to first-level recipients has changed little over the past five years. In 2018, most assistance (62%, US$15.6 billion) from government donors was provided to multilateral organisations. Well over three quarters of funding (89%) from private donors was channelled to non-governmental organisations (NGOs).

The Grand Bargain signatories committed to a 2020 target of at least 25% of international humanitarian assistance being passed to local and national actors as directly as possible. After slight growth since 2016, direct funding to local and national responders decreased in 2019, both as a proportion of total assistance (from 3.5% to 2.1%) and in absolute volumes (from US$782 million to US$444 million).

UN pooled funds enable a flexible response with collective impact. UN pooled funds received a record volume in 2019 of US$1,869 million, an increase of almost 25% from 2018. This was the sixth consecutive year of growth, with total funding more than doubling since 2013.

UN country-based pooled funds (CBPFs) allocated more than US$1 billion in 2019, more than doubling total allocations since 2015. NGOs continued to receive the bulk (71%) of CBPF funding in 2019, with funding to local and national NGOs increasing to almost 25% of total CBPF funding.

Unearmarked and multi-year funding provides recipients with greater flexibility and predictability. Data collected by Development Initiatives from nine UN agencies indicates that unearmarked funding received by these agencies has declined since 2015, in volume and as a proportion of total contributions.

Humanitarian assistance provided as cash or vouchers increased in 2019, both in volume and as a share of total humanitarian assistance. As in 2018, this increase was primarily driven by increases in volumes for UN agencies. Challenges remain, however, in reporting and tracking, including in the response to the Covid-19 (coronavirus) pandemic.
Channels of delivery for international humanitarian assistance

Figure 3.1
Consistent funding patterns, with most public assistance going to multilateral organisations and most private assistance going to NGOs
Funding channels of international humanitarian assistance, 2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donors</th>
<th>First-level recipients</th>
<th>Subsequent recipients</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OECD DAC governments</td>
<td>US$13.8bn</td>
<td>RCRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>US$15.6bn</td>
<td>US$3.1bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>US$4.0bn</td>
<td>US$1.2bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>US$0.1bn</td>
<td>US$0.8bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>US$1.7bn</td>
<td>US$0.3bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other governments</td>
<td>US$4.1bn</td>
<td>US$1.4bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>US$3.1bn</td>
<td>US$1.0bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>US$2.0bn</td>
<td>US$0.8bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>US$0.5bn</td>
<td>US$0.2bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private</td>
<td>US$5.3bn</td>
<td>RCRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>US$1.0bn</td>
<td>US$0.2bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>US$0.6bn</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| OECD DAC governments    | NGOs                                         | Other governments    |
|                         | US$4.1bn                                     | US$3.1bn             |
|                         | US$0.1bn                                     | US$0.5bn             |
|                         | US$1.7bn                                     |                       |
| Other governments       | US$1.2bn                                     |                       |
|                         | US$0.8bn                                     |                       |
|                         | US$0.3bn                                     |                       |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donors</th>
<th>First-level recipients</th>
<th>Subsequent recipients</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OECD DAC governments</td>
<td>US$13.8bn</td>
<td>RCRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>US$15.6bn</td>
<td>US$3.1bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>US$4.0bn</td>
<td>US$1.2bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>US$0.1bn</td>
<td>US$0.8bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>US$1.7bn</td>
<td>US$0.3bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other governments</td>
<td>US$4.1bn</td>
<td>US$1.4bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>US$3.1bn</td>
<td>US$1.0bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>US$2.0bn</td>
<td>US$0.8bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>US$0.5bn</td>
<td>US$0.2bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private</td>
<td>US$5.3bn</td>
<td>RCRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>US$1.0bn</td>
<td>US$0.2bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>US$0.6bn</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| OECD DAC governments    | NGOs                                         | Other governments    |
|                         | US$4.1bn                                     | US$3.1bn             |
|                         | US$0.1bn                                     | US$0.5bn             |
|                         | US$1.7bn                                     |                       |
| Other governments       | US$1.2bn                                     |                       |
|                         | US$0.8bn                                     |                       |
|                         | US$0.3bn                                     |                       |

| Sources: Development Initiatives based on Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC), UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Financial Tracking Service (FTS) and UN Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) data and our unique dataset for private contributions. |
| Notes: RCRC: International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. Our first-level recipient data from government donors and EU institutions uses OECD DAC Creditor Reporting System (CRS), CERF and UN OCHA FTS data. The figures in our calculations for total humanitarian assistance from OECD DAC donors use data from OECD DAC Tables 1, 2a and ‘Members’ total use of the multilateral system’, so totals may differ. ‘Public sector’ refers both to the OECD definition and reporting to the FTS. OECD DAC CRS codes ‘other’, ‘to be defined’ and ‘public–private partnerships’ are merged to ‘other’. Private funding figures use our unique dataset of private contributions for humanitarian assistance. Data is in constant 2018 prices. |
As total humanitarian assistance increased in 2018, channels of delivery remained largely the same as in 2017. The majority of government assistance continued to be directed to multilateral organisations, while private donors channelled most of their assistance to non-governmental organisations (NGOs). This trend appears to have continued in the initial response to the Covid-19 pandemic, with most government funding to date directed to multilateral organisations (see Chapter 4, Figure 4.6).

Funding is often passed to one or more intermediaries before reaching a crisis location. Beyond funding to first-level recipients, there continues to be a lack of data on subsequent transactions (see Chapter 4, Box 4.4, How can data on funding be traced from donor to final recipient?).

- In 2018, governments directed almost two thirds (US$15.6 billion, 62%) of their humanitarian assistance to multilateral organisations. This is a decrease as a proportion of total assistance from 63% in 2017, but an increase in volume from US$14.6 billion. This proportion has remained relatively steady over the last five years, ranging between 58% in 2015 and 64% in 2014. By volume, this amount has increased each year from US$11.6 billion in 2014.

- Governments directed 16% (US$4.1 billion) of their humanitarian assistance to NGOs in 2018. This proportion decreased from 20% (US$4.6 billion) in 2017.

- The bulk of international assistance from private donors was directed to NGOs in 2018, with 89% (US$5.3 billion) of private funding received by NGOs. Private contributions comprised over half of the total funding to NGOs in 2018, with 56% of humanitarian assistance received by NGOs coming from private donors.

- International humanitarian assistance from private donors to multilateral organisations grew from US$467 million in 2017 to US$551 million in 2018. This represented a slight growth in the proportion of private donor funding going to multilateral organisations, from 8% in 2017 to 9% in 2018.

- Funding to NGOs from all donors as a proportion of total international humanitarian assistance decreased from 35% in 2017 to 30% in 2018.
Direct funding to local and national actors

The Grand Bargain set a 2020 target of at least 25% of international humanitarian assistance being passed to local and national actors as directly as possible. This was followed by a subsequent agreement that this should relate to funding passing directly, and indirectly, through one intermediary. Reporting of indirect funding, however, continues to be partial and incomplete.

Where comprehensive data is available on direct funding, it shows two consecutive years of small increases in 2017 and 2018. In 2019, there was a decrease in assistance sent directly to local and national actors as a proportion of all international humanitarian assistance. Absolute volumes sent directly to local and national actors also dropped significantly in 2019, down 30% from 2016 when the Grand Bargain target was set.

- International humanitarian assistance sent directly to local and national actors as a proportion of all international humanitarian assistance decreased in 2019, with 2.1% (US$444 million) directed to local and national actors, decreasing from 3.5% (US$782 million) in 2018.

- National governments continued to receive the majority of direct funding to local and national actors in 2019, although this decreased in percentage terms from previous years. The proportion of direct funding to local and national actors that was passed to national governments dropped to 72% (US$318 million) in 2019, from 81% (US$634 million) in 2018. This reduction was largely due to a 65% decrease in funding received by the Yemeni government, dropping from US$470 million in 2018 to US$163 million in 2019.

- Local and national NGOs received 25% of international humanitarian assistance provided directly to local and national actors in 2019. This was a significant increase from 17% in 2018, and markedly up from 12% in 2016. The increase in the proportion of funding that local and national NGOs received in 2019 was not, however, due to increased funding, but rather was driven by the decrease in funding received by national governments.

Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS data.

Notes: Data is in constant 2018 prices. National Societies: National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. RCRC National Societies that received international humanitarian assistance to respond to domestic crises are included in national actors. For organisation coding methodology, see our ‘Methodology and definitions’.
• The volume of funding received by local and national NGOs decreased from US$134 million in 2018 to US$110 million in 2019. This drop is largely accounted for by a fall in funding to local NGOs from US$33 million in 2018 to US$5 million in 2019.

• The majority of the remaining 3.7% of international humanitarian assistance provided directly to local and national actors was directed to National Societies of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (3.5%).

Pooled funds

Figure 3.3
Total pooled funding increases significantly in 2019, by volume and as a proportion of total assistance
Total funding to UN-managed humanitarian pooled funds, 2010–2019

UN and NGO pooled funds combine contributions from different donors to enable rapid and strategic humanitarian responses. The pooled funds provide flexible funding that can be used where the need is greatest. Since 2013, total funding to UN pooled funds has more than doubled. As a proportion of total public contributions, however, funding to pooled funds has shown a slower increase over the same period.

• UN pooled funds received a record level of funding of US$1,869 million in 2019, an almost 25% increase from US$1,498 million in 2018. This was the sixth consecutive year of growth in contributions to UN pooled funds.

• The rise in 2019 was largely due to a 55% increase in funding to the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF). Funding to the CERF grew from US$555 million in 2018 to US$860 million in 2019, making 2019 the fourth consecutive year of growth in funding to the CERF.

• Funding to country-based pooled funds (CBPFs) increased by only 7% in 2019, from US$942 million in 2018 to US$1,009 million. This was the smallest yearly increase in funding to CBPFs since 2013.

Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS and UN CERF data.
Notes: CBPFs: country-based pooled funds (funding from emergency response funds and common humanitarian funds); CERF: Central Emergency Response Fund. Annual figures include carry-overs from the previous year. Data is in constant 2018 prices.
• In the 2010–2019 period, funding to UN pooled funds more than doubled, from US$827 million to US$1,869 million. As a proportion of total public contributions, funding provided to pooled funds notably increased in 2019 to 8.1%, up from 5.9% in 2018. Proportionally, the total public contributions to international humanitarian assistance that this represents had ranged between only 5.0% and 6.6% since 2010.

A small group of country donors is responsible for the majority of contributions to UN pooled funds.

• Five countries provided almost 75% of total contributions in 2019: the UK (US$357 million), Germany (US$173 million), Sweden (US$96 million), the Netherlands (US$64 million) and Belgium (US$50 million).

• In 2019, the UK increased its funding to the CERF by US$290 million. This more than tripled its previous year’s contribution, from US$114 million in 2018 to US$404 million in 2019. This increased contribution drove the overall increase in funding to the CERF in 2019.

**Figure 3.4**
UN-managed country-based pooled funds allocate a growing proportion of funding to NGOs

UN-managed country-based pooled funds by recipient type, 2015–2019

UN-managed CBPFs respond to needs in specific country contexts. The funds are managed in-country and allocated to a range of implementing partners. NGOs receive more than two thirds of the funding allocated from CBPFs, and CBPFs are the largest single source of direct funding to local and national NGOs.

• Total allocations from UN CBPFs increased by 24% in 2019 to US$1,040 million. Since 2015, allocations from CBPFs have more than doubled, from US$516 million.

• Four CBPFs accounted for half of the CBPF allocations in 2019: Yemen [23%, US$244 million], Syria Cross-border [11%, US$118 million], South Sudan [7.8%, US$82 million] and Iraq [7.6%, US$79 million].

• NGOs received US$741 million (71% of total CBPF funding) in 2019, up from US$567 million [68%] in 2018. Since 2017, the volume of funding allocated to NGOs has increased year on year: rising 0.4% in 2017 and 15% in 2018.

• Of CBPF funding allocated to NGOs in 2019, 65% (US$483 million) was directed to international NGOs and 35% (US$258 million) to local and national NGOs.

**Source:** Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA’s CBPF Grant Management System.

**Notes:** For organisation coding methodology, see ‘Data sources’. Data is in constant 2018 prices.
CBPFS are an important source of funding for many local and national actors, with significant proportions of CBPF funding allocated to them. Despite this positive trend, funding to CBPFS remains only a small part of total humanitarian assistance, representing just 4% of total public donor contributions in 2019. This indicates that CBPFS are only part of the solution to passing more funding to local and national actors.

- Local and national NGOs are receiving an increasing share of the total allocations from CBPFS. In 2019, local and national NGOs received 25% of the total funding from CBPFS, rising each year since 2015 when local and national NGOs received a 15% share.

- This growth was largely driven by five CBPFS allocating increasing proportions to local and national NGOs: the occupied Palestinian territory Humanitarian Fund (a 738% increase in the 2016–2019 period), the Somalia Humanitarian Fund (628%), the South Sudan Humanitarian Fund (172%), the Yemen Humanitarian Fund (170%) and the Democratic Republic of the Congo Humanitarian Fund (74%).

- The proportion of allocations made to local and national actors varies between CBPFS. In 2019, the Iraq Humanitarian Fund allocated 0.9% (US$0.6 million) of its funding to local and national NGOs, while the occupied Palestinian territory Humanitarian Fund allocated 36.9% (US$6.2 million) of funds to local and national NGOs. The Somalia and South Sudan Humanitarian Funds also allocated around one third of their disbursements to local and national actors in 2019, allocating 34.4% (US$15.0 million) and 32.1% (US$23.4 million), respectively.

- The Yemen Humanitarian Fund allocated US$46.2 million to local and national NGOs in 2019 (19.2% of the fund’s total allocations), the largest volume of any CBPF.

- The volume of allocations from CBPFS to UN agencies increased by 11% in 2019 to reach US$286 million, rising from US$259 million in 2018. The total proportion of CBPF allocations directed to UN agencies has been consistently decreasing, however, dropping from 38% in 2015 to 28% in 2019.
Quality funding

‘Quality funding’ encompasses a range of properties that are valuable to different actors in different circumstances, and can include financing that is multi-year, unearmarked or otherwise flexible. The Grand Bargain set specific targets on multi-year and unearmarked funding; however, reporting and tracking progress against these aims remains challenging (see Box 3.2, What progress has been made on how multi-year funding and unearmarked funding is reported?).

Research published in 2020 by Development Initiatives, *Multi-year humanitarian funding: global baselines and trends,* found that funding identified by 11 donors as multi-year had grown each year since 2016, both by volume and as a proportion of total humanitarian contributions.

Signatories to the Grand Bargain committed to “achieve a global target of 30% of humanitarian contributions that is non-earmarked or softly earmarked by 2020.” Data collected from nine UN agencies indicates that unearmarked funding as a proportion of total funding has decreased steadily since 2015. The volume of unearmarked funding increased between 2015 and 2018, before dropping in 2019 to below-2015 levels.

- Between 2015 and 2019, unearmarked funding to the nine UN agencies decreased by US$140 million. The amount of unearmarked funding as a proportion of total funding decreased each year, from 20% in 2015 to 14% in 2019.
- The drop in the proportion of unearmarked funding in 2019 was driven by a 30% increase (US$1.7 billion) of earmarked funding to the World Food Programme (WFP), rising from US$5.7 billion in 2018 to US$7.3 billion in 2019.
- Only three of the UN agencies saw reductions in the amount of unearmarked funding between 2015 and 2019: the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) [a decrease of US$190 million, 24%], the UN International Children’s Emergency Fund [a decrease of US$66 million, 31%], and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees [a decrease of US$22 million, 2%].

*Source:* Development Initiatives based on data provided bilaterally by UN agencies.

*Notes:* The calculations comprise earmarked and unearmarked humanitarian and humanitarian-related contributions given to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), International Organization for Migration (IOM), UN Development Programme (UNDP), UN OCHA, UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UN International Children’s Emergency Fund (Unicef), UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), the World Food Programme (WFP) and the World Health Organisation (WHO). Data is in constant 2018 prices.
• The three UN agencies receiving the largest volumes of unearmarked funding in 2019 were the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (US$1,280 million), UNRWA (US$596 million) and WFP (US$298 million).

• Five UN agencies saw an increase in unearmarked funding across the 2015–2019 period. The largest increases were to the WFP (an increase of US$60 million), the World Health Organization (an increase of US$32 million), and the UN Development Programme (an increase of US$21 million).

• Between 2015 and 2019, earmarked funding grew significantly, with the nine UN agencies reporting a cumulative increase of US$5.4 billion (an increase of 51%).

Box 3.1
The need to accelerate progress on quality funding

The Grand Bargain set out separate commitments on predictable and flexible funding. Since 2016, however, predictability and flexibility have increasingly been seen as complementary elements of humanitarian funding that can enable more efficient and effective programming. As a result, the workstreams on these two issues have merged to reflect this.

The scope of the quality funding agenda has also expanded beyond just multi-year and unearmarked funding to include elements such as reporting requirements, accessibility, timeliness, grant conditions and how funding is disbursed.

As research by Development Initiatives, the Norwegian Refugee Council and the UN Food and Agriculture Organization illustrates, there is a range of emerging practice across the humanitarian system that illustrates how different features of predictability and flexibility within funding arrangements are valued.5

For instance, multi-year core support to UN organisations (known as regular resources), consisting of unearmarked contributions given without restriction, was highlighted as enabling longer-term planning, allowing organisations to scale up sustainable solutions and adapt to changing situations in emergencies. The Programme Based Approach, in which donors provide softly earmarked funding at country programme level within multi-year framework agreements, facilitated timely and needs-based responses, allowing partners to adapt to changing priorities and opportunities.

Through the response to the Covid-19 pandemic, other examples are also emerging. The CERF responded swiftly to the pandemic, issuing single block grants to multilateral agencies. The grants range in volume from US$2.7 million to US$40 million and have been disbursed in two tranches, with allocations made within a maximum of five days from the date of agreement. The Start Network has also launched the Start Fund Covid-19, which provides access to a rapid response funding pool for NGO members of the Start Network. The fund operates windows where members raise ‘alerts’ to respond to identified needs. Funding is agreed within seven days of an alert being raised. By the end of June 2020, £4.9 million of funding had been released for 35 projects in 22 countries through the Start Fund Covid-19.

Further progress needs to be made, however. As a recent policy brief by the Norwegian Refugee Council highlights,6 greater clarity is required on the concept of quality funding and how it is approached. Priority should be given to scaling up effective measures across all funding instruments, including flexibility, multi-year funding and other effective tools. The brief also identifies that donor concerns regarding accountability, reporting and visibility requirements need to be addressed.
Box 3.2
What progress has been made on how multi-year funding and unearmarked funding is reported?

It remains difficult to assess the extent to which Grand Bargain commitments are being delivered on multi-year and unearmarked funding. Reporting is limited and tracking systems not yet optimal. Defining what is to be tracked is key. For earmarked funding, the annex to the Grand Bargain contains definitions of earmarking categories. The Enhanced Quality Funding workstream also published guidance in 2020, clarifying the shared definition of multi-year funding as lasting for 24 months or more. There are two primary tools with which multi-year and unearmarked funding can be tracked: UN OCHA’s Financial Tracking Service (FTS) and the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI).

Tracking multi-year funding

The extent of reporting to both FTS and IATI is limited, given the lack of a common approach to interpreting definitions and reporting on funding. The FTS flow model allows identification of funding across multiple years by source and destination usage years. This permits the identification of a multi-annual funding flow [so spanning more than one calendar or financial year]. If the yearly breakdown is also reported, it is then possible to identify the annual amount of funding. However, extracting summary figures on multi-year grants is not straightforward.

In 2019, 64 different organisations reported a total US$2.0 billion of multi-annual funding to FTS, compared to only US$300 million reported by 31 organisations for 2016. However, for many of these multi-annual flows, it is not possible to confirm that they definitely cover more than 24 months. IATI enables publishers to report at activity level with clear start and end dates, which can show multi-year projects. Given the absence of a widely endorsed approach to reporting multi-year funding flows, however, there is currently no standardised way to publish this information to IATI.

Tracking earmarked funding

FTS introduced the typology of earmarking categories from the Grand Bargain to its platform in early 2019. Already, for 2019 there is data provided by 189 organisations on the level of earmarking consistent with this typology, accounting for 84% of all funding reported to FTS for this year. However, in some cases analysis is hindered by the need to verify the reported level of earmarking between provider and recipient. IATI also allows identification of earmarking categories for individual transactions by specifying the aid type according to the Grand Bargain earmarking typology. Since the Grand Bargain, the quality of published earmarking data to IATI has improved slightly, but remains at a very low level. Only nine providers of IATI data publish data according to this typology (ADRA Denmark, DanChurchAid, UNHCR, Plan Bornefonden, Slovenia Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Voluntary Service Overseas, Leaders of Tomorrow, ActionAid UK and Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

Remaining challenges

The destination of multi-year and unearmarked funding is critical, as is the extent to which it is transferred beyond first-level recipients. However, the traceability of this funding beyond first-level recipients remains challenging [see Chapter 4, Box 4.4, How can data on funding be traced from donor to final recipient?, in section on ‘Channels of delivery for funding the Covid-19 pandemic response’]. Predictable and flexible funding is not always clearly visible. For instance, while benefits to recipients are well-documented, is it also necessary to record programme outcomes, to determine the effectiveness and efficiency of this type of funding.
Humanitarian assistance provided as cash or vouchers can offer greater flexibility and choice to beneficiaries, compared with assistance provided as in-kind goods. Cash can empower recipients and help strengthen local markets. In the Grand Bargain, signatories agreed to “increase the use and coordination of cash-based programming”, yet challenges remain in the reporting and tracking of the use of humanitarian cash and voucher assistance (CVA).

Available data (see Box 3.3, The potential of cash in responding to the Covid-19 pandemic) shows that the rate of growth of humanitarian CVA volumes continued uninterrupted in 2019, representing an increasing share of humanitarian assistance globally.

- Both the volume of funding transferred to beneficiaries and the programming costs of humanitarian CVA increased significantly in 2019, to US$4.3 billion (up 21%) and US$5.6 billion (up 20%) respectively from the previous year.

- As in 2018, this increase was primarily driven by increases in CVA volumes for UN agencies. This uneven growth across organisation types means the UN further accounted for almost two thirds (62%) of transfers to beneficiaries in 2019, compared with 53% in 2017. The WFP alone accounted for 38% of the humanitarian CVA transferred to beneficiaries in 2019 globally.

- All three organisation types (UN agencies, NGOs and the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement), however, increased their volumes of humanitarian CVA transferred to beneficiaries in 2019, by 25%, 21% and 12% respectively.

This growth in volume has outpaced humanitarian assistance more widely, such that humanitarian CVA has an increasing share of total humanitarian assistance.

- According to approximate estimates, CVA programming costs accounted for around 18% of total international humanitarian assistance in 2019, up from 14% in 2017 and 2018.
Box 3.3
The potential of cash in responding to the Covid-19 pandemic

In 2020, the Grand Bargain workstream on cash published guidance on how humanitarian CVA should be tracked at the interagency level. Minimum requirements were set to track the amount of CVA transferred to beneficiaries, disaggregated as cash and vouchers. Despite this agreement, reporting of this information to the main interagency reporting platforms (UN OCHA’s FTS and the International Aid Transparency Initiative [IATI]) is still at a small scale and inconsistent. Over 90% of the data presented in this analysis is therefore collected directly from implementing agencies by Development Initiatives and the Cash Learning Partnership.

Humanitarian CVA can be an effective tool to respond quickly to exacerbated needs and has been recognised as a valuable instrument in the Covid-19 pandemic response. Where the appropriate delivery modalities (such as mobile money or other digital systems) are available, the use of CVA can reduce mass gatherings and deliver assistance quickly.

As of 12 June 2020, a total of 133 countries had planned, introduced or adapted cash-based social assistance programmes in response to the Covid-19 pandemic. This surge in social protection measures amplifies the opportunity for existing efforts to better align humanitarian CVA with social protection programmes.

Due to the lack of reporting on the implementation of humanitarian CVA on real-time databases such as UN OCHA’s FTS and IATI, it is not possible to gauge the volume of CVA used during the pandemic response. It is also not possible to track the crisis contexts in which CVA is currently used and – perhaps more importantly – where it could be used more. Increasing the amount of globally comparable CVA data on FTS and IATI is a crucial step towards improving coordination of the humanitarian response to a global humanitarian crisis of the scale of the Covid-19 pandemic.
Tanzania, 2020

The UMATA programme works with communities in Tanzania to improve sanitation and adopt good hygiene practices to combat Covid-19.

Credit: Water and Sanitation Collaborative Council
In 2020, the Covid-19 (coronavirus) pandemic has increased the global need for humanitarian assistance, compounding existing crises and creating new ones. More than half of countries targeted by the UN’s Covid-19 Global Humanitarian Response Plan (GHRP) (34 of 63 countries) are experiencing protracted crisis.1 Of these 34 countries, three quarters are assessed to be at high (17) or very high risk (8) from the impacts of the Covid-19 pandemic.2

All resources, including official development assistance (ODA), are set to fall. Commercial and private flows such as foreign direct investment and remittances, which are crucial for some developing countries, are already in decline. Our analysis suggests that the revenues of countries experiencing protracted crisis may fall 7% in 2020. The global economic downturn brought about by the Covid-19 pandemic is also likely to undermine one of ODA’s most valuable qualities – its ability to scale up effort in response to rising needs when other resources retreat. Our analysis finds that ODA could fall from US$153 billion in 2019 to US$134 billion by 2021, in the worst of three scenarios, and cuts may continue beyond 2021 as governments re-assess domestic priorities.3

Humanitarian needs are currently higher than ever before. At the end of June 2020, with the addition of needs related to Covid-19, total UN-coordinated appeal requirements for 2020 had already reached US$37.7 billion. This is 25% higher than in June 2019 and constitutes the single largest increase in funding requirements since 2014. An additional US$578 million has been committed to UN-coordinated appeals so far this year, compared to the same point in 2019. This funding appears to be supporting both the Covid-19 pandemic response and other needs not related to the pandemic.

The call for financial support has been answered by bilateral, multilateral and private donors. At the end of June 2020, at least US$3.8 billion in humanitarian and development grants had been reported. Among the 20 largest recipients of this grant funding, 18 are countries experiencing protracted crisis.

Lending has also been substantial. Total support in the form of grants and loans provided by five development finance institutions, including the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, for the Covid-19 pandemic response amounts to US$47.9 billion. Of this, over a third (36%, US$17.0 billion) was directed to 31 countries experiencing protracted crisis, which are also targeted by the GHRP.
A joined-up and transparent approach to financing is critical to meeting the different needs emerging from the Covid-19 pandemic.

Resource flows to address needs emerging from the Covid-19 pandemic

Note: WASH: Water, sanitation and hygiene. The different needs reflected in the figure are indicative and not an exhaustive list.
Official development assistance (ODA), targeted at immediate humanitarian need and broader socioeconomic and health needs, will be critical in addressing the impacts of the Covid-19 (coronavirus) pandemic on the world’s most vulnerable people. Bilateral and multilateral grants and concessional and non-concessional public lending are providing resources to countries experiencing humanitarian crisis associated with the Covid-19 pandemic, for some areas of humanitarian need as well as wider health and socioeconomic support. In addition, support to enable the use of domestic fiscal resources to respond to the pandemic has been made available through short-term suspension of debt repayments and through grants to cover debt repayment (for instance through the Catastrophe Containment and Relief Trust of the International Monetary Fund [IMF]).

The scale of assistance and the most appropriate mix of resources required, including the proportion of grant and loan assistance, will vary depending on the context of each country, considering in particular recipients’ needs, capacity to respond and capacity to manage rising debt. This is particularly important for countries already experiencing humanitarian crisis, where domestic resources are often already limited and capacity to withstand shocks depleted.

This range of international financial support directly targets immediate and longer-term needs, yet constitutes only a relatively small part of the mix of international resource flows to countries in humanitarian crisis. In 2017, humanitarian assistance accounted for 8% of international flows to such countries, whereas developmental ODA accounted for 20%. Other international flows, while functioning differently from ODA, are important. For countries with humanitarian appeals for two or more consecutive years, remittances are the single largest flow, making up 37% of all international flows, while foreign direct investment (FDI) constitutes 12%.

Impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on national and international resources

One particular advantage of ODA, and public finance more widely, is that it can directly target the people and places most in need, even when crises drive down or deter other types of investment. However, the global economic downturn induced by the Covid-19 pandemic is likely to see substantial reductions in ODA. As the economies of donor governments contract, international concerns may struggle to compete with domestic priorities.

Projections calculated by Development Initiatives (DI) indicate that total ODA may fall from 2019 levels of US$153 billion to, at best, US$143 billion in 2020, recovering to US$149 billion in 2021. At worst, total ODA may fall to US$139 billion in 2020 before falling further to US$134 billion (a 12% reduction) in 2021. These projections are based on economic forecasts made in June 2020 by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development of three pandemic scenarios (a short outbreak, a longer outbreak and a second outbreak).

The projected immediate reductions in ODA are likely to severely affect countries already facing humanitarian crisis. ODA represents more than a quarter of all government expenditure for a third of countries within the Global Humanitarian Response Plan (GHRP) [37%, or 23 of 63 countries]; and more than half of these are in a state of protracted crisis. Seven of the ten countries with the highest proportion of ODA as government expenditure are GHRP countries (Somalia, Chad, Central African Republic (CAR), Sierra Leone, Liberia, Niger and Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)); of these, five (Somalia, Chad, CAR, Niger and DRC) are experiencing protracted crisis.
This comes at a time when other resources are also set to fall substantially. Growth projections – that continue to be revised down – could lead to significantly lower government revenues, even in the absence of additional debt, for countries experiencing protracted crisis before the Covid-19 pandemic. Revenues for such countries are projected to fall in aggregate absolute terms by some US$155 billion in 2020. This represents a 7.1% fall over 2019, almost double the 3.7% projected across developing countries more widely. The impacts of the Covid-19 pandemic are expected to severely interrupt progress. By 2021, aggregate revenues in these countries could be around US$500 billion lower than the level predicted prior to pandemic outbreak.

Other international resource flows are also projected to fall sharply, and particularly so for countries experiencing protracted crisis. Remittances and FDI have already fallen sharply and DI calculates a projected fall in remittances, FDI and tourism combined by 27% in 2020, to countries experiencing protracted crisis.

### Needs emerging from the Covid-19 pandemic and funding requirements for the response

The UN’s GHRP sets out the funding requirements for the 63 countries identified as most in need of humanitarian assistance as a result of the Covid-19 pandemic. These countries include 55 with existing humanitarian needs identified through Humanitarian Response Plans and Regional Response Requirements, plus 8 additional countries in which humanitarian need has arisen solely as a result of the pandemic. More than half of these countries (34 of 63 countries) are experiencing protracted crisis with the established challenges that this entails to broader socioeconomic development, government capacity and long-term resilience. The potential impacts of the Covid-19 pandemic on these countries is severe. Of these 34 countries experiencing protracted crisis, three quarters are assessed to be at high (17) or very high risk (8) from the impacts of Covid-19. The pandemic also risks pulling additional countries into long-term crisis. For these countries in particular, deciding how to finance humanitarian and development assistance will require consideration of current conditions but also the likely impact of persistent crisis and future global economic circumstances.

Total requirements for the GHRP stand at US$7.3 billion, with 21% met as of 29 June 2020. The scale of need varies, with individual country requirements ranging from US$506 million for Ethiopia to US$17 million for Benin, excluding need identified through Regional Response Plans. Fourteen countries have requirements in excess of US$100 million. As of the end of June 2020, the extent to which funding requirements had been met for countries within the GHRP varied widely, from 0% in Benin to 54% in Palestine.

In addition to these specifically humanitarian needs, the UN is seeking funding of US$1.2 billion for the World Health Organization (WHO) to address public health needs, as well as further funding for the UN's Framework for the Immediate Socioeconomic Response to Covid-19 to support nine months’ activity to the end of 2020 in developing countries.

These different funding plans highlight both the immediate humanitarian and wider socioeconomic response required to address the impacts of the Covid-19 pandemic. Therefore, coordination and collaboration will be vital between humanitarian and development actors, as well as with peacebuilding actors in unstable or conflict-affected contexts [see Box 4.2, Covid-19 response and the ‘triple nexus’].
Tracking financial flows for the Covid-19 pandemic response

By the end of June 2020, significant financial assistance, beyond pledges, has been mobilised for the Covid-19 response, although more and better-targeted assistance is needed. This analysis draws on data from UN OCHA’s Financial Tracking Service (FTS), the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) and major development finance institutions (DFIs) collated by the Centre for Disaster Protection.\(^\text{10}\)

- At the end of June 2020, US$3.8 billion of international (humanitarian and development) grant assistance (disbursements and commitments) has been allocated to the Covid-19 pandemic response.

- Of this US$3.8 billion, US$2.8 billion is humanitarian grants, US$658 million is development grants and US$383 million is unspecified grants in support of the pandemic response.

- US$1.6 billion of reported international grant support has been provided to support global initiatives or without reporting on the destination location.

- Conversely, US$2.2 billion (58%) of the grant support committed to the Covid-19 pandemic response was allocated to specific countries, with an additional 2% (US$65 million) allocated to specific regions.

By the end of June 2020, international grant assistance had already been directed to more than one hundred countries. As the pandemic spreads and the impact on incomes and food security becomes apparent, this international grant assistance may be required in greater volumes as impacts worsen and affect more countries.

- The US$2.2 billion of country-specific assistance was allocated to 127 countries, with US$1.8 billion directed to 58 GHRP countries. Among GHRP countries, the 33 countries already experiencing protracted crisis received US$1.5 billion.

In addition to humanitarian and development grant funding, DFIs are providing support for health and socioeconomic needs, primarily in the form of loans (concessional and non-concessional), with some additional grant assistance.

- Total loan (concessional and non-concessional) support provided by five major DFIs, including the World Bank and IMF (as of 10 June 2020) to the Covid-19 pandemic response amounts to approximately US$46.7 billion.

- Over half (59%, or US$27.5 billion) of this DFI financing is directed to 50 countries included under the GHRP to Covid-19 and the remaining US$19.2 billion is directed to 63 other countries or regions. Some US$17.0 billion (loans and grants) is directed to 31 countries experiencing protracted crisis.

This data provides only a partial view of all financing to the Covid-19 response, with reporting and data publishing to international platforms and standards not yet complete or fully coherent (see Box 4.1, How are resource flows for the Covid-19 response reported and what does this mean for tracking flows?). Multiple data sources and an absence of standardised reporting makes it challenging to reconcile data and create a clear and full picture. Beyond the analysis in this report, DI continues to track, reconcile and piece together these different financing elements, which will include updates to the analysis on Covid-19 financial flows in this report.\(^\text{11}\)
Box 4.1
How are resource flows for the Covid-19 response reported and what does this mean for tracking flows?

For humanitarian grant flows, UN OCHA’s FTS provides the primary platform for tracking. It records pledges, commitments and paid contributions, capturing funding within UN appeals, including the GHRP, as well as additional humanitarian grants outside appeals, reported by donors, UN agencies and NGOs. Humanitarian grants as well as development grants and loans are published to IATI,12 a common data standard for humanitarian and development activities. Publishing to IATI in general and for Covid-19 activities is increasing but there are gaps in coverage. Accessing and interpreting IATI data, and managing for double counting when aggregating reported funding, can be challenging.

More broadly, reconciling and aligning funding data on Covid-19 reported to FTS, published to IATI and in implementers’ own funding updates can be equally challenging. As we highlight below in the section on ‘Who is providing funding for Covid-19 pandemic response?’, large volumes of financing in the form of grants, loans, debt relief and other financial instruments are also being provided towards the Covid-19 response by DFIs. While some of this financing is captured by IATI, and to a much lesser extent by FTS, more comprehensive reporting of financing by institutions such as the IMF is reported independently through their respective websites. Some progress is being made providing a clearer picture of financing to the pandemic response. For instance, a data visualisation prototype has been recently released, pooling data from FTS, IATI and WHO, which begins to show how these different sources of data can be understood alongside one another.13 However, the Covid-19 pandemic throws into sharp relief the persistent difficulties of coherently tracking and thereby coordinating international humanitarian and development assistance.
Box 4.2
Covid-19 response and the ‘triple nexus’

How can approaches to financing the humanitarian–development–peace nexus be improved in response to the Covid-19 pandemic?

A global pandemic straddles the priorities of humanitarian, development and peace (HDP) actors. An effective response therefore demands joined-up working that brings together these actors – and the frameworks they operate within. Short-term humanitarian responses alone will not address the longer-term implications of Covid-19. What is required is simultaneous support to national health and social protection systems, market opportunities and peacebuilding through wider resource flows, including public and private flows beyond ODA.

DI’s ongoing country research in Cameroon, Somalia and Bangladesh, working with the Norwegian Refugee Council and the UN Food and Agriculture Organization, to be published later in 2020, has highlighted lessons on how HDP actors are collaborating in addressing people’s risk and vulnerability to the impacts of the Covid-19 pandemic and other crises. Financing plays a pivotal role within this.

There are four emerging priorities to address silos in humanitarian and development planning and funding that are crucial in enabling an effective response to the Covid-19 pandemic.

1. **Joined-up assessments, planning and programming**

   Joined-up (or at least complementary) assessments and coordinated planning between HDP actors, with leadership from the national government, is vital for an effective response to Covid-19. Research in Cameroon has shown that planning for longer-term socioeconomic impact and recovery in parallel to the immediate health response is crucial. Here, local actors and informal local coordination mechanisms are playing a key role in coordinating and delivering the response.

2. **Budget flexibility enabled by decentralised decision-making**

   Flexibility to reallocate budgets to adapt, scale up and shift focus as necessary in response to changing vulnerability and crisis needs, such as in response to Covid-19, is crucial for both development and humanitarian actors. Country staff are however constrained by centralised budgetary decision-making, earmarking and demarcations between humanitarian and development budget lines. Decentralised budgetary decision-making and simplified systems enabling budget reallocation is crucial for a more flexible and timely response.

3. **Scaling up contingency funding**

   While budget flexibility is important, reallocating existing budgets can threaten to shift focus away from existing priorities. Access to additional funding enabling scale-up in response to unforeseen crisis, such as Covid-19, is also vital. Contingency financing mechanisms can support this, through in-built programmatic risk financing mechanisms or pooled funding at the national level. There is a pressing need for development actors to incorporate such financing mechanisms as a default programmatic design feature.

4. **Mobilising blended and risk finance**

   Grant funding is often slow and short-term in nature, and smaller than the volume of financing available outside the aid sector. Several new blended finance mechanisms have been announced over recent months in response to the pandemic. Examples include social bonds from the African Development Bank, the Covid-19 response plan of the World Bank, and concessional lending through the Rapid Credit Facility of the IMF. It is crucial that decisions on how to allocate finite grant funding – through risk financing mechanisms or support to national systems – should be driven by an understanding of comparative impact on the lives of vulnerable people, and based on evidence of impact.
Which countries are receiving international funding for response to Covid-19, and in what volumes?

**Figure 4.2**  
Humanitarian and development grants for Covid-19 target countries at high risk of impact and those experiencing protracted crisis  
20 largest recipients of humanitarian and development grants for Covid-19 pandemic response, with markers for risk of impact from the pandemic and for protracted crises, June 2020

Sources: Development Initiatives based on UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Financial Tracking Service (FTS) and International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) data downloaded on 24 June 2020 and on International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) donor response updates as of 15 June 2020. Data on grants by development finance institutions (DFIs) was collated and analysed by the Centre for Disaster Protection.

Notes: DRC: Democratic Republic of the Congo. Only grant assistance allocated directly to countries is included in this graph. For humanitarian grants, volumes capture assistance reported to UN OCHA’s FTS that is directed towards the international humanitarian response, including a small number of funding flows provided by domestic governments.
To understand if needs are being effectively met, it is imperative to have a clear picture of where and when funding is being provided, particularly in the rapidly evolving context of the Covid-19 pandemic.

- The US$2.2 billion grants committed to the Covid-19 pandemic response allocated to specific countries represents 58% of total international grant support. An additional 2% (US$65 million) was allocated to specific regions.
- The remaining US$1.6 billion of reported international grant support has been provided at the global level or without reporting on the destination location.
- US$500 million of the global-level support has been disbursed. More information on the remaining US$1.1 billion should become available, enabling identification of its final destinations and how much is implemented at country level, as commitments turn into disbursements.

International grant funding for the Covid-19 response is being directed to countries that have also been large recipients of international humanitarian assistance in recent years.

- At the end of June 2020, 18 of the 20 largest recipients of international grant assistance for the Covid-19 pandemic response were countries experiencing protracted crisis.
- INFORM’s Covid-19 risk index\(^4\) assessed 17 of these 20 countries as being at very high (5) or high (12) risk from the impacts of the Covid-19 pandemic.
- The group of 10 largest recipients of assistance related to Covid-19 in 2020 includes 9 of the 10 largest recipients of international humanitarian assistance in 2018 (see Chapter 2, Figure 2.6). Only Jordan does not feature as a large recipient of Covid-19 funding.
- Among the 20 largest recipients, Iran and Côte d’Ivoire are the only two countries that have not received large volumes of international humanitarian assistance in recent years.
- Only one country, Côte d’Ivoire, is not currently included in the UN’s GHRP, although it was highlighted in the GHRP’s May update as at risk of needing humanitarian assistance and is considered high risk by INFORM’s Covid-19 Risk Index. At the end of June, little humanitarian assistance was reported to have been provided to Côte d’Ivoire, with the vast majority identified as development assistance, from the IMF’s Catastrophe Containment and Relief Trust to relieve fiscal stress from debt repayments.

By the end of June 2020, most countries had received the majority of their reported international grant support as humanitarian assistance. This international grant support for response to Covid-19 is currently more widely distributed, and less concentrated among a small group of large recipients, than most international humanitarian assistance typically is.

- The three largest recipients of reported international grant support for response to Covid-19 were Somalia (US$236 million), Afghanistan (US$125 million) and Syria (US$102 million). In total, this accounts for 21% of all assistance allocated directly to countries. This is roughly half the 40% of assistance allocated directly to countries provided to the three largest recipients of international humanitarian assistance in 2018 (see Chapter 2, Figure 2.6).
- Of the 20 largest recipients, three received more than half of their grant support in the form of development assistance: Côte d’Ivoire, Mali and Haiti.
- Somalia received a large World Bank grant of US$138 million, which was not specified as humanitarian or development, but appears to support overall crisis recovery through social protection, the construction of health facilities and irrigation.
The Covid-19 pandemic is putting increased strain on already limited funding for humanitarian response. In June 2020, UN appeal requirements (not including those related to the pandemic) of US$30.4 billion were already slightly higher than mid-year requirements in 2019, of US$30.2 billion.15 With the addition of Covid-19 requirements, total UN humanitarian appeal funding requirements for 2020 have already reached US$37.7 billion, 25% higher than in June 2019. Even with no further adjustments to appeal requirements, this would constitute the single largest increase in funding needs since 2014.

However, donors are stepping up. As of 29 June 2020, 20% of all total appeal requirements had been met, totalling US$7.5 billion, with the same proportion, on average, of requirements fulfilled for the Covid-19 appeal and for other humanitarian appeals. While this is lower than the proportion of appeals met at the same time in 2019 (23%), volumes disbursed are US$578 million higher than the US$6.9 billion allocated by mid-year (20 June) in 2019. Given the urgent need to respond to the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic and the impact on donor country economies, the key question is whether funding levels can be sustained in the second half of 2020.
The manner in which international humanitarian assistance is allocated for Covid-19, determined by the type of response required for a global health emergency, is evident in a lower proportion being allocated directly to countries than for other assistance, along with a sixth of total allocations going to global support services.

- By June 2020, of the total appeal funding to Covid-19 response with information on its component, almost three quarters (74%, US$833 million) was allocated directly to countries' plans (HPRs, flash and appeals specific to Covid-19), 17% (US$195 million) was to global support services, while 8% (US$91 million) went to regional response plans.
- This compares to other appeals, not related to Covid-19, of which 83% (US$5.3 billion) went directly to country plans, and 17% (US$1.1 billion) was multi-country.

While the pandemic is placing additional strain on scarce humanitarian resources, 2020 allocations to date do not suggest that donors are prioritising the response to Covid-19 over pre-existing crises. In aggregate, both types of appeal requirements have been fulfilled to a similar degree. And among the countries with the highest appeal requirements for Covid-19 funding, at end of June 2020, it was clear that the majority had received higher proportions of their other requirements.

- Among the 20 countries with the highest Covid-19 appeal requirements, 17 also had other humanitarian appeals. 14 of these 17 countries had higher proportions of their other requirements fulfilled, while only 3 appeals had higher proportions of their requirements for response to Covid-19 met.

However, by the end of June 2020, the extent to which Covid-19 and other requirements had been met varied significantly between appeals. As with funding in previous years to UN humanitarian appeals, there is no clear pattern determined by size of appeal requirements or profile of crisis. Coverage of funding requirements (for appeals components not focused on Covid-19) are varied in 2020, as observed every year (see Chapter 2, Figure 2.2). These range from 44% in Somalia to 9% in Colombia. However, the variance in coverage is greater for Covid-19 components of appeals, ranging from 54% of requirements met in Palestine to 0% in Benin.

- At the end of June 2020, seven countries had received more than 30% of their Covid-19 appeal requirements: Palestine (54%), Mali (53%), Iran (49%), Burkina Faso (46%), Bangladesh (44%), Sudan (34%) and Myanmar (32%).
- Conversely, 13 countries had received 10% or less of Covid-19 requirements, including 7 that had received 5% or less: Benin (0%), Liberia (1%), Colombia (3%), Burundi (3%), Philippines (3%), DPR Korea (3%) and Sierra Leone (4%).
- The combined variation in meeting either Covid-19 or other humanitarian needs reveals a group of countries where funding requirements for both sets of appeals are failing to be met. As of June 2020, a third (6 of 17) of the countries with the largest Covid-19 appeal requirements fell into this category.
- Among the 20 countries with the largest Covid-19 appeal requirements, 6 had received less than 20% of both Covid-19 and other funding requirements: Colombia (3% of Covid-19 and 9% of other requirements met) Haiti (8%, 12%), Lebanon (10%, 11%), Nigeria (13%, 16%), Chad (13%, 19%) and DRC (15%, 14%).
- Of these six countries receiving low proportions of combined appeal requirements, three were identified in the European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations’ (ECHO’s) most recent assessment of forgotten crises in 2019: Chad, Colombia and Haiti.
- Two countries were, however, particularly well-funded, having received more than 30% of their Covid-19 and other funding requirements: Bangladesh (with 44% of Covid-19 and 38% of other requirements met); and Sudan (34% and 35%), which in 2019 was identified by ECHO as a forgotten crisis.
Who is providing funding for Covid-19 pandemic response?

Figure 4.4
Humanitarian and development grant funding patterns for Covid-19 pandemic response broadly reflect funding for other humanitarian crises
20 largest donors of international humanitarian and development grants for Covid-19 pandemic response, June 2020

The call for financial support to those in need as a result of the Covid-19 pandemic has been answered by bilateral, multilateral and private donors. At the end of June, just three and a half months since the WHO declared the Covid-19 outbreak to be a pandemic, commitments of at least US$3.8 billion in humanitarian and development grants have been reported. More is likely to have been committed but not yet reported.

- Based on preliminary data from UN OCHA’s FTS, IATI and development finance institutions collated at the end of June 2020, over 150 donors have so far provided US$3.8 billion of international grant assistance to the Covid-19 pandemic response. This includes US$2.5 billion from 44 different governments and inter-governmental institutions.

- Of this US$3.8 billion, US$2.8 billion is humanitarian grants, around US$658 million is development grants and US$383 million is unspecified grants in support of the pandemic response.

Sources: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS and IATI data downloaded on 24 June 2020 and on IFRC donor response updates as of 15 June 2020.

Data on DFIs was collated and analysed by the Centre for Disaster Protection.

Notes: ADB: Asian Development Bank; AfDB: African Development Bank; CERF: Central Emergency Response Fund; UAE: United Arab Emirates; WHO: World Health Organization. IATI data on humanitarian and development grants is included where it could be identified as additional to FTS data. For more information, please see our online ‘Methodology and definitions’.
With the pandemic continuing to spread across the world and needs escalating, the timeliness with which this funding reaches those most in need is critical.

- Of the total grant support captured in the DI dataset, roughly a third (35%, US$1.3 billion) is reported as having been disbursed. The remaining funding of US$2.5 billion (65%) has been committed or approved.

While the majority of grant funding for the Covid-19 pandemic response comes from a small number of donors, there has been a slight widening in the share of the global response compared to funding patterns for other humanitarian crises. The three donors providing the largest volumes of international humanitarian assistance in 2019 are the largest donors to the Covid-19 response.

- The US, Germany and the UK provided 44% of total grants from public donors to the Covid-19 pandemic response. In comparison, in 2019 these same three donors provided 58% of total international humanitarian assistance from public donors.

Other large bilateral donors to the Covid-19 pandemic feature regularly among the largest donors of international humanitarian assistance, with two exceptions.

- China has provided US$52 million in humanitarian grants for the Covid-19 response, and features as the eleventh-largest bilateral donor of reported grant assistance.
- France has contributed the seventh-largest volume of reported grant funding by bilateral donors, although the vast majority of this has been provided as development rather than humanitarian grants.

Some grant funding from multilateral donors is identifiable, with DFIs being the largest contributors. The majority of DFI support is provided in the form of loans however (see Figure 4.5), and further investigation is required to disaggregate DFI grant contributions further.

Humanitarian grant funding is relatively well reported but data on development grants is not comprehensively published on interagency reporting platforms, or data standards such as the IATI Standard, although reporting on the Covid-19 pandemic response is improving. There is likely to be an additional amount of development grants being provided to the pandemic response. Total pledges made in the ‘Global Goal’ summit convened by the European Commission in support of the pandemic response amount to around US$14.3 billion for Covid-19, indicating that significant funds are yet to be released or reported. DI is working to collate available data on funding for the response to the Covid-19 pandemic on an ongoing basis and will provide regularly updated analysis on our website.
Box 4.3
How is funding with greater flexibility being provided for the Covid-19 response?

The Grand Bargain obliges its signatories to increase the use of flexible funding in its commitments to provide more flexible multi-year funding and more flexible funding through reduced levels of earmarking. The onset of the Covid-19 pandemic has forced donors and implementing agencies to adapt to ensure that existing humanitarian programmes can continue and so that new funding can be negotiated and disbursed as quickly and easily as possible. In the face of an increasingly challenging environment, considerable flexibility has been introduced to some existing and new funding arrangements.

On 30 March 2020, the UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Results Group 5 on Humanitarian Financing issued its ‘Interim key messages on flexible funding for humanitarian response and Covid-19’. This set out key requests for donors and documented the steps that IASC members (UN agencies and INGOs) were taking to increase flexibility of the funding they pass on. These key messages were framed around the concepts of flexibility (for existing funding through re-programming and new funding, through timely, light processes of negotiation and disbursement), and simplification (through the lightening and fast-tracking of processes of grant management, such as due diligence and reporting).

Building on these interim messages, the IASC published a ‘Proposal for a harmonized approach to funding flexibility in the context of Covid-19’ on 30 June 2020. This sets out common actions that UN agencies and partners will seek to pursue. It puts forward nine areas for action, including: simplified procedures for no-cost extensions; allowing budget-line flexibility, ideally up to 20%; covering direct unrecoverable costs incurred due to Covid-19; adopting a remote approach to due diligence and risk management; and introducing reduced reporting requirements.

In practice how has increased funding flexibility been provided?

In response to the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic, UN OCHA’s Country Based Pooled Funds (CBPFs) adopted new Flexibility Guidance on 6 April 2020. This guidance seeks to support the CBPF’s partners to continue operating and to adapt to the altered operating environment. The guidance includes features such as: allowing for re-programming to new locations or activities; allowing cost extensions to scale up activities for Covid-19 response; allowing new projects to include a 4% contingency budget line; broadened cost eligibility; and allowing 15% budget-line flexibility to be applied to staff costs. The CBPFs have indicated that they intend to adopt elements of the flexibility guidance for application beyond Covid-19, on the basis of a review of implementation.

Increased flexibility in donor funding arrangements has been provided. Practice has varied between donors, with changes to official guidance in some instances and in others the adoption of an open, flexible position through which a range of measures are possible on a case-by-case basis. Examples of enhanced flexibility include: increased budget-line flexibility, for instance the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation increasing the threshold for pre-approval of changes to annual budgets from 10% and 20%; and altered cost eligibility, for instance Global Affairs Canada allowing operational partners to cover up to 30 days of local staff costs where projects are suspended due to Covid-19.
Loans constitute the single largest financial flow to help countries address the economic and health impacts of the Covid-19 pandemic. Loans, while not necessarily directly targeting humanitarian need, form a potentially important element of the wider resource mix available to countries, alongside humanitarian and development grants [see section above on ‘Resource flows for Covid-19 pandemic response’], where countries have the capacity to sustainably manage debt repayments. DFIs are the largest source of Covid-19 lending, while in some cases also providing smaller volumes of grants.

Analysis of support provided by five major DFIs, building on data collated by the Centre for Disaster Protection, indicates that the volume of financing from these five institutions varies significantly between countries within the GHRP.

- Total support provided by these five DFIs to the Covid-19 pandemic response amounts to US$47.9 billion. About $1.4 billion of this is in the form of grants, and the rest is loans [concessional and non-concessional].
- Over half of this support (58%, US$28.0 billion) is directed to 53 countries included under the GHRP to Covid-19, including 31 countries experiencing protracted crisis which received US$17.0 billion (loans and grants). The remaining US$19.9 billion is directed to 62 other countries or regions. This volume compares to total GHRP appeal requirements of US$7.3 billion for humanitarian need.

Source: Development Initiatives based on data collated and analysed by the Centre for Disaster Protection from publicly available sources and on IMF data. For more detail, please refer to our ‘Methodology and definitions’.

Notes: Global Humanitarian Response Plan.
Concessional loans include those that are a blend between concessional and non-concessional financing. Loan data is included for financing of the Covid-19 pandemic response by the World Bank Group, the International Monetary Fund, Asian Development Bank, African Development Bank and Interamerican Development Bank. Included are only countries for which there is information on their level of debt distress as per the IMF’s list of debt sustainability analyses as of 30 April 2020. Data is in current prices, as of 10 June 2020.
The volume of DFI support varies significantly between countries covered by the GHRP.

- Five GHRP countries receive half (50%) of all support from the five DFIs: Nigeria, Egypt, the Philippines, Pakistan and Kenya. These countries account for an estimated 10% of country-specific requirements for the Covid-19 response under the GHRP.25

- Ten countries included in the GHRP have received no support from these five DFIs.

- Of these, four have country-specific GHRP requirements [Libya, Syria, Venezuela and DPR Korea]. For Libya and Syria, the requirements are 29% and 22% covered at the end of June 2020, and in the case of DPR Korea, only 3% covered.26

Beyond a small group of middle-income countries receiving a large proportion of total lending to GHRP countries, there is no clear pattern of where and on what scale DFI support is provided, when compared to humanitarian need and funding. In aggregate, lower volumes and more concessional forms of support are directed to countries at high risk of or in debt distress. However, the volumes received by individual countries assessed to have the same level of debt distress vary, while experiencing protracted crisis does not appear to clearly impact on whether and to what extent DFI support is provided.

- South Sudan and Somalia are both in debt distress and have large GHRP requirements of US$217 million and US$226 million, respectively. However, the volume of support they have received differs greatly. South Sudan received just US$7.6 million while Somalia received US$148 million.

- South Sudan’s GHRP requirements are 18% met and it has received US$7.6 million in grants from the World Bank, while Somalia’s GHRP requirements are 16% met and it has received US$138 million in grants from the World Bank and $10 million in loans from the African Development Bank.

Some GHRP countries are receiving relatively larger volumes of DFI support and humanitarian grants. Where this is the case, this support has to be coherently planned to ensure that resources are channelled effectively to need. Some limitations in how funding is distributed restrict the amount available for individual countries.

- Ethiopia and Afghanistan have the largest country-specific requirements under the GHRP, at US$506 million and US$396 million, respectively. The extent of fulfilment of these requirements differs, with Ethiopia having 8% of requirements met and Afghanistan, 20%.

- Both countries are among the larger recipients of funds from DFIs among GHRP countries, with Ethiopia receiving US$505 million and Afghanistan receiving US$524 million.

In other contexts, the level of DFI support is lower. In contexts of high debt distress or instability, low levels of lending, if not grant support, may be appropriate. Here, donors and humanitarian actors need to take into account the wider resource picture in making their allocation decisions.

- Syria (US$384 million requirements under the GHRP, 22% funded), Iraq (US$263 million, 19%), Yemen (US$179 million, 28%) and CAR (US$153 million, 18%) are all conflict-affected states with relatively large requirements for the humanitarian response to the Covid-19 pandemic.

- Syria has received no DFI support, while Iraq, Yemen and CAR have received US$34 million, US$47 million (including US$27 million under the GHRP) and US$52 million (including US$2.5 million under the GHRP), respectively.
For countries facing humanitarian crisis from the Covid-19 pandemic, their long-term capacity to manage debt, whether concessional or at commercial rates, is critical. This is particularly so for those already experiencing protracted crisis caused by other emergencies (such as conflict, natural disaster and displacement).

- Of countries in the GHRP in receipt of DFI support for the Covid-19 pandemic, 15 are at high risk of debt distress or in debt distress. Of these, 11 are experiencing protracted crisis.

- All DFI support for Covid-19 response to countries in debt distress has been made on concessional terms or as grants. World Bank support to countries in debt distress will be solely in the form of grants.

- While all loans to countries within the GHRP at medium risk of debt distress were concessional (some with grant components), close to a quarter (24%) of support to countries in the GHRP considered at high risk of debt distress was in the form of non-concessional loans.

### Channels of delivery for funding the Covid-19 pandemic response

#### Figure 4.6
Multilateral agencies receive nearly three quarters of Covid-19 international humanitarian assistance

Channels of delivery for international humanitarian assistance for Covid-19 pandemic response, June 2020

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Channel</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UN agencies and other multilateral organisations</td>
<td>US$1,947m</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCRC</td>
<td>US$193m</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs and CSOs</td>
<td>US$134m</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public sector</td>
<td>US$119m</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Unspecified
US$258m
10%

**Source:** Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS data.

**Notes:** RCRC: International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. Data is in current prices and was downloaded on 24 June 2020. The chart shows first-level funding as part of the Covid-19 pandemic response as reported to FTS.
Responding to humanitarian need in the Covid-19 pandemic has challenged how assistance is typically delivered, not least through the retrenchment of international staff presence on the ground, which has focused greater attention on the central role that local and national actors should play. Data on the channels of delivery of assistance presents only a partial picture of how funding is being delivered, as data beyond the first recipient is incomplete. However, the available data indicates that patterns of funding to the Covid-19 response are concentrated even further through certain channels, compared to other humanitarian funding in recent years, with significantly higher proportions going to multilateral agencies and lower shares channelled through governments and NGOs.

- As of 24 June 2020, almost three quarters (73%, US$1.9 billion) of the total international humanitarian assistance to the Covid-19 response was channelled through multilateral organisations. This compares to an average of 61% directed to multilateral organisations by governments in response to other humanitarian crises over the period 2014 to 2018.

- Of this humanitarian Covid-19 grant funding to multilateral organisations, 92% was provided to just four UN agencies. The WHO received US$746 million (38% of funding to UN agencies and other multilateral organisations); the UN International Children’s Emergency Fund (Unicef), US$465 million (24%); the World Food Programme (WFP), US$328 million (17%); and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), US$246 million (13%).

- In part, this higher than typical proportion of funding may be explained by 38% of total Covid-19 assistance (US$1.0 billion) being directed to global support services, such as logistics and transportation of supplies, rather than being allocated to specific countries.

- NGOs and CSOs, both international and national, in comparison, have received substantially lower proportions of funding – just 5.1% (US$134 million) of the total international humanitarian assistance for Covid-19 – compared to an average of 19% directed to NGOs and CSOs by governments between 2014 and 2018.

- Five INGOs received nearly a third of all funding to NGOs and CSOs: Save the Children (13%, US$17 million), Norwegian Refugee Council (6.3%, US$8.5 million), Catholic Relief Services (4.6%, US$6.2 million), International Medical Corps (4.2%, US$5.6 million) and Relief International (4.1%, US$5.5 million).

- The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement received 7.3% (US$193 million) of total assistance, with similar volumes directed to ICRC (US$93 million) and IFRC (US$89 million).

- Less than 5% (US$119 million) of total international humanitarian assistance to the Covid-19 response was channelled through public sector institutions. Ten national governments, of which only four are targeted through the GHRP, accounted for more than half of this assistance: Mauritania (US$10 million, 8.4%), Yemen (US$10 million, 8.4%), China (US$7.6 million, 6.4%), Serbia (US$5.8 million, 4.9%), the Maldives (US$5.0 million, 4.2%), Iran (US$4.7 million, 3.9%), Tajikistan (US$4.5 million, 3.8%), Kyrgyzstan (US$4.0 million, 3.4%), Sierra Leone (US$4.0 million, 3.4%) and Kenya (US$3.7 million, 3.1%).
**Box 4.4**

How can data on funding be traced from donor to final recipient?

The traceability of funding describes the ability to track funding through the delivery chain of international assistance – for instance, governments might fund UN agencies who then partially sub-grant components to NGOs for implementation. Tracking funding in this way is crucial to show where international assistance is ultimately implemented and by whom. This is particularly important for understanding the progress made towards Grand Bargain commitments to provide more funding – and more flexible, multi-year funding – to local and national actors.

If the quality of data is good enough, it can be used to coordinate the response and to identify populations in need that are left behind. In the context of a global pandemic with far-reaching consequences for humanitarian and socioeconomic needs, effective coordination and gap analysis with the help of globally consistent data is more important than ever.

To balance reporting requirements and the need for transparency, it is useful to distinguish between weak and strong traceability. To achieve **weak traceability**, implementing organisations have to report all funding flows received and sub-granted, without necessarily connecting the two. **Strong traceability** requires a reporting organisation to link individual outgoing funds with the corresponding incoming funding flows. The minimum ambition should be to achieve weak traceability for as much international assistance as possible. This would provide data on where funding is ultimately directed to, and for what. For some aspects of the response, strong traceability might be necessary to ensure accountability – for instance, to evidence whether multi-year funding is cascaded down to second-level recipients. Both FTS and IATI, as the two main interagency platforms for reporting on the Covid-19 pandemic response, have the technical capacity to capture data on weak and strong traceability.

**How good is the reporting of data that allows funding to be traced?**

Progress on the Grand Bargain transparency commitments has been significant, with 87% of signatories now publishing to IATI and 93% of those publishing humanitarian-related data. However, progress on traceability has been slow. From June 2017 to May 2020, 19 organisations that were Grand Bargain signatories (35%) were publishing IATI traceability information, identifying the funding provider and recipient for each activity across the delivery chain. Only 7 organisations (13%) were providing granular data on Grand Bargain commitments such as cash, localisation and earmarking.27

On FTS, 2019 data shows that there was only US$410 million of second-level funding provided by UN agencies, the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs. This accounts for only 1.5% of total humanitarian funding that year. Of that amount, it is possible to link outgoing funds with incoming funding flows for only US$29 million.
Box 4.4 (continued)

How well can funds be traced for the Covid-19 pandemic response?

At the time of writing, at the end of June 2020, there is little data available on FTS on the Covid-19 response that allows funds to be effectively traced. Large volumes of funding have been reported as commitments at the global level but without data on where they are to be directed. Given that the international response to the Covid-19 pandemic is in its early stages, this is not surprising. However, reporting this information in the future will be critical for effective coordination.

For IATI data, an online prototype visualisation has been developed that provides a snapshot of funding traceability by organisation.28 It visualises incoming and outgoing funds by reporting the organisation for all activities relevant to Covid-19. However, large implementers, such as WFP, UNHCR or UNICEF, have not yet published sufficient data to allow comprehensive assessment of where funding is directed to, the needs it is addressing, or to whom it is sub-granted.

At the end of June 2020, FTS recorded only seven funding agreements, with a total volume of US$4.1 million, that contain information on second-level funding as part of the Covid-19 pandemic response. This is only 0.2% of the total funding reported to FTS as part of the response. However, discussions are already underway to improve the volume and quality of second-level reporting, so more traceability data is likely to be available in future.

The Covid-19 pandemic throws into stark relief the inadequate reporting of data on development and humanitarian assistance, preventing the effective tracing of funding flows. Donors and aid agencies must rectify this, so that the response to the Covid-19 pandemic and other crises is informed by a clear picture of where and how funding is being allocated.
Uganda, 2020

Red Cross teams support families during the twin emergencies of Covid-19 and flash flooding.

Credit: Climate Centre
What is humanitarian assistance?

Humanitarian assistance is intended to save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain human dignity during and after man-made crises and disasters associated with natural hazards, as well as to prevent and strengthen preparedness for when such situations occur. Humanitarian assistance should be governed by the key humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence. These are the fundamental principles of the international Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (RCRC), which are reaffirmed in UN General Assembly resolutions and enshrined in numerous humanitarian standards and guidelines.

In this report, when used in the context of financing data, international humanitarian assistance refers to the financial resources for humanitarian action spent outside the donor country. Our calculations of international humanitarian assistance are based on what donors and organisations report as such and do not include other types of financing to address the causes and impacts of crises, which we refer to as crisis-related financing.

There is no universal obligation or system for reporting expenditure on international, or indeed domestic, humanitarian assistance. The main reporting platforms for international humanitarian assistance are the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD] Development Assistance Committee [DAC] and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs [OCHA]’s Financial Tracking Service [FTS]. Increasingly, data on humanitarian activities is also published according to the International Aid Transparency Initiative [IATI] Standard. OECD DAC members are obligated to report their humanitarian assistance to the DAC systems as part of their official development assistance (ODA), in accordance with definitions set out by the DAC. Some other governments and most major multilateral organisations also voluntarily report to the DAC.

The FTS is open to all humanitarian donors and implementing agencies to voluntarily report contributions of internationally provided humanitarian assistance, according to an agreed set of criteria for inclusion.

The analysis of international humanitarian assistance in the Global Humanitarian Assistance (GHA) Report 2020 draws largely on data reported to the OECD DAC and the FTS. Between these sources there is variation in the criteria for what can be included as humanitarian assistance, as well as volumes reported, so we aim to consistently explain and source the data that we use. Since the 2018 report, we have included humanitarian funding reported to FTS that has been provided by OECD DAC members as assistance to countries not eligible for ODA. We also use other sources to calculate international humanitarian assistance including reports from UN agencies and NGOs on private humanitarian funding and data from the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) on contributions from public donors; data sources and methodologies for these are also clearly marked and explained. Analysis of international assistance to the Covid-19 pandemic response draws primarily on FTS and IATI data, supplemented by other sources. This is explained in greater detail in this chapter’s section on ‘Covid-19 pandemic response’.
**Cash**

Our global estimate of humanitarian assistance provided in the form of cash and vouchers in 2019 is based on data collected from 24 organisations by the Cash Learning Partnership. The data was gathered in support of the ‘Tracking cash and vouchers’ sub-workstream under the Grand Bargain workstream on cash and vouchers and will be analysed in greater detail in a forthcoming publication. The methodology used for these estimates builds on one developed by Development Initiatives (DI) for research in 2016, while taking into account new data sources such as the CashHub by the RCRC. For more information on that methodology and research, see Counting cash: tracking humanitarian expenditure on cash-based programming. This year’s GHA report gives more prominence to volumes of cash and voucher assistance transferred to beneficiaries. This is because 22 of 24 surveyed organisations were able to provide data on those transferred volumes, but only 7 were able to provide data on the programming costs. Further, the guidance produced by the ‘Tracking cash and vouchers’ sub-workstream lists transfer values of cash and voucher assistance as a minimum requirement to be tracked and recommends that associated programming costs are captured in the medium term.

**Channels of delivery**

We use ‘channels of delivery’ to describe the first level of organisations receiving funding for the delivery of humanitarian assistance – multilateral agencies, NGOs, the public sector and the RCRC – whether they deliver the assistance themselves or pass it on to partner organisations. Our channels of delivery data in Figure 3.1 comes predominantly from the OECD DAC’s Creditor Reporting System (CRS) and the FTS. Data in Figure 4.6 is for 2020 and therefore from the FTS, given that OECD DAC CRS data on channels of delivery for 2020 becomes available only in December 2021. For private donors’ channels of delivery, we use our own dataset (see this chapter’s section on ‘Private funding’).

**Constant prices**

Our trends analyses on financial flows are in US$ constant prices (base year 2018) unless otherwise stated. We use data from the OECD DAC, the International Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook (April 2019 release) and the World Bank’s World Development Indicators to convert financial data from current to constant prices using deflators. Consistent with our annual methodology, data in the Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2019 was shown in constant 2017 prices, so totals may vary between reports.

**Country and region naming conventions**

Country and region naming conventions used throughout this report are based on those used by the OECD DAC or the UN. Region naming conventions are based on those used by the OECD except the Middle East and North of Sahara regions, which have been combined. The conventions used do not reflect a political position of Development Initiatives.

**Covid-19 pandemic response**

Chapter 4 of this year’s GHA report includes analysis on international financing to support the Covid-19 pandemic response. Given the rapid development of the pandemic and its response in 2020, this analysis is a snapshot of the data and research available at the time of writing (end of June 2020). DI will continue to refine and update this analysis of financial support available to the pandemic response throughout the year. The primary data sources and associated download dates are as follows:
• UN OCHA’s FTS on humanitarian grant funding available to the Covid-19 pandemic response. This is both inside the Global Humanitarian Response Plan for Covid-19 as well as funding directed outside the plan to support the response. Data includes commitments in the form of legally binding funding obligations and paid contributions. Data was downloaded on 24 June 2020. Global Humanitarian Response Plan funding requirements, received funding and proportion of requirements met are therefore also as of 24 June 2020.

• IATI data on humanitarian and development grant funding available to the Covid-19 pandemic response. The source data was extracted in support of the Grand Bargain Transparency workstream and according to the guidelines on how to publish data on Covid-19 using the IATI Standard. The transactions data used in our analysis also includes funding flows that are not explicitly labelled to be relevant to Covid-19, but are associated with activities that are. In our analysis, government, inter-governmental and private donors are included in our dataset if their IATI data can clearly be identified as additional to what is reported to FTS. DI will continue to refine the methodology for identifying overlaps and additionality between IATI and FTS data on the Covid-19 pandemic response. Data was downloaded 24 June 2020 from d-portal.org.

• Data collated and analysed by the Centre for Disaster Protection on financial reports to the Covid-19 pandemic response from five major development finance institutions: World Bank Group (including International Development Association, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, International Finance Corporation and Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency), International Monetary Fund, African Development Bank, Asian Development Bank and Inter-American Development Bank. This data includes concessional and non-concessional loans by those five institutions, as well as grant support. The Centre for Disaster Protection’s data collection and analysis process is continuously refined and updated as new data becomes available. Data included in this report is as of 10 June 2020.

Crisis categories

For our analysis of crises by category, we applied thresholds to several indicators and cross-checked with other data sources. We used information from the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research’s Conflict Barometer 2019 and data from the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre to identify countries affected by conflict. For countries affected by disasters associated with natural hazards, we used indicators in the INFORM Index for Risk Management and Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT) data. And to identify displacement crises, we used data from the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre and the UN Relief and Works Agency Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA).

Disaster risk reduction

For our analysis of ODA to disaster risk reduction (DRR) in 2018 in Figure 2.9 we include the following funding flows as reported to the OECD DAC CRS:

• Funding reported with the purpose code 43060 ‘Disaster Risk Reduction’.
• Funding reported with the value 2 under the ‘Disaster Risk Reduction’ marker, expressing DRR as principal objective of the associated activity.
• Additional funding with DRR as principal objective as expressed by the project information reported to the CRS. This additional funding was identified by DI through a search for DRR keywords in the project titles and descriptions of CRS entries. The output of the keyword search was then manually screened for relevance to DRR.

Both the purpose code 43060 and the DRR marker were used for the first time on CRS to report on 2018 flows. It is therefore likely that they do not represent comprehensive volumes of DRR funding as they might not yet be widely used by all reporting organisations. The keyword search is therefore used to capture DRR funding not included under the DRR purpose code or marker, but in turn relies on accurate reporting of the project information. DRR funding not reported to the DRR purpose code or marker and with inaccurate or insufficient project information on the CRS is therefore not included in this analysis.

**Earmarked funding**

‘Earmarked’ funding comprises all non-core (‘other’) funding directed to multilateral organisations. Unearmarked funding may include softly earmarked contributions, for instance by region, to better reflect progress against the Grand Bargain commitment of providing more unearmarked and softly earmarked funding.

Our calculation of earmarking to nine UN agencies – Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), International Organization for Migration (IOM), Unicef, UN Development Programme (UNDP), UNHCR, UN OCHA, UNRWA, World Food Programme (WFP) and World Health Organization (WHO) – is primarily based on data provided directly to us by each agency, based on its internal reporting or extracted from annual reports.

**Exchange rates**

To convert original currency values into US$ values, we use exchange rates from the OECD DAC for DAC members and UN operational exchange rates for other government providers. The UN operational exchange rates are also used by UN OCHA FTS.

**Funding for local and national actors**

Our analysis of direct funding to local and national actors in Figure 3.2 uses data from FTS that we then ‘code’ according to a set of organisational categories. Our analysis of recipient types of funding from country-based pooled funds in Figure 3.4 uses the funds’ own classifications of recipients, which might differ from the definitions below. For our own coding process, we use the following categories of local and national non-state actors and national and subnational state actors, as defined by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee Humanitarian Financing Task Team in its *Localisation Marker Working Group Definitions Paper* (January 2018):³

• National NGOs/civil society organisations (CSOs): national NGOs/CSOs operating in the aid recipient country in which they are headquartered, working in multiple subnational regions, and not affiliated to an international NGO. This category can also include national faith-based organisations.

• Local NGOs/CSOs: local NGOs/CSOs operating in a specific, geographically defined, subnational area of an aid recipient country, without affiliation to an international NGO/CSO. This category can also include community-based organisations and local faith-based organisations.
Red Cross/Red Crescent National Societies: National Societies based in and operating within their own aid recipient countries.

Local and national private sector organisations: organisations run by private individuals or groups as a means of enterprise for profit, based in and operating within their own aid recipient countries and not affiliated to an international private sector organisation.

National governments: national government agencies, authorities, line ministries and state-owned institutions in aid recipient countries such as national disaster management agencies. This category can also include federal or regional government authorities.

Local governments: subnational government entities in aid recipient countries exercising some degree of devolved authority over a specifically defined geographic constituency such as local/municipal authorities.

Other categories of first-level recipients featured in this analysis are:

National foundations: foundations in receipt of international humanitarian funds based in aid recipient countries.

National research institutions: academia, think tanks and research institutions in receipt of international humanitarian funds based in aid recipient countries.

Internationally affiliated NGOs: NGOs affiliated to an international NGO through interlinked financing, contracting, governance and/or decision-making systems. This category does not include local and national organisations that are part of networks, confederations or alliances wherein those organisations maintain independent fundraising and governance systems.

Southern international NGOs: NGOs based in aid recipient countries that are not OECD members, carrying out operations outside the aid recipient country in which they are headquartered and not affiliated to an international NGO. The same organisation is classified as a national NGO/CSO when carrying out operations in the country in which it is headquartered.

**International humanitarian assistance**

Our estimate of total international humanitarian assistance is the sum of that from private donors (see this chapter’s section on ‘Private funding’) and from government donors and EU institutions. Our calculation of international humanitarian assistance from government donors is the sum of:

- ‘official’ humanitarian assistance (OECD DAC donors)
- international humanitarian assistance from OECD DAC donors to countries not eligible for ODA from the FTS
- international humanitarian assistance from donors outside the OECD DAC using data from the FTS.

Our ‘official’ humanitarian assistance calculation comprises:

- the bilateral humanitarian expenditure of OECD DAC members, as reported to the OECD DAC database under Table 1
the multilateral humanitarian assistance of OECD DAC members. This comprises:

- the unearmarked ODA contributions of DAC members to ten key multilateral agencies engaged in humanitarian response: FAO, IOM, UNDP, UNFPA, UNHCR, UN OCHA, Unicef, UNRWA, WFP and WHO, as reported to the OECD DAC under Table 2a and the CRS. We do not include all ODA to FAO, IOM, UNDP, UNFPA, Unicef and WFP but apply a percentage to take into account that these agencies also have a ‘development’ mandate. These shares are calculated using data on humanitarian expenditure as a proportion of the total received directly from each multilateral agency.

- the ODA contributions of DAC members to some other multilateral organisations (beyond those already listed) that, although not primarily humanitarian oriented, do report a level of humanitarian aid to OECD DAC Table 2a. We do not include all reported ODA to these multilateral organisations but just the humanitarian share of this.

- contributions to the UN CERF that are not reported under DAC members’ bilateral humanitarian assistance. We take this data directly from the UN CERF website.

When we report on the official humanitarian assistance of individual OECD DAC countries who are members of the EU, we include an imputed calculation of their humanitarian assistance channelled through the EU institutions, based on their ODA contributions to the EU institutions. We do not include this in our total international humanitarian assistance and response calculations to avoid double counting.

Our estimate for official humanitarian assistance in 2019 is derived from preliminary DAC donor reporting on humanitarian aid grants.

Turkey is captured and shaded differently in Figures 2.4 and 2.5 because the humanitarian assistance that it voluntarily reports to the DAC largely comprises expenditure on hosting Syrian refugees within Turkey. We do not include Turkey’s spending on Syrian refugees in Turkey in our total international humanitarian assistance and response calculations elsewhere in the report, as these include only amounts directed internationally by donors.

**Poverty**

We refer to two poverty lines in this report: the international extreme poverty line of $1.90 a day and a higher poverty line of $3.20 a day; both of these poverty lines are expressed in 2011 purchasing power parity dollars. We use international poverty lines with most recent estimates for 2019 in this year’s report to provide comparable, up-to-date analysis. Estimates are based on data from World Bank PovcalNet, World Bank Data Bank, International Monetary Fund World Economic Outlook (April 2020), United Nations World Population Prospects and national sources. In order to produce estimates for 2019 based on existing poverty data sources, DI utilises the estimation approach as detailed by World Bank (2015).14

In this GHA report we also include DI’s own estimates on poverty in five countries without data available from PovcalNet: Afghanistan, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Libya and Somalia. These estimates are based on data from national surveys carried out in those countries, among other sources. For more detail on the methodology behind these estimates, please refer to DI’s corresponding discussion paper.15
Private funding

We directly request financial information from humanitarian delivery agencies (including NGOs, multilateral agencies and the RCRC) on their income and expenditure to create a standardised dataset. Where direct data collection is not possible, we use publicly available annual reports and audited accounts. For the most recent year, our dataset includes:

- a large sample of NGOs that form part of representative NGO alliances and umbrella organisations such as Oxfam International, and several large international NGOs operating independently
- private contributions to IOM, UNDP, UNHCR, Unicef, UN OCHA, UNRWA, WFP and WHO
- the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).

Our private funding calculation comprises an estimate of total private humanitarian income for all NGOs, and the private humanitarian income reported by the eight UN agencies, the IFRC and the ICRC. To estimate the total private humanitarian income of NGOs globally, we calculate the annual proportion that the NGOs in our dataset represent of NGOs reporting to UN OCHA FTS. The total private humanitarian income reported to us by the NGOs in our dataset is then scaled up accordingly.

Data is collected annually, and new data for previous years may be added retrospectively. Due to limited data availability, detailed analysis covers the period 2014 to 2018.

Our 2019 private funding calculation is an estimate based on data provided by Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), pending data from our full dataset. We calculate the average share that MSF's contribution represents in our private funding figure for the five previous years (2014–2018) and use this to scale up the private funding figure provided by MSF to arrive at an estimated total for 2019. The rationale for this methodology is that the share of MSF's private funding remains relatively consistent year on year (ranging between 25% and 29% of the total amount over the last five years).

Rounding

There may be minor discrepancies in some of the totals in our charts and infographics, and between those in the text, because of rounding.

UN-coordinated appeals

We use this generic term to describe all humanitarian response plans and appeals wholly or jointly coordinated by UN OCHA or UNHCR, including strategic response plans/humanitarian response plans, flash appeals, joint response plans and regional refugee response plans. We use data from UN OCHA’s FTS and UNHCR for our financial analysis of UN-coordinated appeals.
# Data Sources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data Source</th>
<th>Website</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACAPS</td>
<td><a href="http://www.acaps.org/countries">www.acaps.org/countries</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Cash Learning Partnership</td>
<td><a href="http://www.cashlearning.org">www.cashlearning.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EM-DAT: International Disaster Database</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Université Catholique de Louvain, Brussels, Belgium</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country-Based Pooled Funds Intelligence Portal</td>
<td><a href="https://pfbi.unocha.org/">https://pfbi.unocha.org/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBPF allocations, CBPF Intelligence Portal, UN OCHA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food Security Information Network</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INFORM</td>
<td><a href="http://www.inform-index.org">www.inform-index.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INFORM Global Crisis Severity Index</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies</td>
<td><a href="http://www.ifrc.org">www.ifrc.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFRC’s appeal reports, IFRC, Geneva</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debt sustainability analysis</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>States of Fragility 2018: Understanding Violence, OECD, Paris</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD Creditor Reporting System</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UN High Commissioner for Refugees</strong></td>
<td><a href="http://data.unhcr.org">http://data.unhcr.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid-Year Trends (historical), UNHCR Global Trends reports, response plans’ funding snapshots</td>
<td><a href="http://reporting.unhcr.org">http://reporting.unhcr.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</strong></td>
<td><a href="http://www.unocha.org/cerf">www.unocha.org/cerf</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Emergency Response Fund/CERF, UN OCHA, New York</td>
<td><a href="https://fts.unocha.org">https://fts.unocha.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial Tracking Service/FTS, UN OCHA, Geneva</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East</strong></td>
<td><a href="http://www.unrwa.org/resources/about-unrwa">www.unrwa.org/resources/about-unrwa</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNRWA in Figures reports</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PovcalNet, World Bank</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### acronyms and abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3RP</td>
<td>Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan for Syria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBPF</td>
<td>Country-based pooled fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CERF</td>
<td>Central Emergency Response Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRS</td>
<td>Creditor Reporting System (DAC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil society organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CVA</td>
<td>Cash and voucher assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee (OECD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFI</td>
<td>Development finance institution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development (UK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DI</td>
<td>Development Initiatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPR Korea</td>
<td>Democratic People’s Republic of Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRR</td>
<td>Disaster risk reduction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECHO</td>
<td>European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDI</td>
<td>Foreign direct investment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FTS</td>
<td>Financial Tracking Service (UN OCHA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GBV</td>
<td>Gender-based violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GHA</td>
<td>Global Humanitarian Assistance (programme by Development Initiatives)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GHRP</td>
<td>Global Humanitarian Response Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNI</td>
<td>Gross national income</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRP</td>
<td>Humanitarian response plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IASC</td>
<td>Inter-Agency Standing Committee (UN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IATI</td>
<td>International Aid Transparency Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDMC</td>
<td>Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally displaced person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFRC</td>
<td>International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INFORM</td>
<td>Index for Risk Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official development assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>Purchasing power parity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCRC</td>
<td>International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RRP</td>
<td>Regional response plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>UN Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>UN High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unicef</td>
<td>UN International Children’s Emergency Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNRWA</td>
<td>UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organization</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
executive summary

1. Development Initiatives defines countries experiencing protracted crisis as countries with at least five consecutive years of UN-coordinated humanitarian or refugee response plans as of the year of analysis.

chapter 1

1. Development Initiatives defines countries experiencing protracted crisis as countries with at least five consecutive years of UN-coordinated humanitarian or refugee response plans as of the year of analysis.

2. According to the INFORM Epidemic Risk Index, which aims to identify countries at risk from health and humanitarian impacts of Covid-19 that could overwhelm current national response capacity, and therefore lead to a need for additional international assistance. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/publication/annual-reports/inform-covid-19-risk-index


4. This figure is in PPP (purchasing power parity) to allow for comparison of poverty data across countries. PPPs are constructed by comparing the cost of a common basket of goods in different countries. To reflect internationally comparable poverty lines, we use the $1.90 and $3.20 poverty lines derived from 2011 prices.

5. Development Initiatives based on data from USAID’s demographic and health surveys, Unicef’s multiple indicators cluster surveys and World Bank PovcalNet.

6. For more information on Development Initiatives’ methodology on identifying the poorest 20% within the P20 approach, see https://devinit.org/resources/p20-benin-consultation-consensus/methodology/


10. Defined as not having an INFORM Currently Highly Violent Conflict Intensity of 7 or above.

chapter 2


2. Turkey and EU institutions are not included in these calculations.

3. See Chapter 1, Figure 1.4. A large number of countries outside the DAC provide support to refugee and IDP populations; of the 20 countries with the largest forcibly displaced populations, only Germany is a DAC member. In addition, Turkey also voluntarily reports some in-country refugee hosting costs to the DAC (US$11.5 million in 2019), although most of the spending it reports to the DAC as humanitarian assistance is also used to support Syrian refugees. Data on expenditure by other hosting countries is not reported to the DAC, making comparative analysis difficult.

4. Agreed in October 2017, the revised OECD DAC guidelines state that in-donor refugee costs are only those reported under the specific ODA category. Other spending on refugee hosting in these countries that is not reported to this code is not included (see OECD, 2017. DAC high level communique: 31 October 2017. Available at: https://www.oecd.org/dac/DAC-HLM-2017-Communique.pdf). The revisions aim to enhance the consistency of reporting between donors as well as transparency of reported costs. For analysis of these guidelines, see Development Initiatives, 2017. ODA modernisation: an update following the October HLM. Available at: https://devinit.org/publications/oda-modernisation-update-following-october-2017-hlm/

5. In 2019, the data available from the OECD DAC CRS does not include a breakdown of Italy’s ODA contributions, and so the volume of ODA expenditure for in-country refugee hosting costs cannot be identified. Between 2016 and 2018, a period for which Italy’s expenditure has been reported, Italy spent an average of US$1.6 billion on in-country refugee support.


7. Development Initiatives defines countries experiencing protracted crisis as countries with at least five consecutive years of UN-coordinated humanitarian or refugee response plans as of the year of analysis.

chapter 3


2. IASC Humanitarian Financing Task Team, 2018. Localisation Marker Working Group: definitions paper. Available at: https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/system/files/hftt_localisation_marker_definitions_paper_24_january_2018.pdf This paper defines ‘as-directly-as-possible’ funding as that passed through “a single international aid organisation” but notes that further research and discussion are planned to consider whether other intermediaries should be considered for inclusion.

notes


6. Authored by Lydia Poole, with the support of FAO and NRC, on behalf of the Quality Funding Workstream.


Chapter 4

1. Development Initiatives defines countries experiencing protracted crisis as countries with at least five consecutive years of UN-coordinated humanitarian or refugee response plans as of the year of analysis.


5. See note 4.


8. The 14 countries with country-specific requirements in excess of US$100 million as of 29 June 2020 are: Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Syria, Colombia, DRC, Iraq, Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan, Yemen, CAR, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Haiti. 


10. World Bank Group (including IDA, IBRD, IFC and MIGA) [WBG], International Monetary Fund [IMF], African Development Bank [AfDB], Asian Development Bank [ADB] and Inter-American Development Bank [IADB].


24. Analysis is based on data from: World Bank Group (including IDA, IBRD, IFC and MIGA) [WBG], International Monetary Fund [IMF], African Development Bank [AFDB], Asian Development Bank [ADB] and Inter-American Development Bank [IADB].

25. Nigeria, the Philippines and Pakistan receive 32% of DFI support and account for 10% of all country-specific requirements. Egypt and Kenya have relatively small requirements for other humanitarian needs as country components of regional response plans, however data for country-specific requirements for the Covid-19 pandemic response for all countries in regional plans is not yet available.

26. At the end of June 2020, funding to Venezuela for response to the Covid-19 pandemic was not being tracked on UN OCHA’s FTS, so it was not possible to identify the coverage of appeals requirements.

27. For more information, please refer to DI’s progress report, Supporting Grand Bargain signatories in meeting commitments to greater transparency, available at: https://devinit.org/resources/supporting-grand-bargain-signatories-meeting-commitments-greater-transparency/

28. The data and corresponding visualisation is available at: http://covid19.humportal.org/flows/

---

**chapter 5**

1. For more information, see: Development Initiatives, 2018. Supporting Grand Bargain signatories in commitments to greater transparency. Available at: https://devinit.org/resources/supporting-grand-bargain-signatories-meeting-commitments-greater-transparency/

2. OECD DAC definitions and reporting guidelines can be found at: www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-standards


5. Data can be accessed via the Cash Maps, available at: https://cash-hub.org/resources/cash-maps


8. Up-to-date data on humanitarian funding flows reported to FTS in support of the Covid-19 pandemic response is available at: https://fts.unocha.org/emergencies/911/summary/2020


16. Please be aware we may not have data reported for each organisation in every year. For some NGO alliances, we may have collected data from only one member organisation, therefore treated here as independent.
Development Initiatives (DI) is an international development organisation that focuses on putting data-driven decision-making at the heart of poverty eradication.

Our vision is a world without poverty that invests in human security and where everyone shares the benefits of opportunity and growth.

We provide rigorous information to support better decisions, influence policy outcomes, increase accountability and strengthen the use of data to eradicate poverty.

Our Global Humanitarian Assistance (GHA) programme analyses resource flows to people at risk of and affected by crises, promoting data transparency and access to information through our research and publications – including our annual GHA reports. This content is solely the work of DI and represents our analysis and interpretation of the available data. For further details on the content of this report, and to ask questions or provide comments to its authors, please contact us by email (gha@devinit.org) or visit our website.

The Global Humanitarian Assistance programme is funded by the governments of Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden.

Canada

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF DENMARK
Danida

Sweden

Sverige
Global Humanitarian Assistance (GHA) reports use the latest data to present the most comprehensive assessment of international financing at work in humanitarian situations. The GHA Report 2020 depicts the crisis financing landscape in which the Covid-19 pandemic has become the pre-eminent feature. The report looks back to review humanitarian needs and financing in 2019, presenting this alongside more immediate analysis of how resources are being targeted in response to the pandemic.

In a complex and changing financing landscape, the GHA Report provides clear and independent analysis of how much assistance is given, who it is provided by, where it goes, how it is delivered and how it can more effectively meet people’s needs. Four years on from the Grand Bargain agreement, this year’s report contains updated analysis on progress towards meeting commitments on cash programming, funding to local and national actors, and flexible funding. The 2020 report also includes new analysis of funding for disaster risk reduction.

Transparent and reliable information, as provided by the GHA Report 2020, is essential for all those working to address the causes and consequences of crises. This year we are making our data even more accessible by sharing new interactive charts alongside the report. Decision-makers can now delve into our data through a series of user-friendly and flexible tools.

Please visit our website to download and share this report and other relevant analysis and explore the interactive charts. To ask questions or provide comments please contact us by email (gha@devinit.org). We welcome your feedback.