

Global Public Investment: A Climate Finance Solution for West Africa

The potential of GPI for Côte d'Ivoire and other
West African countries

Arsène Brice BADO, PhD
<arsenebrice.bado@cerap-inades.org>

Acknowledgements

This resource was produced by CERAP with support from [Development Initiatives \(DI\)](#).



CERAP trains people in ethical governance to reduce poverty by promoting justice and social cohesion, paying particular attention to the most vulnerable people.

DI supported the production of this report, including facilitating peer review and providing editorial assistance and guidance. The opinions expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of DI.

DI unlocks the power of data to enable policies and investments that improve the lives of people experiencing poverty, inequality and crisis. [Read more about DI's work.](#)

This report is copyright 2024 CERAP and licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution BY-NC-ND 4.0 International license, unless stated otherwise. We encourage dissemination of the work provided a reference is included.

Contents

Acknowledgements 2

Introduction..... 4

Current climate finance architecture, limitations, and why we need an alternative..... 6

 Climate financing in Côte d’Ivoire 11

 Global Public Investment as a credible alternative to current climate financing 13

 Making GPI effective in Côte d’Ivoire and other West African countries..... 14

Socializing GPI beyond the financial discourse 16

 The dynamics of GPI would better serve the interconnected way we now live 16

 Global public investment at the financial level is a corollary of global citizenship at the political level..... 17

 Promoting eco-citizenship as a way of socializing GPI and climate finance..... 18

Conclusion 20

 Recommendations..... 21

References 23

Introduction

Climate finance is one of the areas of international cooperation where the new concept of Global Public Investment (GPI) can play a critical role by switching the top-down approach of donors and international financial structures. West African countries, as well as other recipients of international public climate finance, are critical of and frustrated by the procedures and structures through which they strive to access climate finance.¹ Indeed, the architecture of international public finance maintains a structural imbalance between influential donors and low-income recipient countries. Recipient countries often have no decision-making power about the priorities, procedures, financing amount, granting process, and implementation of climate finance.² Climate finance tends to be perceived as a matter of charity rather than moral responsibility from the perspective of bilateral and multilateral climate finance providers.³

However, when it comes to a global issue such as climate change, all are responsible, even though not at the same level. Because the environment is a global public good,⁴ the impacts of global warming on the environment therefore constitute a global problem. The resolution or mitigation of this problem requires global coordination beyond the individual borders of each country.⁵ This is why all countries must contribute to the extent of their abilities to resolve global problems such as climate change.⁶ No country is too poor to contribute to resolving these global problems. Likewise, no rich country can be satisfied with its surplus as a contribution to resolving these global problems. From such a perspective, the concept of GPI, which stipulates that all contribute, all participate in decision-making, and all benefit from

¹ Rebecca Schaaf, "The Rhetoric and Reality of Partnerships for International Development," *Geography Compass* 9, no. 2 (February 25, 2015): 68–80, <https://doi.org/10.1111/gec3.12198>.

² Nisha Krishnan, "Following the Money Isn't Enough: How Civil Society Organizations Provide Accountability for Climate Adaptation Finance," Working Paper (Washington, D.C., September 2020), <https://doi.org/10.46830/wriwp.18.00041>.

³ UNOG, "Climate Finance Should Not Add to Debt Burdens of Poor Countries, Says United Nations Expert in Durban," *States News Service*, 8 Dec. 2011. *Gale In Context: Biography*, link.gale.com/apps/doc/A274418799/BIC?u=upenn_main&sid=summon&xid=f7ae625e. Accessed 11 Mar. 2024.

⁴ David McCoy, "Global Public Investment: Time to Build the Movement Now," IPS Inter Press Service, August 17, 2022 link.gale.com/apps/doc/A714090048/GIC?u=upenn_main&sid=summon&xid=e0985fff. Accessed 11 Mar. 2024.

⁵ Inge Kaul, Isabelle Grunberg, and Marc Stern, *Global Public Goods: International Cooperation in the 21st Century*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), <https://doi.org/10.1093/0195130529.001.0001>.

⁶ Jonathan Glennie, *The Future of Aid. Global Public Investment* (New York: Routledge, 2021).

collective effort, is an essential innovation in global public finance. The GPI concept is not yet operationalized on a large scale and will still have to convince its skeptics of the need for a paradigm shift in global public finances.⁷

This is why this study strives to contribute to popularizing this concept of GPI. To achieve this goal, the first part of the article assesses the architecture and current practice of climate finance. The second part demonstrates how the new GPI paradigm is a relevant and effective alternative to solving global problems such as climate change. The third part proposes a strategy to hasten the acceptance and implementation of the GPI concept in African countries and across the world. It suggests freeing GPI from the very specific and technical discourse of the field of finance, and instead developing a discourse that is more accessible to the public and which relies on existing concepts of interdependence, global citizenship, and eco-citizenship. The paper's conclusion shows how the concept of GPI is a logical continuation of adaptation to the reality of today's increasingly globalized world. The article ends with practical recommendations that West African countries could implement to effectively contribute to operationalizing the GPI concept internationally.

⁷ Christoph Benn et al., "Building a Better System: Making Global Public Investment a Reality. Recommendations of the Expert Working Group on Global Public Investment" 2022, <https://globalpublicinvestment.org/resources/>.

Current climate finance architecture, limitations, and why we need an alternative

West Africa has been identified as one of the regions in the world most negatively affected by climate change,⁸ although it contributes very little to climate change.⁹ Despite this, it benefits little from international climate financing. Furthermore, this funding is poorly adapted to the real needs of communities and countries to effectively combat climate change.¹⁰ In a report published in September 2022,¹¹ Oxfam International draws up a compelling assessment of the climate financing received by eight West African countries, namely Senegal, Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Ghana, Nigeria, and Chad.¹² Three main findings of this report are worth highlighting.

First, international public climate finance has been low and insufficient for West African countries. Indeed, between 2013 and 2019, these eight countries “received US\$11.7bn in international public climate finance, an average of US\$1.7bn per year”. This seems to be an important amount of funds. However, as the report stated, “Looking at the regional aggregates, the West Africa/Sahel region receives an average amount of US\$4.90 per year per person; however, according to the aggregated Nationally Determined Contributions assessments of needs, they would need US\$57.75 per year per person”.¹³ According to Oxfam’s report, these countries need an average of US\$19.7bn per year instead of the current average of US\$1.7bn per year, representing a significant deficit. For instance, in 2019, these West African countries received US\$2.5bn for climate finance. This amount “represents only 12.7%

⁸ François Gemenne et al., “Changement Climatique, Catastrophes Naturelles et Déplacements de Populations En Afrique de l’Ouest,” *Geo-Eco-Trop.* 41, no. 3 (2017): 2.

⁹ World Meteorological Organization, “Africa Suffers Disproportionately from Climate Change,” Press Release Number: September 4, 2023, [https://wmo.int/media/news/africa-suffers-disproportionately-from-climate-change#:~:text=But%20it%20is%20the%20continent,said%20WMO%20Secretary%2DGeneral%20Prof.](https://wmo.int/media/news/africa-suffers-disproportionately-from-climate-change#:~:text=But%20it%20is%20the%20continent,said%20WMO%20Secretary%2DGeneral%20Prof.;); See also Aimable Twahirwa, “L’Afrique pâtit du changement climatique de manière disproportionnée, selon un nouveau rapport,” September 5, 2023, <https://link.gale.com/apps/doc/A763442050/EAIM?u=anon~d77436d6&sid=sitemap&xid=ecd9b811>.

¹⁰ Carlos García Paret and Santiago Lorenzo, “Adapter Les Marchés Financiers Aux Changements Climatiques,” *Revue d’économie Financière* 117, no. 1 (April 17, 2015): 107–26, doi:10.3917/ECOFI.117.0107; Severino, “Climate Finance for Africa: Burden or Opportunity?,” 47–49.


¹¹ Martín Norman Casas and Azara Remalia Sanogo, “Climate Finance in West Africa: Assessing the State of Climate Finance in One of the World’s Regions Worst Hit by the Climate Crisis” (Oxford, September 27, 2022), <https://doi.org/10.21201/2022.9363>.

¹² Chad is in Central Africa, but it is also part of the Sahel region alongside the following West African/Sahel region countries covered by the Oxfam climate finance assessment report: Burkina Faso, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, and Senegal.

¹³ Ibid.

of the average annual financial needs for external climate finance outlined by West Africa/Sahel countries in their NDCs.¹⁴ [...] However, when considering Oxfam’s climate-specific net assistance (CSNA) estimate [...], the true value of climate finance would drop to 7.3%, representing an alarming gap of 92.7%.”¹⁵ This is illustrated in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Comparison of current public climate finance reported (pink line), and CSNA (red line) versus conditional finance needs estimated in West Africa/Sahel countries’ NDCs (top bar).



Source: Casas and Sanogo, “Climate Finance in West Africa: Assessing the state of climate finance in one of the world's regions worst hit by the climate crisis.” Oxfam International Report, September 2022, p.13. URL: <https://oxfamilibrary.openrepository.com/handle/10546/621420>

Note: CSNA: climate-specific net assistance

Second, international public climate finance has become a huge burden for West African countries. According to Oxfam International, 62% of globally reported international climate finance received by West African countries between 2013 and 2019 were in the form of debt instruments, which means that climate finance allocated in the form of grants during the same period represented only 38%. As Oxfam’s report stated:

“In stark contrast, debt instruments have increased by 610% for the same period (from \$243m in 2013 to \$1.72bn in 2019). By comparison, grants (non-debt instruments) have increased by only 79% (from \$423m in 2013 to \$760m in 2019). In addition, non-concessional loans (loans not meeting ODA thresholds for concessionality)¹⁶ have also increased notably: today they account for 17% for the

¹⁴ Nationally determined contributions (NDCs) are work undertaken by each country to reduce national emissions and adapt to the impacts of climate change, as stipulated in the Paris Agreement, Article 4, paragraph 2. For more information, see <https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-agreement/nationally-determined-contributions-ndcs>.

¹⁵ Casas and Sanogo, 13.

¹⁶ Casas and Sanogo, “Climate Finance in West Africa: Assessing the state of climate finance in one of the world's regions worst hit by the climate crisis.” Oxfam International Report, September 2022, p.18. URL: <http://hdl.handle.net/10546/621420>

total climate finance provided. Oxfam believes that none of these finance instruments should be accounted as net climate assistance [...] All of this is evidence of a particularly concerning trend: that climate funds flowing towards West Africa/Sahel are increasingly being used for financial and investment purposes, rather than for pure net assistance (grants).”¹⁷

It is unfair that climate finance has become a burden for West African countries when they have contributed the least to climate change but are the most affected by it. As Severino says, African countries have minimal responsibility for climate degradation but, unfortunately, have a maximum vulnerability.¹⁸ The industrialized countries that contributed the most to climate change should provide climate grants instead of climate loans to low income West African countries already overburdened by the debt service. “Climate finance is not as a matter of charity, and should be seen as a legal obligation under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and a moral responsibility on the part of those that have contributed the most to it.”¹⁹ The provision of climate finance to low income countries in the form of debt instruments results in a situation where these countries would not be fully committed to tackling climate change because of the high costs of climate loans perceived as an unjust financial burden. Financing climate investments through debt cannot be an effective solution. We must, therefore, question the current global financial architecture, which is based more on loans than grants and which is not adapted to the financing of activities against climate change.

Third, West African countries and their local communities do not have full ownership of implementing the international public climate finance they receive. Indeed, most reported international public climate finance, whether multilateral or bilateral, to West African countries is not received directly by local governments or local communities and civil society organizations. International NGOs, delegated corporations, or UN structures usually receive international climate funds to be implemented in local countries. As Oxfam’s report noted, less than 1% of climate finance is locally led:

“Using the OECD-CRS data, of the institutions that have direct access to international climate finance in the West Africa/Sahel region, only 0.8% could be labeled as ‘local’. Most of this finance is directly managed by local

¹⁷ Casas and Sanogo, 18.

¹⁸ Severino, “Climate Finance for Africa: Burden or Opportunity?,” 44.

¹⁹ UNOG, “Climate Finance Should Not Add to the External Debt Burdens of Poor Recipient Countries, Says UN Expert.” Available at: <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2011/12/climate-finance-should-not-add-external-debt-burdens-poor-recipient>

NGOs, while local governments only manage 0.1% of the total climate finance.”²⁰

Not only is less than 1% of climate finance locally led, but “local communities and governments [have been] currently excluded from decision making and planning in how climate adaptation finance is governed,”²¹ according to the World Resources Institute. Thus, the objectives of climate finance are defined from the donors' perspective and not from the perspective of countries vulnerable to climate change. This lack of ownership of climate finance deprives local governments and communities of responsibility and decision-making in using these funds, even though they are at the frontline of climate change impacts.

The above facts demonstrate how the international public climate finance architecture is biased against recipient countries like those in West Africa.²² Indeed, the current architecture of international public climate finance maintains a structural imbalance between donor countries on the one hand, and recipient countries on the other.²³ In addition, recipient countries are not sufficiently consulted or, when they are, they have little decision-making power vis-à-vis donor countries.²⁴ It also appears that donor countries are increasingly facing a rise in populist and nationalist political movements that affect international cooperation and international public climate finance.²⁵ Added to this are tensions on the international scene between donor countries, which hampers international public funding mechanisms.²⁶ These difficulties call into question the governance of international public finances.

²⁰ Casas and Sanogo, “Climate Finance in West Africa: Assessing the State of Climate Finance in One of the World’s Regions Worst Hit by the Climate Crisis,” 24.

²¹ Krishnan, “Following the Money Isn’t Enough: How Civil Society Organizations Provide Accountability for Climate Adaptation Finance,” 4–5; Casas and Sanogo, “Climate Finance in West Africa: Assessing the State of Climate Finance in One of the World’s Regions Worst Hit by the Climate Crisis,” 25.

²² OECD, World Bank, and UN Environment, “Financing Climate Futures: Rethinking Infrastructure,” *Financing Climate Futures*, November 28, 2018, <https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264308114-EN>.

²³ Paret and Lorenzo, “Adapter Les Marchés Financiers Aux Changements Climatiques”; Szuba and Mathilde, “Aurélien Bernier, Le Climat Otage de La Finance, Ou Comment Le Marché Boursicote Avec Les « Droits à Polluer »,” April 23, 2009, <https://doi.org/10.4000/VERTIGO.8069>.

²⁴ Carola Klöck, Nadia Molenaers, and Florian Weiler, “Responsibility, Capacity, Greenness or Vulnerability? What Explains the Levels of Climate Aid Provided by Bilateral Donors?” *Environmental Politics* 27, no. 5 (September 3, 2018): 892–916, doi:10.1080/09644016.2018.1480273.

²⁵ Arsène Brice Bado and Kinhou Agblonon, “De La (Des) Unión Europea En África a Un Multilateralismo Comprometido,” *Razón y Fe: Revista Hispanoamericana de Cultura* 277, no. 1431 (2018): 39–50.

²⁶ Masaru Kohno et al., “Donor Competition and Public Support for Foreign Aid Sanctions,” *Political Research Quarterly* 74, no. 1 (2021): 212–27, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912919897837>.

The concept and mechanisms of climate finance are linked to that of public development assistance. It is important to rethink the concept of international development assistance. It should be noted that this international aid is not ‘aid’ but rather ‘debt’. It would be a mistake to consider this as a contribution to a country’s effort to fight against the impacts of climate change.²⁷ Given existing relations between donor and recipient countries, it can be observed that the lack of decision-making power on grant allocation and the use of such financing further exacerbates inequality and an imbalance of power.²⁸ In addition, development assistance is a one-time investment that is supposed to encourage change and promote the economic transformation of the country so that it can become self-reliant and develop its economy. However, the problems to be solved are generally long-term and require sustainable financing for structural transformation. Therefore, the one-off nature of the granting of financing does not make it possible to achieve this.²⁹

A problem that African researchers and policymakers have often raised is that projects that are supposed to be financed by international public funds do not meet the realities and expectations of the beneficiary countries.³⁰ This is often because donor countries decide on priorities and project development or provide guidance to requesting countries to prepare projects for funding.³¹ As a result, several funded projects are not achieving the expected results. Therefore, as long as there is inequality in North–South relations on the governance of international public funds, this situation will continue.³²

²⁷ UNOG, “Climate Finance Should Not Add to Debt Burdens of Poor Countries, Says UN Expert”; Farka Mouhamadou Maïga Farka and Alix Mazounie, “Les Financements Climat : Résoudre La Crise Financière via Un Mécanisme de Solidarité Efficace Au Sommet de Paris ?” *Techniques Financieres et Developpement* 120, no. 3 (2015): 19–26, [doi:10.3917/TFD.120.0019](https://doi.org/10.3917/TFD.120.0019).

²⁸ Glennie, *The Future of Aid; Global Public Investment*.

²⁹ Émilie Debels-Lamblin and Luc Jacolin, “The Impact of Climate Change in Sub-Saharan Africa: Vulnerabilities, Resilience and Finance,” *Bulletin de La Banque de France*, 230/4 (Paris, July 2020).

³⁰ Rebecca Schaaf, “The Rhetoric and Reality of Partnerships for International Development,” *Geography Compass* 9, no. 2 (February 25, 2015): 68–80, [doi:10.1111/gec3.12198](https://doi.org/10.1111/gec3.12198).

³¹ Andrew Rogerson, “Aid Harmonisation and Alignment: Bridging the Gaps between Reality and the Paris Reform Agenda,” *Development Policy Review* 23, no. 5 (September 2005): 533–36, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7679.2005.00301.x>.

³² Koch, *Foreign Aid and Its Unintended Consequences*.

Climate financing in Côte d'Ivoire

It should be noted that on the side of African countries, specifically Côte d'Ivoire, it is necessary to have rigorous and systematic monitoring of the funds allocated to projects to ensure better management. Indeed, there is a problem of transparency in managing international public funds to finance development projects. Donor countries have legitimate grievances about managing development assistance funds allocated to African countries. Corruption³³ and embezzlement of development aid funds are practices that discredit some recipients and lead donor countries to impose drastic measures to ensure transparency in managing aid funds.³⁴ For recipient countries, these measures paradoxically reinforce the feeling of interference and domination by the donor countries.

Faced with the limitations of official development assistance funds, it is recommended that African countries take initiatives to finance their development and not rely on the Global North.³⁵ After all, nothing is free. Solutions must be tailored to suit the unique circumstances of each country, incorporating organic and context-specific approaches. It is the responsibility of individual nations to devise solutions that align most effectively with their own interest and context.³⁶ To do this, Côte d'Ivoire, like many other West African countries, must work to reduce its budget deficit by mobilizing more savings at the national level. To increase savings at the national level, the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) obliges all countries to have a tax rate higher than 20% of their budget. But the reality is that no WAEMU country has managed to achieve this tax collection rate. For example, over the past two years, the tax collection rate in Côte d'Ivoire has not exceeded 14%.

³³ AB Bado - Comprendre la pauvreté au and undefined 2004, "La Corruption Dans Les Transports Publics Au Cameroun," *Presses de l'Université Catholique d' ...*, n.d., accessed May 10, 2019.

³⁴ Anuj Kapilashrami and Oonagh O'Brien, "The Global Fund and the Re-Configuration and Re-Emergence of 'Civil Society': Widening or Closing the Democratic Deficit?" *Global Public Health* 7, no. 5 (May 2012): 437–51, doi:10.1080/17441692.2011.649043; Chang, Rusu, and Kohler, "The Global Fund: Why Anti-Corruption, Transparency and Accountability Matter."

³⁵ Jidefor Adibe et al., "Development in Africa," *Brookings.Edu*, 2015, <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/foresight-africa-full-report-FINAL.pdf#page=25>.

³⁶ D Ratha et al., *Beyond Aid: New Sources and Innovative Mechanisms for Financing Development in Sub-Saharan Africa*, 2008, <https://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/abs/10.1596/1813-9450-4609>.

In the specific case of Côte d'Ivoire, development aid should be aligned with the priorities of the National Development Plan (NDP).³⁷ The State should put forward its funding priorities in the NDP instead of striving to compete for subsidies available from donors, which do not correspond to the priorities of the NDP. In addition, the grants donors make available are not always easily accessible, as the procedures for applying for these grants are often very complex and difficult. There is therefore a need to train specialists at the national level on the rules and procedures for applying for international assistance grants.³⁸

In sum, international public finance has not worked well for development and mitigating the impacts of climate change. This requires us to look for credible alternatives to finance sustainable development and, in particular, to deal with the impacts of climate change. This report examines how the new concept of global public investment could be an effective alternative to the problem of international public aid for Côte d'Ivoire and other African countries.

³⁷ Gouvernement de Côte d'Ivoire, "Côte d'Ivoire- Plan National de Développement 2021-2025," 2021, https://www.google.com/search?q=cote+d%27ivoire+plan+national+de+developpement&oq=Cote+d%27ivoire%2C+Plan+Nationale&gs_lcrp=EgZjaHJvbWUqCAGBEAAYFhgeMgYIABBFgDkyCAGBEAAYFhge0gEJMTAyOTVqMG o3qAIAAsAIA&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8.

³⁸ Krishnan, "Following the Money Isn't Enough: How Civil Society Organizations Provide Accountability for Climate Adaptation Finance," 8.

Global Public Investment as a credible alternative to current climate financing

The current architecture of global public aid maintains a structural imbalance between donor countries, which are mostly countries of the Global North, and recipient countries, which are mostly countries of the Global South, including African countries. This imbalance is further exacerbated by power relations where donor countries decide on the conditions of eligibility and the priorities to be financed in beneficiary countries. The concept of Global Public Investment (GPI), which aims to restructure the architecture of international public financing, advocates for paradigm change. “The core characteristics of Global Public Investment are its potential to enhance the supply of public goods, services and infrastructure globally, through raising each year a nominal, fixed portion of national income as GPI funds and re-allocating those marked funds on a per-capita or other needs-indexed basis”.³⁹

The GPI concept promotes systems of funds to which all countries contribute to the extent of their capacities, to which all participate in decision-making, and for which all are beneficiaries.⁴⁰ It would allow the emergence of a true multilateralism in which international financial institutions would no longer be perceived as structures of domination, but as participants in a common undertaking in which everyone finds their way. Indeed, it is in the interest of high income countries that control global public finance to make room for contributions from lower income countries and share responsibility for devolving these common funds to solve problems such as those related to climate change, and which require coordinated action at the global level.⁴¹ Indeed, the 5th Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change report warns that without ambitious and immediate actions to control global warming below 2°C and mitigate climate change, living costs will increase massively in the coming years.⁴² Under the new GPI framework, climate finance could represent an essential lever to fight climate change through both mitigation and adaptation.

³⁹ Simon Reid-Henry, “Global Public Investment: Redesigning International Public Finance for Social Cohesion—A Preliminary Sketch,” *Revue d’Economie Du Développement* 27, no. 2 (April 2019): 169, <https://doi.org/10.3917/EDD.332.0169>.

⁴⁰ Glennie, *The Future of Aid; Global Public Investment*.

⁴¹ Inge Kaul, “Providing Global Public Goods: Managing Globalization,” *Providing Global Public Goods: Managing Globalization*, February 13, 2003, 1–668, <https://doi.org/10.1093/0195157400.001.0001>; Inge, Grunberg, and Stern, *Global Public Goods: International Cooperation in the 21st Century*.

⁴² UNFCCC and SBSTA, “Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change,” December 5, 2014, p.51, <http://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/wg2>.

For climate finance to be effective, the international community must do more than increase resource flows to isolated local interventions. Instead, it needs to address critical issues to foster transformation at the national level. First, international public funding cannot simply be used as an end in itself to fund isolated interventions. Second, with more than 50 international public funds, 60 carbon markets, and 6,000 private investment funds already providing “green finance,” mobilizing external finance in a way that is consistent with national systems and priorities is extremely complex. The GPI framework may provide better coordination for existing climate finance structures.⁴³ Indeed, decades of research on development assistance shows that the effectiveness of development actions, such as those needed to promote transformational change to address climate change, is severely undermined by the isolation of key national development planning and poverty reduction strategies. Thus, one of the most important contributions of the GPI framework is that it fosters coordination at the global level and true multilateralism in which countries can voice their concerns and negotiate on a level playing field.

[Making GPI effective in Côte d’Ivoire and other West African countries](#)

However, the GPI framework of fostering coordination, collaboration, and negotiation between countries worldwide on the same basis may be challenging. It requires solid competencies in several areas for Côte d’Ivoire and other West African countries to fully take advantage of it. The ability to contribute and, most importantly, to access and use international funding under the GPI framework will depend on a pool of local skills for navigating the procedures and negotiating with peers at the international level. West African countries need to develop local expertise that can be contracted to undertake different elements of climate change projects and programs, from environmental scans to the installation and maintenance of technologies and project management skills.⁴⁴ Capacity building is often needed to develop

⁴³ Benn et al., “Building a Better System: Making Global Public Investment a Reality. Recommendations of the Expert Working Group on Global Public Investment.”

⁴⁴ Krishnan, “Following the Money Isn’t Enough: How Civil Society Organizations Provide Accountability for Climate Adaptation Finance.”

this endogenous talent pool and grow a green economy at the local level. As Ajavon⁴⁵ noted, African experts currently lack the necessary resources to negotiate climate finance institutions.

Moreover, most West African countries do not yet have coherent proposals on the mitigation and adaptation to climate change impacts. Without clear climate finance policies, these countries rely on foreign experts from industrial countries to assess climate change impacts and produce reports for negotiations with climate finance institutions. A disabling factor is the lack of technicians and technocrats who can reorient discussions in favor of the realities of West African countries. Thus, the GPI framework for climate finance is relevant and attractive, but it also requires a huge responsibility from all countries, especially countries from the Global South that need to train their experts to produce evidence-based research to use in negotiations.⁴⁶

⁴⁵ Ajavon, Ayité Lô, « Les financements pour lutter contre les impacts du changement climatique dans l'espace CEDEAO », talk given during the Roundtable on GPI and Financing for Sustainable Development, held on June 13, 2023 at CERAP, Abidjan.

⁴⁶ Krishnan; Ratha et al., "Beyond Aid: New Sources and Innovative Mechanisms for Financing Development in Sub-Saharan Africa".

Socializing GPI beyond the financial discourse

To improve climate finance, it is essential to harness public and decision-makers' support for the concept of GPI. The socialization of the concept requires raising awareness among leaders, whether in the public or private sector. Indeed, while the concept of GPI is attractive, its innovative character, however, shakes up traditional practices and calls into question the entire aid policy. It is therefore necessary to work for a change of mentality that passes from assistance to responsible and reciprocal solidarity in which "all contribute, all decide, and all benefit." The best way to achieve that would be to develop a discourse that lays the ground for wide acceptance of GPI beyond the financial sector. Until then, the concept of GPI has mainly only circulated among economists and financiers. It is time to find justifications other than financial ones to give popular support to the concept of GPI. I suggest harnessing the financial discourse of GPI to the more philosophical and popular concepts of interdependence, global citizenship, and eco-citizenship. These concepts have already traveled well and far across the world, and they express the same dynamics underlying the concept of GPI. The best strategy is to show that, even though the concept of GPI is new, its dynamics and meaning are not; they are the consequence of the evolution of the world and the globalization of peoples and businesses across the planet.

The dynamics of GPI would better serve the interconnected way we now live

Today, although its five hundred and ten million square kilometers have remained unchanged since the dawn of time, our earth has never seemed so narrow, so contiguous. National borders, however distinct, continue to reveal themselves every day, a little close.⁴⁷ Despite the distance that separates us physically, realities are more and more shared, more and more common, and the interdependence we have been speaking about for half a century becomes more apparent daily.⁴⁸ Recent events such as the global health crisis of COVID-19 and repeated disasters linked to climate change reveal, in broad daylight, the need to think about the challenges of our world in an interconnected way.

⁴⁷ Arsène Brice Bado, *Dignity across Borders : Forced Migration and Christian Social Ethics* (Denver, Colorado: Outskirts Press Inc., 2011).

⁴⁸ Arsène Brice Bado (Ed.), *La Citoyenneté Mondiale et l'écocitoyenneté Dans Le Contexte de La Crise Sanitaire à Covid-19*, ed. Arsène Brice Bado (Abidjan: Editions du CERAP, 2022).

It is one thing to acknowledge that these realities and challenges exist and that action needs to be taken at the global level. It is another thing altogether to convert such action into all aspects of our daily lives. It is this reality that global citizenship reflects at the political level, eco-citizenship at the environmental level, and GPI at the economic and financial level.

Global public investment at the financial level is a corollary of global citizenship at the political level

The concept of global citizenship⁴⁹ is subject to controversy which, far from making it meaningless, in fact highlight its relevance. There are many different approaches to it, of course, but they all tend to construct our world as a networked world, an interconnected world, a global village, a globalized world, a “common home”. Whatever the approach, the idea of reciprocal interdependence has acquired a wide audience. It carries such credence that even the sovereigntist nations, despite being subject to recent conservative upheavals, can no longer deny their responsibility, and that polluting industries in the Global North can cause climatic damage in the Global South.

When it comes to the impacts of global warming, and the urgency of the situation, it is therefore undeniable that we must act as members of a large global community and align ourselves behind the challenges we face. We all need to adopt responsible practices and behaviors, and make effective climate financing and global public investment a priority to safeguard and protect the world.

This is why global citizenship education is one of the best ways to socialize the concept of GPI. UNESCO considers it a key response to the global challenges of our world. Education in global citizenship can act as a process of collective empowerment, a process of awakening people's awareness of the need for each person to assume their share of responsibility to the world, now and for the future. From this perspective, global citizenship education would help promote more inclusive societies in terms of rights, duties, and responsibilities, providing “individuals with the understanding, skills, and values they need to contribute to solving the interrelated challenges of the 21st century.”⁵⁰

⁴⁹ Bado, 2022.

⁵⁰ Sobhi Tawil, “Le Concept de « Citoyenneté Mondiale » : Un Apport Potentiel Pour l'éducation Multiculturelle ?,” *Revue Internationale d'éducation de Sèvres*, no. 63 (September 1, 2013): 133, <https://doi.org/10.4000/ries.3501>.

Promoting eco-citizenship as a way of socializing GPI and climate finance

The concept of eco-citizenship refers to “individual or collective behavior that consists in observing the principles and rules designed to preserve the environment”.⁵¹ From the perspective of eco-citizenship, human beings are not external to their natural environment. There is an interdependence between human beings and their environment. Damaging this environment would thus endanger the human community since environmental problems are often transnational and go beyond the state framework.

This is why, nowadays, eco-citizenship has become an international norm promoted by discourses of awareness and empowerment that encourage certain attitudes and practices that respect the environment. The concept of GPI can take advantage of this international norm to develop awareness-raising activities in favor of climate finance. In this sense, I like Alexandre Kiss’s definition of the concept of eco-citizenship as “a generalized consciousness that encourages all individuals to take into account in their daily actions the consequences that their actions are likely to have on the environment, in the present, but also the medium and long term”.⁵² This generalized consciousness can foster policies favoring the implementation of GPI’s core principles such as “all contribute, all decide, and all benefit.” As for eco-citizen practices,

[they] refer to a heterogeneous set of gestures, equipment practices, and purchasing behaviors for goods or services whose realization is supposed to be carried out (...) have a particularly negative or positive impact on the environment. They concern a plurality of areas of daily life, including the purchase and consumption of food, transport and mobility practices, electronic equipment and household appliances, energy consumption at home (water, electricity, gas, other fuels), waste emission, and sorting.⁵³

Eco-citizen or eco-responsible practices refer to another major concept, “sustainable development,” defined in the Brundtland Report as “development that meets the needs of the

⁵¹ Dictionnaire de français Larousse, “Définitions : Écocitoyenneté,” n.d., <https://www.larousse.fr/dictionnaires/francais/ecocitoyennete/10910119>.

⁵² Maël Ginsburger, “De La Norme à La Pratique Écocitoyenne. Position Sociale, Contraintes Matérielles et Diversité Des Rapports à l’écocitoyenneté,” *Revue Française de Sociologie* 61, no. 1 (2020): 44, <https://doi.org/10.3917/rfs.611.0043>.

⁵³ Ginsburger, 46.

present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.”⁵⁴ This concept of sustainable development was inspired by the philosopher Hans Jonas in his book *The Imperative of Responsibility*⁵⁵. In it, Jonas proposes an ethic for a technological civilization whose techno-sciences tend to deplete the earth’s resources and thus lead humanity towards the threat of self-destruction. Jonas then calls for a non-anthropocentric humanism based on a new version of the Kantian categorical imperative: “Act in such a way that your action is compatible with the permanence of life on earth.”⁵⁶ This categorical imperative could be the motto of all eco-citizens interested in climate finance under the framework of GPI.

⁵⁴ Marie-Louise Martinez and Marie-Claude Chamboredon, “Approche Anthropologique de La Construction d’identités Citoyennes,” in *Développement Durable et Autres Questions d’actualité*, ed. Alain Legardez (Éducagri éditions, 2011), 91, <https://doi.org/10.3917/edagri.legar.2011.01.0089>.

⁵⁵ Hans Jonas, *The Imperative of Responsibility: In Search of an Ethics for the Technological Age* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1984).

⁵⁶ Martinez and Chamboredon, 90.

Conclusion

Faced with the limits of current models of international public finance, the new GPI framework presents an alternative. Applied correctly it could solve the climate finance dilemma for West African countries that are among those hit hardest by the impacts of climate change. These countries which contribute the least to climate change suffer the consequences the most. There is, therefore, a shared responsibility of industrialized countries, which contribute the most to global warming and control international public finances, to allocate more resources to reduce the impacts of climate change in West Africa. This solidarity is not charity but a moral obligation. This is why the new framework proposed by the GPI concept offers a better opportunity for both the economically wealthiest countries and poorest countries, such as those in West Africa, to participate with dignity in the effort to combat climate change or to better adapt to it. This new framework is the best way forward for an increasingly globalized world where no country can live in isolation anymore. Indeed, the recurrence of climatic disasters, which spare no country, and the recent COVID-19 pandemic, which has affected the entire world, have created a radically new context that forces us to rethink how we live together as one humanity on the planet. This also forces us to take seriously our interdependence, our interconnection, and to remember that we are all citizens of the world. More than ever, we are responsible for each other; what happens on the other side of the world concerns us and we can no longer live without considering others and our environment.

The GPI concept is, therefore, consistent with the evolution and the current state of the world. It represents a logical update of international public finances in a world where an increasing number of emerging global issues require global coordination beyond individual countries, be they rich or powerful. Thus, GPI is a call for unity in diversity, which can only be built through solidarity and responsibility assumed by all, rich and poor.

Moreover, the worldview and philosophy underlying the concept of GPI are not foreign to Africa. Indeed, it could be easier to socialize in the African context than in others. The fundamental principles of the GPI concept – all contribute, all decide, and all benefit – are consistent with the concept of “Ubuntu”.⁵⁷ As Desmond Tutu defines it, the concept of Ubuntu

⁵⁷ Bado, *La Citoyenneté Mondiale et l'écocitoyenneté Dans Le Contexte de La Crise Sanitaire à Covid-19*, 50.

indicates openness and availability to others; it relates to the awareness of belonging to something greater. “I am what I am because you are what you are,” or “I am what I am because of what we all are.”⁵⁸ This interdependence between all humans, which is at the heart of the concept of Ubuntu, establishes a duty of solidarity and responsibility for all. Thus, the best chance for the GPI concept to be accepted by decision-makers and the public in Africa will be to show how this concept has a social anchor in African cultures. It is, therefore, time to take the concept of GPI out of its financial and economic jargon and return it to the public using language accessible to all. The widespread appropriation of the GPI concept is an essential step in mobilizing the actors and forces necessary for its implementation. It is at this price that the concept of GPI will live.

Recommendations

The following recommendations suggest practical measures that governments, leaders in the private sector, and civil society organizations can use to address the persistent imbalance in global financing and hasten the implementation of the GPI framework:

- Strengthen regional coordination within the African Union, the Economic Community of West African States, the West African Economic and Monetary Union, and other regional organizations. A unified and collective voice strengthens Africa's position in international negotiations on financing for mitigating climate change impacts and other sustainable development projects.
- Advocate for reforms of the global financial architecture to reduce persistent imbalances. This may include reform of the International Monetary Fund to give greater voice and representation to African countries, as well as reforms of development finance institutions such as the World Bank.
- Strengthen South–South cooperation by establishing strategic partnerships with other developing countries. This can involve exchanges of expertise, joint development projects, and joint financing initiatives, thereby strengthening the collective voice of developing countries in global discussions on financing for climate and development.
- Improve the mobilization and efficient use of domestic resources by strengthening tax governance, fighting tax evasion, and promoting transparent and accountable use of public

⁵⁸ Bado, 50.

funds. This would help strengthen Africa's position in financing for climate and development negotiations.

- Train African experts on climate finance and the functioning of GPI so that they can develop evidence-based studies to support negotiation activities with international public financial institutions.
- Socialize the concept of GPI by developing a discourse beyond the sophisticated financial jargon, making it accessible to the larger public. This can be done through well-established concepts such as interdependence, world citizenship, eco-citizenship, and Ubuntu.

References

- Ideofor Adibe, Julie Biau, Amy Copley, Homi Kharas, Mwangi S. Kimenyi, John Mukum Mbaku, Michael, et al. "Foresight Africa: Top Priorities for the Continent in 2015" *Brookings.Edu*, 2015. <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/foresight-africa-full-report-FINAL.pdf>.
- Bado, Arsene Brice, "La corruption dans le transport urbain à Yaoundé : Le cas des taxis", in Marie-Thérèse Mengue & Jean-Didier Boukongou (Eds.), *Comprendre la pauvreté au Cameroun*. Yaoundé : Presses de l'Université Catholique de l'Afrique Centrale & Paris : Karthala.
- Bado, Arsene Brice. *Dignity across Borders : Forced Migration and Christian Social Ethics*. Denver, Colorado: Outskirts Press Inc., 2011.
- Bado, Arsène Brice (Ed). *La Citoyenneté Mondiale et l'écocitoyenneté Dans Le Contexte de La Crise Sanitaire à Covid-19*. Abidjan: Editions du CERAP, 2022.
- Bado, Arsène Brice, and Kinhou Agblonon. "De La (Des) Unión Europea En África a Un Multilateralismo Comprometido." *Razón y Fe: Revista Hispanoamericana de Cultura* 277, no. 1431 (2018): 39–50.
- Benn, Christoph, Joep Lange Institute, et al. "Building a Better System: Making Global Public Investment a Reality. Recommendations of the Expert Working Group on Global Public Investment," 2022. www.equalinternational.org/publications.
- Casas, Martín Norman, and Remalia Azara Sanogo. "Climate Finance in West Africa: Assessing the State of Climate Finance in One of the World's Regions Worst Hit by the Climate Crisis." Oxfam International, September 27, 2022.
- Chang, Zhihao, Violet Rusu, and Jillian C. Kohler. "The Global Fund: Why Anti-Corruption, Transparency and Accountability Matter." *Globalization and Health* 17, no. 1 (December 1, 2021): 1–11.
- Debels-Lamblin, Émilie, and Luc Jacolin. "The Impact of Climate Change in Sub-Saharan Africa: Vulnerabilities, Resilience and Finance." *Bulletin de La Banque de France*, 230/4, Paris, July 2020.
- Gemenne, François, Julia Blocher, Florence De Longueville, Sara Vigil, Diaz Telenti, Caroline Zickgraf, Dalila Gharbaoui, and Pierre Ozer. "Changement Climatique, Catastrophes Naturelles et Déplacements de Populations En Afrique de l'Ouest." *Geo-Eco-Trop*. 41, no. 3 (2017): 317–37.
- Ginsburger, Maël. "De La Norme à La Pratique Écocitoyenne. Position Sociale, Contraintes Matérielles et Diversité Des Rapports à l'écocitoyenneté." *Revue Française de Sociologie* 61, no. 1 (2020): 43–78. <https://doi.org/10.3917/rfs.611.0043>.
- Glennie, Jonathan. *The Future of Aid; Global Public Investment*. New York: Routledge, 2021.
- Gouvernement de Côte d'Ivoire. "Côte d'Ivoire- Plan National de Développement 2021-2025," 2021. https://www.google.com/search?q=cote+d%27ivoire+plan+national+de+developpement&oq=Cote+d%27Ivoire%2C+Plan+Nationale&gs_lcrp=EgZjaHJvbWUqCAGBEAAYFhgeMgYIABBFgDKyCAGBEAAYFhgeOgEJMTAyOTVqMGo3qAIAAsAIA&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8.
- Inge, Kaul, Isabelle Grunberg, and Marc Stern. *Global Public Goods: International Cooperation in the 21st Century*. *Global Public Goods*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999. <https://doi.org/10.1093/0195130529.001.0001>.

- Kapilashrami, Anuj, and Oonagh O'Brien. "The Global Fund and the Re-Configuration and Re-Emergence of 'Civil Society': Widening or Closing the Democratic Deficit?" *Global Public Health* 7, no. 5 (May 2012): 437–51. <https://doi.org/10.1080/17441692.2011.649043>.
- Kaul, Inge. "Providing Global Public Goods: Managing Globalization." *Providing Global Public Goods: Managing Globalization*, November 1, 2003, 1–668. <https://doi.org/10.1093/0195157400.001.0001>.
- Klöck, Carola, Nadia Molenaers, and Florian Weiler. "Responsibility, Capacity, Greenness or Vulnerability? What Explains the Levels of Climate Aid Provided by Bilateral Donors?" *Environmental Politics* 27, no. 5 (September 3, 2018): 892–916. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09644016.2018.1480273>.
- Koch, Dirk-Jan. *Foreign Aid and Its Unintended Consequences*. London: Routledge, 2023. <https://mitpressbookstore.mit.edu/book/9781032412146>.
- Kohno, Masaru, Gabriella R. Montinola, Matthew S. Winters, and Gento Kato. "Donor Competition and Public Support for Foreign Aid Sanctions." *Political Research Quarterly* 74, no. 1 (February 17, 2021): 212–27. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912919897837>.
- Krishnan, Nisha. "Following the Money Isn't Enough: How Civil Society Organizations Provide Accountability for Climate Adaptation Finance." Working Paper. Washington, D.C., September 2020. <https://www.wri.org/research/following-money-isnt-enough-how-civil-society-organizations-provide-accountability-climate>.
- Maïga, Farka Mouhamadou, and Alix Mazounie. "Les Financements Climat : Résoudre La Crise Financière via un Mécanisme de Solidarité Efficace Au Sommet de Paris ?" *Techniques Financieres et Developpement* 120, no. 3 (2015): 19–26. <https://doi.org/10.3917/TFD.120.0019>.
- Martinez, Marie-Louise, and Marie-Claude Chamboredon. "Approche Anthropologique de la Construction d'identités Citoyennes." In *Développement Durable et Autres Questions d'actualité*, edited by Alain Legardez, 89–112. Éducagri éditions, 2011. <https://doi.org/10.3917/edagri.legar.2011.01.0089>.
- McCoy, David. "Global Public Investment: Time to Build the Movement Now." *Interpress Service*, 17 Aug. 2022.
- OECD, World Bank, and UN Environment. "Financing Climate Futures: Rethinking Infrastructure." *Financing Climate Futures*, November 28, 2018. <https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264308114-EN>.
- Paret, Carlos García, and Santiago Lorenzo. "Adapter Les Marchés Financiers Aux Changements Climatiques." *Revue d'économie Financiere* 117, no. 1 (April 17, 2015): 107–26. <https://doi.org/10.3917/ECOFI.117.0107>.
- Ratha, D; Mohapatra, S; and Plaza, S. *Beyond Aid: New Sources and Innovative Mechanisms for Financing Development in Sub-Saharan Africa*, 2009. https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=S05GWMg3vniC&oi=fnd&pg=PA143&dq=African+countries+take+initiatives+to+finance+their+development+&ots=bnf1LnXEhL&sig=g6_H6EnfJHTKc5yM49XKNmL418.
- Reid-Henry, Simon. "Global Public Investment: Redesigning International Public Finance for Social Cohesion—A Preliminary Sketch." *Revue d'Economie Du Developpement* 27, no. 2 (September 8, 2019): 169–201. <https://doi.org/10.3917/EDD.332.0169>.

- Rogerson, Andrew. "Aid Harmonisation and Alignment: Bridging the Gaps between Reality and the Paris Reform Agenda." *Development Policy Review* 23, no. 5 (September 2005): 531–52. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7679.2005.00301.x>.
- Schaaf, Rebecca. "The Rhetoric and Reality of Partnerships for International Development." *Geography Compass* 9, no. 2 (February 1, 2015): 68–80. <https://doi.org/10.1111/gec3.12198>.
- Severino, Jean Michel. "Climate Finance for Africa: Burden or Opportunity?" *Politique Etrangère* 2022, no. 1 (January 1, 2022): 43–54. <https://doi.org/10.3917/pe.221.0043>.
- Szuba, Mathilde. "Aurélien Bernier, Le Climat Otage de La Finance, Ou Comment Le Marché Boursicote Avec Les « Droits à Polluer »." <Http://Journals.Openedition.Org.Proxy.Library.Upenn.Edu/Vertigo>, April 23, 2009. <https://doi.org/10.4000/VERTIGO.8069>.
- Tawil, Sobhi. "Le Concept de « Citoyenneté Mondiale » : Un Apport Potentiel Pour l'éducation Multiculturelle ?" *Revue Internationale d'éducation de Sèvres*, no. 63 (September 1, 2013): 133–44. <https://doi.org/10.4000/ries.3501>.
- Twahirwa, Aimable. "L'Afrique pâtit du changement climatique de manière disproportionnée, selon un nouveau rapport." *allAfrica.com*, 2023. <https://link.gale.com/apps/doc/A763442050/EAIM?u=anon~d77436d6&sid=sitemap&xid=ecd9b811>.
- UNFCCC, and SBSTA. "Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change," December 5, 2014. <http://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/wg2>.
- UNOG. "Climate Finance Should Not Add to the External Debt Burdens of Poor Recipient Countries, Says UN Expert" *States News Service*, 2011. https://link-gale-com.proxy.library.upenn.edu/apps/doc/A274418799/BIC?u=upenn_main&sid=summon&xid=f7ae625e.
- World Meteorological Organization. "Africa Suffers Disproportionately from Climate Change" Press Release Number: 04092023, September 4, 2023. <https://wmo.int/media/news/africa-suffers-disproportionately-from-climate-change#:~:text=But%20it%20is%20the%20continent,said%20WMO%20Secretary%20DGeneral%20Prof>.